

The Existence of State Viewed From Tareeqat

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ABSTRACT: *Tareeqat* is etymologically derived from Arabic *tarîqah* from plural form *tarâ'iq*. It means the path or way (*al-kaifiyah*), traffic place (*al-sirâth*), *mazhab* sect, flow or sect (*al-mazhab*), method or system (*al-uslûb*). *Tareeqat* is the fath or the open way to God Almighty taken by a *sâlik* (*tareeqat* followers) to go to God, Allah SWT. *Tareeqat* is often imaged as old, has no socio-political, and apolitical sensitivity. And yet the history of the Islamic world shows the role of *tareeqat* in various countries in the political struggle against the colonialism. The *tareeqat* community contributed to the resurrection and the formation of the state. The role of the *tareeqat* in the stage of social-historical life can be said to be quite complex. *Tareeqat* is required to play a role in the demands of the times. Besides playing its role as an educational institution and Islamic *da'wah*, *tareeqat* also becomes a social community and economic institution. *Tareeqat* can even become a military oriented of socio-politically institution.

Keywords: state; tareeqat; tasawuf; struggle

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I. INTRODUCTION

Tasawuf or sufism in the teachings of Islam can be identical with mysticism in the teachings of other religions. The purpose of *tasawuf* is to obtain a direct and conscious relationship with God. Nevertheless *tasawuf* cannot be separated from the political domain. This can be traced from the etymology of the word "Sufi". There are four theories about the word "Sufi", which is defined as *ahlu al-suffah* (أهل الصفة), Sufi word is derived from *saf* (صف) which describes virtue, the word of *Sufi* is taken from the word *safâ* (صافي) which means holy, and the Sufi word is taken from *sûf* (صوف) that is cloth made of fur or wool.¹ From the four theories, there are two theories that explain the relationship of *tareeqat* or Sufi with politics or the administration of government or state.²

First, the word of Sufi is derived from *ahlu al-suffah* (أهل الصفة) as the people who emigrated to follow the Prophet from Makkah to Medina. During in Medina, the Prophet's companions who emigrated from Makkah did not have any possessions and lived in the mosque. They slept in the Prophet's mosque on a bench and made a saddle or *suffah* as a pillow.³ This relationship with politics is the cause of their willingness to live a life of deprivation because of following the political strategy set by their leader. The situation in Makkah that could not guarantee their security caused the Prophet and his followers moved to Medina. Sociologically, the emigration

¹ It is as stated Harun Nasution. There are four theories about the word "Sufi". First, Sufi is meant as *ahlu al-suffah* (أهل الصفة), that is, those who follow the Prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina. Second, the word Sufi is derived from the *saf* (صف) that reflects the priorities. This priority as when someone is doing *salat* on the first *saf* (row). Third, the word Sufi is derived from *Safa* (صافي) which means holy. A Sufi is defined as a person who is sanctified and purified himself through a variety of exercises or *riyadah* in the long term. Fourth, the word Sufi is derived from *sûf* (صوف) the cloth of fur or wool. See Harun Nasution, *Philosophy and Mysticism in Islam*, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973), 57-58

² See Mahmud Suyuti, *Politik Tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah Jombang*, (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001), 115.

³ See M. A. Syaban, *Sejarah Islam (Penafsiran Baru) 600-750*, terj. Machnun Husein, (Semarang: IAIN Walisongo Press, 1993), 12. Also see Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran-ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1528.

of the Prophet and his followers to Medina was because they did not have any political power that could support the prophetic mission. While in Medina, the Prophet could play the role of religious political leader, although he never claimed to be a ruler directly.⁴

Secondly, the word of Sufi can also be regarded as the derivation of the word *sîf* (صوف) that is the cloth from fur or wool. This theory is more accepted as the origin of Sufi terms.⁵ The Sufis prefer to use rough woolen cloth as a symbol of simplicity and poverty. The symbol of the clothes they wore is very different from the clothes worn by the rulers of their day. They also alienated themselves to guard themselves from government influence and maintain their inner conditions. The choice was taken by the Sufis as a form of their protests against the ruler in terms of economic and politics.⁶

While the term is often associated with the term of *tasawuf* is *tareeqat*. *Tasawuf* and *tareeqat* seem to have the same meaning, but actually both have different meanings and empirical implications. *Tasawuf* is a more individualized practice of esoteric religion. Meanwhile *tareeqat* has taken the form of institutionalized sufism order with massive congregational model.

