Chief determinants of values in a democratic political community as the primary source of basic theory of Public Administration

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I. Introduction

This paper focuses on the place and role of values in the social scientific study including an analysis of some background aspects to understanding in proper perspectives and correct contexts the basic theory of public administration in the western democratic and non-dictatorship developing countries including. Specific sub-aspects to be covered included:

- Some pertinent background aspects to basic theory
- Theory of government (politics) or theory of public administration
- The fact- value dichotomy in the sphere of social sciences.

1.2 The place and role of values in social scientific study

With regards to the question whether the study of public administration can be ethically neutral, two schools of thought may be distinguished. These two schools are empiricists (descriptive school) and the transempiricists (prescriptive school). However, the differences between them, in so far as there are clear differences of opinion on this matter, are not very great; and there is a large area of agreement between them.

Empiricists (empiricism), on the one hand, hold that considerable part of the study of public administration is purely empirical and can be approached neutrally and objectively. They regard Public administration as pure empirical science (empirical theorist).

Trans-empiricists (trans-empiricism, normativism), on the other hand, believe that purely science study of public administration cannot produce anything of importance; that a study of public administration cannot produce anything of public administration never can be purely scientific (trans-empiricists, normativists).

If possible as science is to serve, its discoveries must be put at the service of human values. And to be service, the discipline must also concern itself with value judgments. The search for the value standards must be unceasing. In so far as anyone has not become completely indifferent to moral judgments, he cannot help making value phenomena he inevitably males value judgments. The following is a quotation from E. S Redford: "reflections on a Discipline" (American political Science review, December 1961).

"Even the most ardent advocate of scientism will see the inevitability of value projections in his study. Value judgment becomes patterns of belief, and whether these become 'rules of the game. As David Truman puts is, or are contending patterns, they are part of the factors in the sequence of causes, results, more causes and more results. The other thing is that the researcher is never so objective-so-culture free, so oblivious to utility-that he chooses his subject, organizes his data, and draws his conclusions without intrusion of value-assumptions. The very effort to exclude value judgments I kind of implicit assumption that data of science have intrinsic only, that they constitute an end in themselves, and are not to be sought because they are means for the accomplishment of ends and values not furnished by the data. This results in a further implicit assumption that explanation of things is the function of scholar".

Because the study of public administration is the study of an aspect of human action in particular environment, it also concerns the ends, purposes, means, values, goals, ideas which people pursue in various circumstances and by various methods. Some of these goals are of a political nature and come within the compass of Political Science. This study therefore involves the gaining of knowledge not only about political ends which are or should be pursued, but also about the administrative methods which may be used to attain these ends. What it amounts to is the development of knowledge of ends and means as well as the interrelations between them. For those reasons, values necessarily form an integral part of the study.

What we are going to study are the normative aspects of public administration or standards of values which guide the activities of the public administrators and their subordinates in their daily tasks of working out priorities and of implementing government policy decisions, plans, programmes and directives.

1.2.1 Some pertinent background aspects of the article

In this disputation, we are concerned with what we have called the basis theory of Public Administration in an earlier context. This is the area of, amongst other things, the search for the notorious principles of Public Administration. We should make it absolutely clear though that there are various kinds of theory- even among the general or grand scale type.

A further extremely important factor which has to be considered in this connection has already been hinted at several times in this study. It is this: the meaning, nature and scope of Public Administration theory will be dependent, amongst other things, on how we demarcate and define the field of public administration. If we say public administration consists of x, y and z then theory cannot be say a^2 and B, unless a^2 and B are integral part of x, y and z. This particular fact has been grossly overlooked and sadly missed to far too greater an extent by many lofty and distinguished overseas learned authors and scholars that is one of the major reasons why, judged on the basis of available forest of literature, the theory of Public Administration is such a repulsive mess. This accounts for the reasons why it takes a labouriously long time in searching for in defining and justifying our definition of the field of public administration with reasonable certainty let alone precision.

