Stemming the Tide of Insecurity Imposed by the Boko Haram Insurgency on the North East Nigeria: A Sociological View Point

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Abstract: What motivated this paper was the quest to inform people both from within and without Nigeria, of the need to understand insurgency and Boko Haram within the context of global, historical and theoretical perspectives as they relate to level of insecurity and how criminal they are to various societies. The data collected was purely documentary and anecdotal evidence which was analyzed qualitatively. Analysis was also made of the various counter insurgency measures (COIN) taken by successive governments in Nigeria to determine its success or otherwise. Findings were that insurgency and Boko Haram have substantially influenced the youths in inflicting a lot of pain on Nigerian society and beyond, in which case, theoretical perspectives were employed as explanatory tools for ways out. The recommendations among others include government to be proactive rather than being reactionary by taking the fight to the insurgents.

Key words: Stemming, Tide, Insecurity, Boko Haram, Insurgency, Sociological, Viewpoint.

I. INTRODUCTION

It is a common adage amongst sociological analyst that ‘conflict is inevitable’ and that it is a ‘necessary evil’ for development to take place. Conflicts come in various forms, viz- inter-tribal and inter-communal wars, religious uprisings (such as the Maitatsine uprising experienced in the 80s); riots/demonstrations; (the Aba Women riots) post election violence, the Nigerian civil war, the Niger Delta militants and of recent the Boko Haram insurgency. The Boko Haram Insurgency has taken its toll on Nigerians, particularly on those in the North East and more specifically on the inhabitants of the three frontlines states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.

The quantum of life and property lost to the insurgency cannot be over emphasize. All figures given were mere speculations. Any conflict that persisted beyond a reasonable period of time is counterproductive and an enigma for development. The Nigerian civil war took 30 months (1967-1970), to come to an end with ‘no victor no vanquished’. It actually ended on the round table. This current conflict (the Boko Haram Insurgency) has defied solution and it is in its seventh year now. Hitherto, so many suggestions have been proffered and government embarked on several counter insurgency measures which includes; the use of military power, emergency rule and administrative (i.e. the setting of panels-the Galtimari fact finding committee and the Turaki committee).

Other suggestions muted include Jonathan’s ‘carrot and stick approach’, ‘the amnesty deal’, Kashim’s ‘marshals plan’ and the ’integrated approach’ etc. The insurgents, too, had their various tactics which include among others- guerilla warfare; suicide bombing; kidnapping and abduction; poisoning of food and water sources etc. There seem to be no end in sight to the problem and it is continuing unabated. Though the military seem to have weakened the fire power of the insurgents by recapturing most of the territories under the control of the armed group; the insurgency is far from being over. This is because there are many dimensions to the issue than what the ordinary person can think of. The problem could possibly be ideological, religious, political, economical, psychological and even socio-logical. Be that as it may, there must be a way out. This is what this paper intends to explore. Questions that readily come to mind include; what are the immediate and remote causes of the conflict? What is the historical origin of the Boko Haram insurgency? What theoretical explanations can be advanced? Who are the parties involved? How is their modus operandi? What counter-insurgency measures were employed and how can the conflicts be resolved in the interest of all and sundry?

Global Context

Insurgency is a global phenomenon. Insurgency worldwide is considered as a rebellion against authority; however, not all rebellions are insurgencies. There have been many cases of non-violent rebellions, using civil resistance, as in the Peoples Power Resolution on the Philippines in the 1980s that ousted President Marcos and the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion it may not be viewed as an insurgency but a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. For example, during the American civil war, the confederate states of America war not recognized as a sovereign state, but it was recognized as a belligerent power and thus confederate warships were given the same
rights as United States warship in foreign ports. Insurgency has been used for years in professional military literature. Under the British, the situation in Malaya (now Malaysia) was often called the malayan Insurgency or the troubles in Northern Ireland. Insurgency have existed in many countries and regions, including the Philippines, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Northern India, Yemen, Djibouti, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Democratic Republic of Congo, the American Colonies of Great Britain, and the Confederate States of America. Each had different specific but share the property of an attempt to disrupt the central government by means considered illegal by that government. Insurgences differ in their use of tactics and methods. In a 2004 article, Robert R. Tomes spoke of four elements that “typically emphasis” an insurgency (Tomes R R, 2004). These include.

1. Cell between that maintain secrecy;
2. Terrorism used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the insurgents for protection.
3. Multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining the new regional and
4. Attacks against the government.