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The term or word of *tareeqat* is etymologically derived from Arabic *tarîqah* from plural form *tarâ'iq*. This can mean the path or way (*al-kaifiyah*), traffic place (*al-sirâth*), *mazhab* sect, flow or sect (*al-mazhab*), method or system (*al-uslûb*). *Tareeqat* is the fath or the open way to God Almighty taken by a *sâlik* (*tareeqat* followers) to go to God.⁷ *tareeqat* means the journey of a *sâlik* to God by purifying himself or the journey that must be taken to get closer to God.⁸ In its development, *tareeqat* then undergoes institutionalization process and contains the meaning of *tareeqat* organization.⁹ In this case, *tareeqat* is defined as a way or a guide in performing worship in accordance with what was exemplified by the Prophet and also what the companions, *tabi'in*, *tabi'i al-tabi'in* did. The practice is carried out from generation to generation until *tareeqat* teachers continue up today.¹⁰

Tareeqat as the path taken by the Sufis can be described as a path that stems from the *Shari'ah*. The main road is called *shâri'*, while the path is called *târiq*. The derivation of this word indicates that *tareeqat* is a branch of *shari'ah* that composed of various laws of God. The path (*târiq*) will not be possible without the main road (*shâri'*). A *sâlik* is impossible to gain a mystical experience if the command of *Shari'ah* is not obeyed first.¹¹

Tareeqat can also be interpreted as a way that refers to a system of meditation or good deeds which are associated with Sufi teachers and the organizations that grow around a typical method of *tasawuf*. The most important good deeds of all is the *dhikr* that is reading the sentence "*lâ ilâha illa Allâh*" followed by a series of prayers in a certain numbers. The readings are sometimes also followed by certain breathing and gestures; even there are some ascetic practices.¹²

In the beginning, *tareeqat* was a Sufi society that established spontaneously without any bond. In the early Sufi period, around the 3rd and 4th centuries, *tasawuf* was an individual phenomenon. Just around the fifth and sixth centuries, Sufi elites began to institutionalize their spiritual teachings to be easily learned and practiced

⁴ Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996), 12.

⁵ Terms of Sufism *tasawuf* in *manaqib* of Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilan is closer to this term. It is explained that Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani wore a robe and a head covered with rags. Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani walked barefoot, ate disposed food and vegetables, etc. See Jafar bin Hasan bin Abd al-Karim al-Barzanji, al-Lujjain al-Madani, (Semarang: Maktabah al-'Alawiyah, nd), 12. See also the Shari, "Political Dimensions of the teachings of Sufism (Case Study on Manaqib Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani)" *ash-Syir'ah Journal of Sharia and Law*, Vol. 45 No. II, July-December 2011 (1523-1540), 1529.

⁶ Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran-ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1529.

⁷ Abdul Wahid Mu'thi, "Tarekat: Sejarah Timbul, Macam Macam, dan Ajarannya", dalam *Diktat Kursus Tasawuf* (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2006), 85-86.

⁸ Hasan Shadily, *Ensiklopedi Islam*, Jild 5, cet. 4 (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, PT Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 1997), 66.

⁹ Ma'mun Mu'min, "Pergumulan Tarekat dan Politik (Peranan Kyai Haji Muhammad Shiddiq dalam Tarekat dan Politik di Kudus)", *Fikrah*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Juni 2014 (153-186), 160.

¹⁰ Mustafa Zahri, *Kunci Memahami Ilmu Tasawuf* (Surabaya: Bina Ilmu, 1995), 56.

¹¹ See Annemarie Schimmel, *Mistical Demension of Islam*, (Carolina: University of Nort Carolina Press, Chapel Hill USA, 1975), 101.

¹² See Martin Van Bruinessen, *Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), 15.

by their followers.¹³ This group is considered a *tareeqat embryo*. The association then began to develop into a Sufi organization that had certain rules. This mystical organization began to spread widely in the Islamic world since the eleventh century.¹⁴

The growth of the *tareeqat* network is characterized by a system of *murshid* relationships (a teacher) and *murid* (student).¹⁵ The spiritual progress of a *tareeqat* follower is marked by the certificate from the teacher. The progress level of a *tareeqat* follower begins as a *mansub* (ordinary follower) then becomes *muqaddam* (student), *khalifah* (Sheik aide) and eventually becomes a *murshid* (teacher). The difference of *mazhabs* in *tareeqat* is a necessity from different understanding of Islamic religious teachings.¹⁶