Now when we get down to examining some substantive elements of public administration, for example, control, planning, delegation, and direction, it will be realized that we can already advance some useful theories; although the ceteris paribus assumptions which have to be made in some cases are considerable in scope. But as we have pointed out, this is not the kind of theory with which we are concerned at the present time. At present time, the social science of Public Administration cannot and self-correcting body of knowledge contributing to the understanding explanation the prediction, the evaluation, and eventual control of the complex public administration phenomena and conditioned of the empirical social world. No confirmed general theory of public administration that can be identifies anywhere. Those ardent scholars who are making assiduous comparative studies of various systems of public administration are in search of such theory. However, we can still proceed without such theory. We are at present only at the stage where we are designing reasonably systematic and rational analytic framework for the analysis of administrative reality, and this mammoth academic exercise, when it has successfully produced refined, might prove to have been instrumental in important theory construction, especially positivistic or empiricistic general theory.

In a much more limited field we must feel justified to state that Public Administration as a social science has already developed and achieved a highly organized, special kind of normatistic theory which, we think, holds for democratic (American, British, European, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand) countries, which are at least non-dictatorship, with capitalist or semi-capitalist economic systems; and ' with varying degrees and to a more limited extent also for certain capitalist or semi-capitalist and non-dictatorship developing countries in Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Latin America. This normative theory explains to a very significant extent the nature of public administration, particularly in the western capitalist and also in non-dictatorship semi-capitalist developing countries of the world; but it is more of a normative character in that it prescribes how public administrations should be conducted, by postulating certain factors which ought to be borne in mind by all public administrators and their subordinates. In the past we were perhaps too ambitious in calling these factors "principle". The rigorous standards of scientific theory construction, however, demand that we be more cautious in our terminological applications.

1.2.2 Theory of government (politics) or theory of public administration

What then are the current factors in the theory of public administration? The factors we about to examine, raise the crucial question of whether they are confined only to the field of public administration or whether they cover the larger field of government (politics). In earlier discussion reference was made to Frederick W. Riggs's (1947) affirmation of John Gaus' (1948) proposition that a theory of government (politics) means a theory of public administration also. We should now demonstrate not only logically, but also factually, that this is so. Perhaps we should state more clearly to get out logic quite straight- the whole point of departure in form of a syllogism:

Theory x is theory of government (politics): Major premise.

Public administration is a part of government: Minor premise.

Thus theory x is also a theory of public administration: Conclusion.

What we are about to examine is theory x, whether our major premise is true, will have to appear from the subsequent discussion and from the theory itself. Our second premise cannot be proved logically or factually. It is true according to our formulated definition.

We have now reached the stage in our academic studies, however, when we must carefully and broadly look at certain fundamentals, that is:

We must reasonably and clearly establish the valid basis of our value judgments and the proper sources of our value systems in the democratic political community; and we must systematically determine beyond all doubt the criteria that distinguish public administration from private or business administration.

1.2.3 The fact – value dichotomy in the sphere of social sciences

There is considerable difference of opinion between various empiricists and trans - empiricists, with regard to the place and role of values in the behavioural sciences (political science, psychology, public administration). This has given rise to what is known as the "fact – value dichotomy". This amounts essentially to the logical separation, under influence of logical positivism, of statements of fact (which are empirically verifiable). Aronld Brecht (1967:126) lucidly describes the "logical gulf" in politics between what is and what ought to be. "Deductive analytic logic… can add nothing to the meaning of propositions; it can merely make explicitly what is implied in that meaning. Inferences of what ought to be, therefore, can never be derived deductively (analytically) from premises whose meanings is limited to what 'is'; they can be correctly made only from statements that have an 'ought' meaning, at least in the major premise.

This view held by Arnold Brecht (1967) and others, was gradually but radically altered by thinkers of the behaviouralist school. (Note bene: the distinction between behaviourism and behaviouralism), Behaviouralisn emphasizes the presence of values as essential to political research.

Today almost all political and administrative researches and analyses are dominated by more modern behaviouralist and scientific approaches to Political Science and Public Administration. We pointed out that scientific method (the criterion for empirical verification) is itself normative and value – laden. But the subject – matter of the natural sciences is value – free whereas a behavioural scientist is not and cannot be involved with value – free subject – matter since man never acts in a value free manner.