The Boko Haram insurgency initially started as a religious group with no territorial, political (power) or expansionist intention. The intention was to establish sharia law through preaching. However, the group turn violent in 2009 as an aftermath killing of their members by the newly established ‘operation flush’ (a military outfit meant to flush criminalities in the state). The insurgency in Nigeria can be seen in the context of other conflicts nearby, for example, in the North of Mali. The Boko Haram leadership is having international connections with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUIJAD) Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s factional and other militant groups outside Nigeria. Other pointers to its international connections include the presence of combatants from neighboring Chad and Niger. Furthermore, in 2015, Boko Haram swore allegiance to ISIL. Though this is seen by many observers as a gimmick or a way of attracting sympathy from similar insurgents groups worldwide.

II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

One can find alot of distortions and conflicting reports on the emergence of the Boko Haram sect that later turned to an insurgent group. However, information at the disposal of different security agencies pieced together by Sunday Tribune of 12th February, 2012 indicated that contrary to the widely-held belief that Boko Haram started around 2003, the group has been existing since 1995 (Abimbola-Adesote 2012) where a group of youths settled in a place near Kanamma village in Geidam Local Government Area of Yobe State claiming a ‘darul Islam’- Islamic state led by Mohammed Ali, now late. They were flushed out of the place by security agencies. The group went to settle on the Gwoza hills. Yet still they were dislodged by government forces. The group went into oblivion until when Mohammed Yusuf the erstwhile leader of the Boko Haram pinched his tent at the Indimi Mosque in 2000. Yusuf had won the respect and confidence of some clerics and youths at Indimi mosque (Abimbola and Adesote 2012). He started presiding over some mosque activities and along the line; he upstaged most of the teachers to emerge a leader. Many youths who followed him saw the older cleric as secular and anti-sharia. According to the reports, majority of his followers were largely illiterate youths who engaged in petty trading or had dropped out of school (Danjibo, 2009). As time went on, Yusuf established his own mosque ( at Markas) in an area called Railway Quarters in Maiduguri, while also extending his preaching to the mosques located at Kandahar, Unguwan Doki (near Monday Market) and Millionaires quarters. Investigators were also told that by early 2004, the Islamic sect had grown in states of its presence with Borno, Yobe and Bauchi being notable and that some of the converted youths abandoned their studies to join the group. It was after 2004 that the sect leaders were said to have established links with the Algerian Salafist Group, now known as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Magreb, (AQIM), which gave them training on combat and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDS) from trainings acquired in AQIM. It was gathered that members of Boko Haram were able to show dexterity in handling of weapons and manufacture of what is called ‘dirty bombs’ through IEDS (Danjibo, 2009, Nigerian Tribune 30, January, 2012). The sect turned violent in 2009 when their cries for justice for the killing and maiming of their members while on a burial procession to the graveyard by the newly establish military outfit “operation flush” set up by the state government to tackle the spate of insecurity, armed robbery. Banditry and general state of insecurity then. The sect uprising in 2009 resulted to killing of many of its members, destruction of its operational headquarters “Markas” at the Railway Quarter and fleeing of its members. Buji Foi former commissioner under the form Governor, Ali Modu Sheriff and Baba Fugu, an in-law to Mohammed Yusuf and the leader, Mohammed Yusuf himself were killed by the security forces.

Late 2009 the members of the sect regrouped and engaged in reprisal attack and started killing sporadically, individuals perceived to have aided the security agencies during the uprising; identified security agents and prominent political and government officials. The sect under the new leadership of Abubakar Shakau sacked some words in Maiduguri notably Umarari Jajeri and Bulabulin Ngaram. The members of the sect occupied mostly these parts of Maiduguri and used it as their base. From there they started unleashing mayhem
in the three frontline states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa as well Gombe and Bauchi states. The bombing of the Police headquarters in Abuja and the United Nations Office in Abuja were planned and executed from their operational based. The emergence of the “Kato da Gora” a Youth Vigilante Group in 2013 also known as “Civilian JTF” brought a new dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency. The insurgents were chased out of their base in Maiduguri to Sambisa Forest. The insurgency then assumed a more dangerous dimension. They became ambitious and started capturing territories and hoisting their flags. Gwoza, Bama, Ngala, Marte, and later Mafa, Kukawa, mobbar Abadam Local Government Areas where captured and local authorities sacked. Inhabitants of these areas became refugees on their own land and were camped in various places in Maiduguri as Internally Displaced Person (IDPs).