Many *tareeqats* are growing in the Muslim world. Many of them can grow exponentially as *Qadiriyyah*, *Naqsabandiyah*, *Khalwatiyyah* and others. This is because the role of the social, cultural, political and others that become a necessity for *tareeqat* as a practical social organization that contacts directly with social life of the community.¹⁷ However, according to the theory of struggle for life from natural selection developed by Darwin, not all *tareeqat* could survive until today. Historically, many *tareeqat* are lost in time because it did not have any supporter who continues to fight for it. An example is a *tareeqat* attributed to Ibn Sab'in, and *tareeqat* of Bustamiyah.¹⁸

According to the view of Herbert Spencer, the existence of a social group to survive is affected by two main factors. First is the internal factor. This factor relates to the potential of the *tareeqat* to evolve structurally and functionally. Second is the external factor. External factor is such as organization or other group that are in the environment. A social organization like *tareeqat* should be able to set the strategy and adapt to other groups. When a group of *tareeqat* cannot do it, then it is certain that the group will be lost in time.¹⁹

The history of Islam records that the *tareeqat* practice had created various forms of attitude and behavior of political practices. Although normatively, politic and *tareeqats* are two different and separated things but this should not be reflected in the historical domain. The bond of *tareeqat* in political practice can be seen in the records of Islam. As an example is the involvement of several sufi institutions such as *ribath*, *zawiyah*, and *khanqah* in Islamic political struggle.²⁰

¹³ Sri Mulyati, dkk., *Mengenal dan Memahami Tarekat-tarekat Muktabarah di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Kencana, 2004), 6. Also see Noer Iskandaral Barsany, *Tasawuf, Tarekat, dan Para Sufi* (Jakarta: Srigunting, 2001), 73.

¹⁴ M. Muhsin Jamil, *Tarekat dan Dinamika Sosial Politik*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005), 51. Lihat pula Agus Riyadi, "Tarekat Sebagai Organisasi Tasawuf (Melacak Peran Tarekat Dalam Perkembangan Dakwah Islamiyah)", *Jurnal at-Taqqaddum*, Volume 6, Nomor 2, Nopember 2014 (357-385), 362.

¹⁵ Rumadi, *Post Tradisionalisme Islam*, (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 2007), 90.

¹⁶ The differences in understanding the teachings of religion does not only create in *tareeqat*. The difference also occurs in politics, law, theology and so on. Further information can be found in Ahmad Syafi'i Mufid, "Faham Islam Transnasional dan Proses Demokratisasi di Indonesia", *HARMONI Jurnal Multikultural & Multireligius* Vol. VIII, No. 31, Juli - September 2009, (8-34), 9. Lihat pula Mahmoud M. Ayoub, *The Crisis of Muslim History: Religion and Politics in Early Islam* (Terj. Munir A. Muin: *The Crisis of Muslim History: Akar Akar Krisis Politik dalam Sejarah Muslim*), (Bandung: Mizan, 2004). Compare to Farag Fouda, *Kebenaran yang Hilang: Sisi Kelam Praktik Politik dan Kekuasaan dalam Sejarah Kaum Muslim (Al-Haqiqah al-Ghaybah)*, (Jakarta: Balai Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama Jakarta Bekerjasama dengan Yayasan WakafParamadina, 2007), 45-89.

¹⁷ Agus Riyadi, "Tarekat Sebagai Organisasi Tasawuf (Melacak Peran Tarekat dalam Perkembangan Dakwah Islamiyah)", *Jurnal at-Taqqaddum*, Volume 6, Nomor 2, Nopember 2014 (357-385), 361.

¹⁸ Tawfiq al-Tawil, *al-Tasawwuf fi Misr Ibana al-Asr al-Uthmaniyy* (Kairo: al-Hay'ah al-Misriyyah al-'Ammah li al-Kitab, 1988), 39.

¹⁹ Scott Gordon, *The History and Philosophy of Social Science* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 427. Lihat pula Abd. Syakur, "Mekanisme Pertahanan Diri Kaum Tarekat", *Islamica*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Maret 2010 (211-228), 220.

²⁰ See Hasan Asari, *Menyingkap Zaman Keemasan Islam*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1994), 91. Lihat pula Agus Riyadi, "Tarekat Sebagai Organisasi Tasawuf (Melacak Peran Tarekat Dalam Perkembangan Dakwah Islamiyah)", *Jurnal at-Taqqaddum*, Volume 6, Nomor 2, Nopember 2014 (357-385), 365.