A society cannot exist, therefore, without being bound to a system values to justify its political activity and continually use its values, nor will it show any progress without an objectivity and must continually use its values, nor will it show any progress without an objective verification of it beliefs. A society must continually use its values, to justify its political activity and must continually use practice science and philosophical theory to justify it s values. However, abstract and impractical the contribution of the moral philosopher may be, they form and indispensible part of our social knowledge, acting as a spur to man. On the other hand, we definitely need special contributions of empirical theorists, which are based on practical experience and are modified from time to time in the light of new empirical discourses. Christian Bay (The structure of Freedom. Pp 4-5), maintains that all human action is implicitly or explicitly concerned with values. No one in his right mind would occupy himself with a problem, unless its clarification or solution was value to him. He sees the task of the social scientists as being of a dual nature:

- a. He collects all available logical and empirical insights into a subject in order to clarify the implications of our choice of goal values and thus to influence that choice;
- b. He also attempts to explain factual interrelationships between possible combinations of available means and desired ultimate ends. In the last resort the choice of goal values is a matter of personal faith, but knowledge of the practical implications of the goal values makes it possible to discover the best way of promoting them and preventing their frustration.

Because the study of public administration is the study of an aspect of human action in a particular environment, it also concerns the ends, values, goals, objectives, ideas, which people pursue in various circumstances and by various methods (means). Some of these goals and methods are of a political nature and come within the compass of Political Science and Public Administration. The study therefore involves the gaining of knowledge not only about political ends which are or should be pursued but also about the methods which are or should be used. What is essentially amounts to is the development of knowledge of ends and means as well as the interrelationships between them. For these articulated reasons, values necessarily form a part of our field of study.

To support the contention, therefore, that there is no 'fact – value dichotomy' in the discipline of political science and public administration as descriptive sciences. We shall here make use of the relevant academic contributions by E.Y Hedding from the Department of Political Science and Public administration at the university of South Africa (1968)

1.3 Analysis of chief determinants of political values in democratic communities

Secondly, the chief determinants of values in the democratic political community as the primary source of the basic theory of Public Administration, in democratic societies involve the following factors

Thirdly, let us examine the chief determinants of political values, as the primary source of the basic theory of public administration, which have established the bases of our value judgments and which provide the proper sources or bases of our value system in both developed and developing democratic societies.

Conceptual framework of values

E.T Hedding, an eminent political scientist from the Department of Political science and Public Administration at the University of South Africa, in 1968, lucidly and systematically uses the rationally constructed conceptual framework of W.H Werkmeister: (Social Science and the problem of values in H. Schoeck and J.W Wiggins, Scientism and values, 1960). His scholary breakdown of value is briefly outlined as follows:

- The value of social sciences.
- Values in social sciences.
- Values for the social sciences.
- (a) The value of social sciences breaks down into two divisions, but is relatively uncomplex. Werkmeister says: 'Because knowledge of any kind satisfies man's innate curiosity, it is of value. It is of value because knowledge and understanding are crucial importance as the basis for rational decisions and reasonable actions. Here we are dealing with the value of social science in dealing with man's aspirations, intentions and hopes, including his aspirations to understand himself and to control his environment'.
- (b) By value for social sciences, Werkmeister refers to the value mentioned earlier inherent in the methodology of science. I quote: These are; The overall value commitments and valuation of any given culture or periods in history with respect to science in general, and scientific value commitments which an investigator cannot value if he is not classed as a scientist at all. 'included here is the commitment to objectivity in the evaluation and interpretation of facts'.
- (c) Valuations in the social science occur in so far as
 - 1. Valuations and value commitments are part of the facts which the social scientists studies, and
 - 2. As a question: concerning the explanatory categories in the social sciences

Human beings are end or goal pursuing creatures. People out of a variety reasons, out of choice, make decisions in terms of interest. As scientists we try to explain why people choose this or, which or decide in certain directions. Their actions may be used based on articulated or unarticulated, conscious or unconscious decisions or behavior. But all of them, including habitual behavior are value – involved in that they are value – motivated, and they are susceptible to rational analysis. That is, the atoms of social science are value – motivated, and they are susceptible to rational analysis. That is, the atoms of social science are value - involved. Therefore, the facts of social science are actually value reason why David Easton and Christian Bay define politics in terms of value. Thus at the level of political science qua science, there is no fact – value dichotomy, rather a fact – value identity in duality.