Since then government have instituted some counter-insurgency measures with varying degree of successes and failure. As at now government claims that the insurgents have been sufficiently degraded but that they engage in pockets of attacks on soft targets here and there.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical expositions are varied and confusion as many explanations has been posited as there are authors. Some have used political, sociological and psychological variables to explain their action (Herskovits, 2012). The bottom line is insurgency (terrorism) is not a mono causal phenomenon. Rather, it is multifaceted. However, there are sufficient empirical data, which suggest that the Boko Haram insurgency is attributable to multiples of factors such as poverty, unemployment, bad government and politics. We shall examine some of these theories.

IV. THE RELATIONAL/VENGEANCE THEORY
Relational theory attempts to provide explanation for violent conflicts between groups by exploring sociological, political, economic (religious) and historical relationships between such groups. The belief is that cultural and value difference as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in different ways. Thus, a number of conflicts grow out of a past history of conflict between groups that has led to the development of regarding stereotypes, racial intolerance and discrimination (Faleti, 2006: 54 -55). The differences in value invariably creates the “we” and “others dichotomy”, “The fact that ‘others’ are perceived as different makes us feel they are entitled to less or are inferior by reason of [……..] values. This disrupts the flow of communication between us and them and to that extent, twists, perceptions that we have about each other’ (bid. P. 55). The state and other members of Nigerian society who are targets of Boko Haram’s violence may indeed find it difficult to understand the sect’s penchant for blood-letting. On the one hand, the former group becomes in this context the “We” and all efforts are being to secure it from savagery of the “others”, the Boko Haram members. On the other hand, the latter group, bond either by the common purpose of fighting the ‘unbelievers’ for Allah, or feeling of deprivation or both sees the remaining members of the Nigerian society as the ‘others’. In the circumstance mutual antagonism exists and can be violently expressed. On the part of Boko Haram, killing of member by government security forces- the “others” attracts reprisals from it, the “We”. The cogency of the relational/vengeance perspective is such that for a long time, it remained the plausible explanation for the terror campaign by Boko Haram as the death of Yusuf in the police custody and the hunting and incarceration of the members by the Nigerian security forces were seen to have fired the “we” and “others psychology, and have been a major factor in the sect’s resolve to avenge for its members through the terror campaigns (Daily Sun, online, January 23, 2012).

Similarly, to the “others”, the sect is identified by the “prohibited name”, Boko Haram, (Western education is sin), whereas to the sect, the “We”, our name is Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda Awati wal jihad (Sahara reporters, online, January 22, 2012). Beside its pejorative connotation, in the sect’s perspective, the name does not capture its objective and has been a motivation to violence. Its spokesman, Abu Qaqa offered this, in particular, as reason for the sects targeting of the Nigeria media (Sahara reporters, online, May1, 2012). Somalis al Shabaab also exhibits this tendency (BBC Somali, online, June 21, 2009).

V. THE HUMAN NEEDS/SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES.
The socio-economic perspective of the Boko Haram Challenge in Nigeria, essentially attempts to de-emphasize the interpretation of this being a particular Muslim or Northern crises (Kukah, 2012). The perspective which blames social conditions for the violence is anchored on the human needs theory of social conflicts. Its central thesis is that all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfill and failure caused other individuals or groups to meet these needs could lead to conflict. (Rosati et al., 1990 cited in Faleti, P. 510.) The theory is similar to the frustration-aggression theory of violence, which posits that aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dougherly and Ifaltzgrate Jr, 1990: 266). According to the theory, relative deprivation is a perceived disparity between value expectation and value capabilities and that the lack of a need satisfaction- defined as a gap between aspirations and achievement generally relies on the psychological state of frustration and
aggressive attitudes emanating from it (Midlarsky, 1975:29). Nigeria’s socio-economic indexes seem to validate the assumption of human needs theory. The Human Development Index Trend, for instance, ranked Nigeria 156 out of 186 in 2011. The socio-economic factors being adduced as the root causes of violence in Nigeria include: unemployment, especially among the youth, poverty and a deteriorating standard of living, especially in the North. But perhaps its relevance in the interpretation of the Boko Haram problem is that while its proponents admit of endemic poverty and hopelessness generally in Nigeria, they note its severity in the north. Hence for professor Jean Herskovits of the State University of New York, to whom it was clear in 2009 when the insurgency began that the root cause of violence and anger in both the north and south of Nigeria is endemic poverty and hopelessness”, the government must address socio-economic deprivation, which is most severe in the north (Herskovits, 2012).