The Sufi institution of *ribath* originally was a Muslim army barracks which were on the forefront of Islamic Army battle. *Ribath* is on the border with the enemy or in the conquest process area. The tendency of *ribath* occupants then turned from the physical war into a war against themselves reflected from Sufi practices.

Even it was told that Sheik 'Abd al-Jilani as the founder of *tareeqat* of Qadiral Qadiriyyah used *ribath* as place to live with family and a place to learn his students.²¹ Meanwhile the Sufi institution of *zawiyah* is a traditional Sufi institution which has closed relationship with political *Mamluks* (ruler) in Egypt.

Khanaqah institution also had a close politics relationship with the ruler of the Seljuk dynasty in the late 5th century Hijriah. The existence of *khanaqah* became stronger thanks to the patronage of the ruler. *Khanaqah* institution grew with the expansion of the Seljuk dynasty outside Khurasan and Iraq.²² There were many *Khanaqah* found as a gathering place for Sufi in the east region of Persia. As a center of culture and religion, *khanaqah* got many subsidies from the government, wealthy aristocrats, merchants and others.

III. DISCUSSION

3.1 The View of *Tareeqat* Community about the State

The growing general view puts *tareeqat* in a position far from the world of politics and state affairs. The view like this is due to the tendency of Sufi followers who prefer to cleanse themselves and their souls by abandoning the world affairs. However, it is necessary to know the views of the *tareeqat* people about the state in order to know how their role in politics and the state.

Borrowing from the classification of political strategy made by Imam Suprayogo, there are three typologies of political views in facing the power. First is *the struggle from within*. This group has an active interaction with the government. This *tareeqat* group is willing to adapt to the ruling government. Second is *the struggle from without*. This group is more likely to make a distance from the dominant force or government. This *tareeqat* group is not reluctant to take a different attitude from the government. Third is *the conditional cooperative group*. This group only makes limited communication with the government in order to obtain benefits related to the development of its *tareeqat*.²³

The first typology is *the struggle from within* as group that interacts actively with the government for example it can be seen from the political stance of Naqsabandiyah *tareeqat*. This can be seen from the Naqsabandiyah *tareeqat* which is more likely to approach power. The *tareeqat* that has branches in almost all Islamic countries is looking for followers from the political elite. As a *tareeqat* who has the largest followers, many sheiks of Naqsabandiyah *tareeqat* have good relations with the government. Therefore it is natural that many of these sheiks *tareeqat* have strong influence among political elites.²⁴

The close relationship of Naqsabandiyah *tareeqat* with the government for example can be seen from the story of Sheik 'Ubaidillah Ahrar, the second caliph of the founder *tareeqat* of Baha'uddin Naqsaband. He is a wealthy Sheik and has great influence in the palace of the Eastern (Afghan) dynasty. He has many students from all classes of life. This certainly strengthens the political weight of the Naqsabandiyah *tareeqat* group. The situation is used by the *tareeqat* to support one of the candidates for the succession of the sultan or ruler when there was a change of power. The Naqsabandiyah *tareeqat*'s support eventually led Abu Sa'id became a king. The Sheik *tareeqat* then became a teacher, adviser and spiritual protector of the king Abu Sa'id who later

Bandingkan dengan Abu al Wafa al-Ghanimiy al-Taftazaniy, *Sufi dari Zaman ke Zaman*, ter. Ahmad Rofi'i 'Utsman, (Bandung: Pustaka, 1985), 235.

²¹ Dewan Redaksi Eksiklopedi Islam, *Ensiklopedi Islam*, (Jakarta: Ihtiar Baru Van Hoeve, 1994), 17.

Lihat pula Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1531.

²² Hasan Asari, *Menyingskap Zaman Keemasan Islam*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1994), p, 96.

²³ Imam Suprayogo, *Kyai dan Politik: Membaca Citra Politik Kyai*, (Malang: UIN Malang Press, 2007), 119-121.