Werkmeister shows how all explanations (even in an advanced social science as mathematical economic) are ultimately given in value terms, and that this can be achieved by including value terms in the basic assumption which are fundamental to the whole science. In this category, *Werkmeister*, in offering a word of warning and speaking in fact for the buck of behaviouralists, make a statement the gist and intent of which provides precisely the point of criticism of all anti-behaviourists.

Werkmeister's statement is as follows: 'the value premise of social theory should state what has been or being valued within the social group under investigation, not what should be valued in the opinion of the investigator. Value terms, if they are to be useful at all as explanatory categories, must be indigenous to the subject matter itself.

In ending this article, Werkmeister suggests a system of value structuring embedded in empirical reality, with value preferences necessarily stated in terms of goals to be achieved. The key to what I have to say, he says, lies in the fact that felt value experiences cluster around certain core values which are associated with distinct facts of human existence.

- 1. Let us at this point leave Werkmeinster's analysis, and briefly recap. Behaviouralistic empirical science is value laden and accounts for values in three ways.
- 1.1 Knowledge of the social sciences is itself valuable as providing insight into vital problems which need solution.
- 1.2 The scientific is value laden as for commitment to methodology is concerned, and so far it occurs within a cultural pattern providing a Weltanschauung, 'behind' the method. Besides method of a science, its structural framework is a value.

- 2. The units whether institutions or men of politics are laden. The fact value dichotomy, if through of a two unavoidably separate areas of study, is simply non existent at the descriptive level.
- 3. There are yet no grounds to become prescriptive in any ultimate sense. In connection I quote from Nagel. The point is that the question of how a given ideal is to be realized, or the question whether a certain institutional arrangement is an effective way of achieving the ideal, is on the face of it not a value question, but a factual problem to be resolved by the objective methods of scientific enquiry concerning the adequacy of proposed means for attaining stipulated ends, the problem of which ideal to choose, that is prescription, remains.

C. Roseman, C.G Mayo and F.B Collinge (Dimensions of Political Analysis, 1966 p.5), have this to say about the concept of values: The importance individuals or groups attach to phenomena and ideas in terms of their views of the world. One of the major controversies in the development of a discipline is the appropriate emphases to be placed in the established of the disciplines body of abstractions – a controversy ranging from the issue of value – distortion of fact to the question of the possibility or desirability of either vale – laden or value – neutral theory. Many scholars tend to take polar positions on this matter; either that values ought to be central to the discipline or that they ought to be central to be absolutely eliminated as subjective and unscientific. The nature of any given discipline is perhaps best approached at first through the question of value – how the discipline understands and uses them.

This then brings us to the issue of the chief determinants of values in the political community in a democracy in both developed western and semi-capitalist developing (prismatic) societies.

1. Ends and purposes (values):

We have constantly kept coming against the concepts: *ends and purposes* (values) and we had tried to make it clear that apart from our scientific system of knowledge, that is, knowledge which related to what is provided by empirical verification, we are also concerned with *ends and purposes* (value, normative judgments), that is, that which relates to *what ought to be* and cannot be established by means of empirical scientific methods or from observation of *what is*. We must now ask ourselves the following fundamental questions:

- On what basis can value judgments be justified or accepted as true? And
- What are the proper sources or bases of values in the democratic political community?

Answers and explanations

In an earlier section of terminological analyses, we defined the terms phenomenon, value and norm and here we shall only give summaries of them as follows:

- Value: is regarded as a phenomenon, condition, or line of action which is preferred, required, desired, or thought fitting. There are goal values, instrumental values and values as ends, as purposes or as means.
- Norm: is viewed as an individual's expectations about behaviour, whether justified or not the desire may refer to his own behaviour whether shared with other or not, and whether accommodated or not. The expectation may refer to his own behaviour or to that of other persons.
- **Evaluation:** or concluding whether a given course of action is right or wrong necessitates the possession of a standard or a yardstick for judgment (standard of value), or the ethical norm, against which particular proposition is measured.