VI. THE POLITICAL FEUD PERSPECTIVE

The political feud perspective harps on the Nigerian power relations. It is based on the north –south political dichotomy and the politics of majority and minority. It explains the tricks and intrigues of party politics as well as political rivalry of various geo-political zones such as the one between the Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem-Borno Empire. It is against this backdrop, that the Political Feud Theory has generated more interest than any of the perceptions that attempt to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon as it also further exposes the deep division among Nigeria’s disparate social groups (Kukah, 2005). The political feud perspective is premised primary on the arguments that while the extra judicial killing of the leadership of the Boko Haram in 2009 could have triggered a violent confrontation with the state, the severity that the violence has now assumed is the fallout of a fierce political battle in 2011 (Alozieuwu, 2012). Against this backdrop, one could consider the political feud perspective as a weak explanation due to the fact that the outcome of the 2015 elections under score this premises. If this explanation is cogent, the emergence of president Muhammadu Buhari, being a Fulani and Muslim from the North would have made the insurgents to come to a truce or all together abandon the war.

VII. CONSPIRACY THEORIES

The conspiracy theories attempting to explain the Boko Haram crises can be marked into two broad categories: one focusing on machinations of internal actors, the other on external actors. Internal actors may include the disgruntled northern power elite who, having lost power, are bent on bringing down Nigeria under a southern leadership as well as the Jonathan administration itself, which may be sponsoring the crisis in order to rally southern support behind his administration. And there is also the perception that Boko Haram may be a secret society controlled by some ‘invisible hands that seek to destroy the north ahead of 2015 so as to forestall or weaken its bid for the presidency at that time’” (Adibe, 2012: 58).

External actors, on the other hand, may include powerful western state like the United States or neighboring African states envious.

The Al-Qaeda/Magreb/Al-Shabab Connection

The United Nations report was quoted to have linked Boko Haram with Al-Qaeda Islamic Movement (AQIM) in the Maghreb region (Nossiter, 2012). According to the report, some of the AQIM members from Nigeria and Chad had received training in Al-Qaeda camps in Mali during the summer of 2011. In 2006, Al Qaeda was reported to be moving its activities to Africa. This was appreciated from the submissions of Abu Azzam al-Ansari as quoted by Radin (2012) that ‘there was no doubt that Al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciated the significance of African region for the military campaigns against the crusaders. (Adenrele, 2012). The Emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was equally reported by the same writer to have pointed to provide Boko Haram with weapons, training and other support in order to expand the reach into sub-Saharan Africa not only to gain ‘strategic depth’ but also to “defend” Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a winning crusaders. Johnson (2011) even reported a kind of synchronized coordination between the Boko Haram, AQIM and Somalia Al-Shabaab as the observed the groups focusing on suicide bombing activities and contracting the outside terrorists with an intention to relate with one another in a coordinated efforts to become a potential threat to United states and its allies. This explained the suicide bombing of United Nations House in Nigeria in August, 2011 by Boko Haram. While an attempt have been made to explain the driving forces behind the Boko Haram phenomena, it is obvious that each of the perspectives offers some degree of insight into the problem.

Stemming the Tide

It is not out of place for us to examine some of the counter-insurgency measures employed by the government to determine their effectiveness or otherwise before proffering solutions.
Successive governments in Nigeria have taken measures to counter the insurgency and the present government claim to have sufficiently degraded the insurgency. But this has not stopped the insurgents from launching attacks on soft targets here and there in the country. Akpan, Ekenem and Olofu- Adebayo posited that governments’ response to Boko Haram insurgents has been reactionary rather than proactive. They argued that, what this signifies is that the government counter offensive strategy is not yielding the right results.

To be fair to government, it implemented some counter insurgency measures, which include

- Imposition of state of emergency
- Curfews have been imposed.
- GSM services have been banned and retread.
- Civilian JTF have been established.
- Road blocks have been set up and many other measures which cannot be discussed due to security reasons.