2. Active democratic participation in political life as a value: basic ethical principle of freedom and its implications:

The basic ethical principle of freedom (especially in its positive sense) implies that all the governed must effectively participate in the government and administration of their societies. It is quite clear that in certain political situations there are groups of people who, for a number of reasons, do not at present enjoy effective participation in the government of their countries. In such situations, therefore, one of the major tasks is to make radical changes to provide active political participation by all groups which will accord with the Christian ethics in such social situation. However, certain basic principles will need to guide the search for democratic changes.

First, whatever transitional arrangement may be necessary, no proposal for political participation which should be unfair or inequitable as between different groups are acceptable.

Second, *active and effective participation at all levels of government and administration* for all groups must be constitutionally worked out and be accepted. Such levels of government may mean: national, provincial and local government, and even international government.

Thirdly, *political proposal* for any group or segment of society can *never* be satisfactory *unless sufficient and adequate economic arrangements* are also proposed for the group or segment. *Political programmes, therefore, cannot be divorced from economic and social realities.*

Level ground for fair political participation:

The desired terms of reference in establishing and ensuring a level ground for fair political participation should be explicit:

- a. To enunciate the ethical considerations applying particularly to political life;
- b. To assess the present political situations in certain countries: Iran, Iraq, Tibet, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo Sudan Angola, Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia, South Africa and Somalia; in light of these considerations; and
- c. To consider the political constitutional implications of:
- an equitable sharing of political rights;
- a removal of discriminatory, or oppressive laws, rules, regulations and practices;
- a removal intolerant attitudes towards opposition political parties, and encouragement of robust, free and democratic debate; and
- a removal of deceitful tendencies to take over other people's properties under various pretencies/guises.

Two basic matters providing common ground:

It should very soon become obvious that on two matters at least there is common ground:

- to abolish completely all forms of discrimination, on the face of the earth and
- on the rights of all legitimate citizens to share in political power in their countries.

Furthermore, it is very important to underscore the fact that thre should:

Need for orderly political change:

There should be an agreement, too, on the fact that political change should come about by peaceful, legitimate, and constitutional means, not by violence.

There should be reasonable structural changes in the political systems to facilitate fair citizens political participation I the public affairs of his country.

Policy – making and policy implementation

Active democratic participation in orderly political life: consists of

- a. the conscious making of decisions, and
- b. their effective implementation in practice.

Making a decision means choosing from among a variety of alternatives and necessitates value – norms which will enable one to make the desired or the desirable choice. One's ultimate choice is influenced by one's estimates which are in turn closely related to the value – norms which one applies to practical life – situations.

The quality of one's value – estimates, that is, whether they are good or bad, is influenced by certain factors, the most important being the values one has and one's ability to apply them, which in turn depends on the standards of value (value systems) one has and their quality. In concrete situations people with the same standards of values may, however, apply them differently. This brings us to a vexed question which is often the cause of serious differences.

3. Proper grounds for political values

What are the proper grounds (chief determinants) for political values in democratic societies?

Answers, explanations and illustrations:

In order to understand this sub-subject in its correct contexts and proper perspectives, let us examine briefly the *general principles* and the *specific determinants for political and administrative values* in democratic societies.

a. General principles

According to Arnold Brecht (1967:3 – 21), all major contributions, however, up to the beginning of 20^{th} century had one feature in common, that is, less frequently encountered in typical scientific writings thereafter. They focused attention on questions such as these:

- What id the end of state, government and public administration?
- What is the proper end toward these ends? And, above all,
- What is the best form of government?

Answers to questions:

In both asking and answering questions of this kind, scholars would find it their professional duty to answer them – pronouncements were freely advanced on good and evil, just and unjust, morally right and wrong, worth (detestable and wicked), laundable and reprehensible, desirable and undesirable, valuable and non – valuable, kind and unkind.

In support, the scholars and writers would refer to a number of first principles, derived in various ways:

- a. Sometimes from religion;
- b. Sometimes from nature;
- c. Sometimes from philosophical speculations;
- d. Sometimes forwarded as self evident postulates;
- e. Sometime distilled from the history of political ideas;
- f. Sometimes based on the historical evolution of western civilization; and
- g. Not infrequently taken, directly or indirectly, from the positive law, in particular the constitution, of the respective country or countries.

Among sources of such principles Christianity and the law of nature have played an especially importance role. They have continued to do so in:

- political science,
- public administration,
- municipal government and administration,
- administrative law.

As a result publications in the field of political theory up to the turn of the 20th century if not beyond it, included many statement, meant to be scientific, as to what were the proper means, ends and purposes of organized human life; for example,

- states, government and public administration ought to serve the interest of the individuals or the greater number of them;
- All men and women should be treated as equal because they were born equal;
- Everyone should fulfil useful function in society;
- The Ten commandments should be obeyed
- State properly so called sovereign; and
- Many maxims of this kind.

But The Big Question Is Still Being Asked:

What then are the proper ends and purposes of the state, government and administration?

Scholars are seemingly agreed on the principles, even though they often mean different things to them. Thus all are sure to enumerate: justice, security, order and general welfare among the proper ends and purposes of state, government ad public administration and many add freedom and equality. But they would hen interpret these ideas in various ways.

In accordance with the contemporary views, the proper ends and purposes which the state, government and administration should facilitate to satisfy in democratic societies have been expanded to include:

b. Specific chief determinants for political, governmental and administrative values in democratic societies.

We make mention of the most common of these values as follows:

- Will of God as a basic source of value system, that is, the religious system;
- Natural law as a basic source of value system;
- Other theories as a basic sources of value system:

- From contract theories,
- From the constitutions
- > From philosophical contemplations or speculations which are acceptable to the logic of mind.
- > From cultural; and historical evolution of western civilization.

These various value system (determinants) are put forward as sources of or grounds for our political, governmental and administrative values, as detailed below:

1. Derived from the will of God or Bible

Political values must ultimately derive the will of God or the Holy Bible. This is the religious value system. This comprises the sphere of faith and religious revelation.

The basic idea is that in the last instance standards of values are based on the Will of God. The Will of God may be made known in various ways: that is, either

- Direct revelation to the individual if intermediary, as the ten Commandments were revealed to Moses;
- Indirectly through: reason, ethical intuition, or experience.
- Variants of these religious views are held by:
- > Protestant thinkers, for example, the Calvinists, Calvin, Kuyper, Dooyerweerd and by
- > Roman Catholic thinker, for example, Cathrein, Maritain.
- Pentecoscopal thinkers

2. Derived from natural law.

Political values must ultimately derive from natural law.

Natural law as a value system and the role as ascribed to reason are seen as a ground for our political and administrative values.

The basic idea is that there are absolute standards of morality that exist independently of the will of the ruler or state (according to Socrates). They exist in the form of external, universal, immutable laws of nature which are prescribed by reason.

The various theories about natural law were influenced by the following two views especially:

- a. The existence of a universal order that holds for everybody, and
- b. The existence of inalienable human rights.

The stoics (Greeks: Socrates, Plato and Cicero and thinkers enlarge on the idea if the existence of a law of nature which consequently received increasing recognition. This led to the formulation of the principle that the difference between right and wrong is absolute, that is, it cannot be made or changed by any legislation, and that it is incumbent on the state to provide legislation promoting right behavior and actions and discouraging wrong ones. In other words, the state has moral obligation to its citizens. This view takes us back to the very core of the writing of SOCRATES and his convictions, as contained in PLATO'S Republic: that the concept of justice is absolute and not limited to time and place.

The stoics held that justice is to be found in the nature of man: morality is determined, not by the rule of the stronger, but by the rule of reason, which all men share alike'.