The present government followed suit with similar strategies but with more vigor. Troops have been reinforced. There is however, a significant reduction in the scope, but not in the impact of the insurgents’ operations. At this point it is also appropriate to explore some theoretical explanations on how to end the insurgency. Counter insurgency models, not mutually exclusive from one another come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett and Eizenstat. Kilcullen describes the “pillars” of a stable society, while Eizenstat addresses the “gaps” that form cracks in special stability. McCormick Model shows the interplay among the actors: insurgents, government, population and external organizations. Barnett describes the relationship of the country with the outside world, and Cordesman focuses on the specifics of providing security.

**Kilcullen Three Pillars**

Kilcullen describes a framework for counter insurgency. He gives a visual overview (Kilcullen, 2006), of the actors in his model of conflicts which he represents as a box containing an ecosystem, defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside the box, are, among others, government counter insurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgents’ forces and the general population, which is made up of three groups.

1. Those committed to the insurgents;
2. Those committed to the counter insurgents;
3. Those who simply wish to get on with their lives.

Often, but not always states or groups that aid one side or the other are outside the box. Outside the box intervention has dynamics of its own (Lynn, 2005). The counter insurgency strategy can be described as efforts to end the insurgency by a campaign developed in balance along three pillars: security, political and economical. Kilcullen advocates “unity of effort”. In his view, unity of efforts “depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem (i.e. the distributed knowledge of swarm) platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. Each player must understand the other’s strengths, weakness, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency terms must be structured for veracity (the ability to perform a wide range of tasks) and agility (the ability to sensation rapidly and smoothly between tasks).

**Eizenstat and Closing Gaps**

Insurgences, according to Stuart Eizenstat grow out of “gaps” (Eizenstat et al 2005). To be viable, a state must be able to close three “gaps” of which the first is more important: Security: protection “… against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure security, rebellious armed groups or criminal non state actors may use violence to exploit this security gap- as in Haiti, Nepal and Somali. Capacity: The survival needs of water, electrical power, food and public health, closely followed by education, communication and working economics system (Sargraves, 2005), “An inability to do so creates a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then perhaps political upheaval. In most environments, a capacity gap coexists with or even grows out of – a security gap. In Afghanistan and the Democratic republic of Congo, for example, segments of the population are cut off from their governments because of endemic insecurity. And in post conflict Iraq, critical capacity gaps exist despite the country’s relative wealth and strategic important (Stuart et al 2005). Legitimacy: closing the legitimacy gap is more than an incantation of “democracy” and “elections”, but a government that is perceived to exist by the consent of the governed, has minimal corruption, and has a working law enforcement and judicial system that enforce human rights.

**McCormick Magic Diamond**

McCormick’s Model (McCormick 1987) is designed as a tool for counter insurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success.
In this way the counter insurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model’s strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore, the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the insurgent or COIN force.

The model depicts four key elements or players:
1. Insurgent force
2. Counter insurgency force, (i.e. the government)
3. Population
4. International community.

All these interact, and the different elements have to assess their best options in a set of actions:
1. Gaining support of the population
2. Disrupt opponents control over the population
3. Direct action against opponent
4. Disrupt opponent’s relations with the international community.
5. Establish relationships with international community.

**Barnett and Connecting to the Core**

In Thomas Barnett’s paradigm (Barnett, 2005), the world is divided into a ‘connected core” of nations enjoying a high level of communication among their organizations and individuals, and those nations that are disconnected internally and externally. In a reasonably peaceful situation, this describes a “system administrators” force often multinational, which does what some call “nation-building”, but most importantly, connects the nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate – these communication linked to swarm coordination. If the state is occupied or in crucial war, another paradigm comes into play: the **leviathan**, a first world military force that takes down the opposition regular force. Leviathan is not constituted to fight local insurgences, but major forces. Leviathan may use extensive swarming at the tactical level, but are dispatch is a strategic decision that may be made unilaterally, or by an established group of the core such as NATO.

It was also propounded that the United State would be more effective and less dependent on large scale use of military power to encounter insurgency in the Muslim world by correcting three major deficiencies:

- Civil competence and capacity to build effective and legitimate local government
- Capabilities to organize train, equip and advise local military and police forces.
- Information gathering, sharing and exploitation.

Drawing from the above theories and postulations, we are now in a good position to proffer solutions on how to stem the tide of insurgency in Nigeria. The cardinal opinion of these writers, that an effective counter insurgency measures could be seen from the following perspectives. The measures should be implemented on immediate, short term and long term basis.