This doctrine is beautifully summarized in the following extract from CICERO'S dialogue in the book DE Re Publica: 'True law is right reason in agreement with nature: it extends to all men, is unchanging and everlasting: its calls men to duty by its commands and by its voice of warning holds them back from deceit. Its orders and its prohibitions are not unheeded by good men it is sinful to try to amend this law nor is it right to try to repeal any part of it. It is impossible to abolish it entirely there need not be different laws in Rome and in Athens or different laws now and in the future but all nationals at all nations at all time, will be under the sway of one law, everlasting and unchangeable. And there will be one universal master and ruler, the God, who is the author of this law, its promulgator and its enforcing judge. Whoever disobeys him will be fleeing from himself and turning away from the very nature of man.

Critical views on Cicero's quotation

Professor Hugh LAST stated that this quotation from Cicero's book is the sources of the absolute difference between what is good and what is evil.

Leo Strauss holds that knowledge of natural law may obtaines through argument.

Jacques Maritain, on the other hand, believes that intuition plays an important in man's search for natural law.

3. Derived from other theories as basic sources

- Other scholars and writers derive their values
- a. From contract theories;
- b. From philosophical contemplations or speculations as a source of values, but only these values which are acceptable to the logic of mind; and
- c. On what is known as the cultural and historical sources of western and eastern civilizations.

II. Summary on the chief determinants of political values in democratic societies

Synopsis

These chief determinants of political values are as follows:

3.0 Ends and purposes as values

The special needs of human kind which both the state and government and administration help to satisfy are:

3.1 Right active participation in political life as a value:

Consists of deliberately making decisions and their effective implementation in practice.

3.2 Proper grounds as chief determinants for political values:

3.2.1 General principles including the proper purposes, ends and means of organized human life to serve the interests of the individuals, or of the greater number of them; and that all men and women should be treated equal because they were born equal and in the image if the Creator; and everyone should fulfill some useful function in society; and that God must obey.

3.2.2 Specific chief determinants for political and administrative values:

- a. The will of God as a basic source of value system.
- b. Natural law as a basic source of value system.
- c. Other theories as basic sources of values system.
 - -From contract theories;
 - -From written constitutions;

-From philosophical contemplations or

-Speculations which are acceptable to the logic of mind;

-From cultural and historical evolution of western civilization.

III. Comments and conclusion

From the above expositions it is quite evident that there are both rational and non-rational determinants of values in society.

Finally, a few remarks about the quality of the various standards of values as sources of values, about the justification of our values derived from these standards.

All values systems are not equally meaningful. Some may even contain arbitrary elements. One must ask oneself whether there are anomalies in a value system and whether it satisfactory reflects the countless aspects of human life.

FRANK J. SORAU, (Perspectives on Political Science, pp. 70-71), writes: "The justification of values. After one has identified political values and observed how they enter political debate, the troublesome problem of final justification remains. Is there no way of saying these goals are, or those political arrangements are preferable to those? Have we no fixed, no philosophical measuring sticks, by which we can assess various ways of governing? On this most fundamental question, political scientists and all scholars, for that matter - are divided. Those scholars who believe we have the measuring stick are frequently called philosophical absolutists. That is to say, they believed that there exist universal, fixed and unchanging standards of good and truth, and that influential approach among the philosophical absolutists of the western word has been that of natural law. From the ancient Greek stoics through John Locke and the American founding fathers, and down to contemporary writers such as Jacques Maritain, men have believes that there are in the very were in the very mature of man and creation, they have ultimate roots in the will of the creator. They are again in JEFFERSON"S phrase, the law of nature and the nature's God from these natural laws one furthermore deduces a series of natural rights of the individual the rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, for example. How does one discover or determine these natural laws? One perceives the natural law of a classical, humanistic, rational, commonsense knowledge of man - by the kind of intuitive knowledge of man and society which any serious, educated, rigorous, intellect is capable of. It can, indeed, be known and grasped and appreciated by any other rational man.

We have in large measure succeeded in establishing the bases of four value judgments and proper sources of bases of our values in the political community in democratic societies. And now we intend to establish authoritatively and o demonstrate distinctly the significance of these values systems to normative factors that explain the nature of public administration and guide the activities of public administrators and their subordinates in their daily tasks of working out priorities and implementing government policy decisions, directives, plans and programmes.

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