**Immediate Measures**

- The military should take the fight to the insurgents not waiting for them to attack before taking actions.
- Government should enlist the services of the ‘karwina’ (local hunters) who have exhibited willingness to join the fight and seems to have knowledge of the geographical location of the insurgents.
- Improve on intelligence gathering by the use of the locals who are constantly being harassed by the insurgents.
- Procure modern and efficient arms and ammunition that are of superior fire power to that of the insurgents.
- Use modern information communication technology (ICT) to locate, identify and dislodge the insurgents’ camps. For instance, use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) and other modern gadgets.
- Reorganize and reinforce the multinational taskforce for it to be effective.

**Short Term Measures**

- Reorganize the Civilian Task force (Youth Volunteer vigilante) to be well effective by training, equipping and re-orienting).
- The federal government should enlist the support of citizens in the fight against the insurgents by compensating anyone who gives reasonable information to security organizations about the members of the group.
- Form Community/Village Security Committees- who would use the age long tradition of maintaining security by identifying visitors/strangers by their landlords
- Identify the sponsors of the insurgents and their source of arms and ammunition to cut supply of arms, logistics and information to the insurgents.
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- Hasten the reorganization, rebuilding, rehabilitation and resettlement of the internally displaced persons. Open up highways (roads) leading to the recaptured territories so that life will return to those areas without which there will be no end in sight.
- The federal government should undertake intensive policing of the country’s borders, especially the Nigerian Chad and Niger -Cameroun border in the North Eastern region of the country. These measures would prevent insurgents and their foreign supporters from entering or establishing camps within the country’s borders.
- The saboteurs in the military and other security organizations should be identified and prosecuted.
- Reach out to the insurgents, where possible, to broker a truce in whatever form within the confines of the law of the land. For “every conflicts start with a word and ends with word.”

Long Term Measures
- Overhauled the entire national security architecture, improve intelligence gathering, training, funding, logistical support to the armed forces and security collaboration with friendly nations.
- Beef up the Nigerian borders by increasing immigration checked and post as well as thinking of building fence where feasible as found in some European countries.
- Religious worship centers, clerics and preachers be registered by the government and monitored so that the content and scope of their preaching should be within the confines of what the various religious teach and propagate.
- Welfare scheme be introduce to cater for the unemployed and indigent citizens.
- Family institution should be strengthened, all new members in the family be registered, enlisted into the welfare scheme and compulsory and free education up to the secondary level be provided.
- Youth unemployment can be addressed by incorporating into National Youth Service Scheme, a school to farm program, skill acquisition etc.
- War on corruption, fighting corruption is non-negotiable and a currency which is invoked
- De-radicalization strategy- there is need of a counter radicalization program to prevent many more young people (illiterate and unemployment) from being radicalized. Such strategies would require initiatives to counter violent extremist ideology and create positive incentives against radicalization.
- Effective Information Management and Strategic Communication
- Economic development plan for Northern Nigerian. Economic revival goes beyond providing substantial funds. It has to be guided by clear objectives, roles of public and private sectors and security groups.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Insurgency is violence by clandestine groups or individuals against established authorities with the aim of establishing territorial control or change of government. Insurgency in Nigeria was triggered by the extra judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the erstwhile leader of Boko Haram. Although Yusuf allegedly drew inspiration from Ibn Taymiyya, he reportedly resisted some followers relentless advocate that “an Islamic state was realizable through preaching and mobilization of the people to reject secularism, by way of taking up arms and fighting to conquer the unbelievers”’. Yusuf was said to be against any form of violence, saying it was against the teaching of Islam’. (Sulieman cited in Uzodike and Maiangwua, 2012: 101). In any case, it is clear that Boko Haram has metamorphosed from a strictly religious movement to one espousing a political agenda.

The amount of destruction, both in terms of human and material lost, since 2009 cannot be quantified, yet the insurgency persisted and seems to have defied all human solutions. However, government seems to have ‘sufficiently decimated the Boko Haram insurgents now. Yet attacks on soft targets continued unabated.

While some suggested that a holistic approach be adopted, others called for collaboration with world leaders and international organizations as strategies to rid the country of insurgents. Some also suggested the need for dialogue with the sect suffice, to say that, “the carrot and stick approach”, the “integrated approach” and “the marshal plan”, are still valid. The sociological approach remains the ultimate, to stem the tide of insurgency in Nigeria.

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