²⁴ See <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/islam-digest-koran/15/11/22/ny7qpt1-peran-tarekat-lintas-benua> Diakses 13 Desember 2016 pkl. 13.12 WIB.

replaced with the king `Abd al-Lathif.²⁵ The strength of this *tareeqat* is then also used to make the Islamization of the government and change some customary rules that applied in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah.²⁶

Naqsyabandiah *tareeqat* also spread to western Asia (Ottoman Turkey) and South Asia (Moghul India). When it is noted, it can be seen that many Naqsyabandiyah *tareeqat* sheiks have strong influence among the ruling elites. Even some of these *tareeqat* sheiks become sultans or rulers. Sultan Bayezid II who ruled at the end of the 15th century in Turkey is for example. He is famous as one of the rulers who are very close to some *tareeqat* teachers. Sultan Aurangzeb who ruled in India in the mid-seventeenth century also got influence from some Naqsyabandiyah *tareeqat* sheiks. The teachers or *tareeqat* sheiks are close to this ruler and then had a big influence in changing the religious life system under the sultan's power. One of the letters written by Sheik Muhammad Ma'sum to Sultan Aurangzeb for example contains the suggestion to perform *jihad* in two forms, war against the unbelievers and war against the lust.²⁷

The similar approach also occurs when Naqshbandi entered Indonesia. Around 1850, Sheik Isma'il Minangkabawi returned to Indonesia after being caliph Naqsyabandiah in Makkah. He later became a teacher and adviser to young King of Riau (*Yang Dipertuan Muda*) Raja Ali. The close relationship of the sheiks *taareeqat* in Riau with authorities continued to the rules of King Abdullah and King Muhammad Yusuf. Even it is told that King Muhammad Yusuf strengthened his legitimacy as a ruler by visiting Mecca to ask the certificate of caliph Naqsyabandiyah from Sheik Muhammad Salih al-Zawawi.²⁸

The approach taken by the *tareeqat* shaikhs or teachers and the sultans and the rulers is very benefiting for them and the development of the *tareeqat* they lead. The existence of the *tareeqat* which obtained the legitimacy from the authorities will be able to grow rapidly. In addition, the proximity of the *tareeqat* Sheik will be able to color and influence the policies taken by the government. For example is the close relationship between the *tareeqat* and authorities in Riau, Pontianak, Langkat and some other areas. Some areas became the places where *Shariah* was appreciated because of the effect of the *tareeqat*.²⁹ The role of the sheiks or *tareeqat* teachers in in the palace is very varied. The role of a Sheik in the palace is determined by the proximity of the Sheik with the authorities. A Sheik could become a teacher of religion at the palace to be "life-saving".

Despite the proximity of the *tareeqat* ruler gives benefits for both of them, but not everyone will see it positively. Some see it as a bad thing, especially for a teacher or Sheik and *tareeqat* group. There are sarcastic expressions to the *tareeqat* leaders who are close to the authorities. The success of Sheik Isma'il Minangkabawi in Riau for example, it is told "and Haji Isma'il has returned to Makkah to bring the much money."³⁰

The close relationship between the *tareeqat* and the rulers besides conducted by *murshids* or other *tareeqat* teachers, it is also made by the authorities or the king.³¹ There are some things as the authorities' motives developed a close relationship with the *tareeqat* leaders. For example, it is because *karamah* owned by a Sufi Sheik. *Karamah* and spiritual power that owned the Sufi sheiks is expected to protect and preserve the government he led. The presence of the Sheik who has *karamah* is also expected to bring blessing to the palace. Besides that, a Sheik who is *ahl kashf* can help authorities in determining the results of the various policies to be

²⁵ Jo-Ann Gross, "Multiple Roles and Perceptions of a Sufi Shaikh", dalam: Marc Gaborieau dkk. (ed), *Naqshbandis: Historical Developments and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order* (Istanbul & Paris: Isis, 1990), 109-121.

²⁶ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Tarekat dan Politik: Amalan untuk Dunia atau Akherat?" *Majalah Pesantren* vol. IX no. 1 (1992), 3-14.

²⁷ Hamid Algar, "Political Aspects of Naqshbandi History", dalam Gaborieau dkk. (ed), *Naqshbandis*, 123-52.

²⁸ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Tarekat dan Politik: Amalan untuk Dunia atau Akherat?" *Majalah Pesantren* vol. IX no. 1 (1992), 3-14.

²⁹ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Tarekat dan Politik: Amalan untuk Dunia atau Akherat?" *Majalah Pesantren* vol. IX no. 1 (1992), 3-14.

³⁰ Sayyid `Utsman bin `Aqil bin Yahya al-`Alawi, *Arti Thariqat dengan Pendek Bicaranya* (Betawi, 1889), 9. Lihat pula Martin Van Bruinessen, "Tarekat dan Politik: Amalan untuk Dunia atau Akherat?" *Majalah Pesantren* Vol. IX no. 1 (1992), 3-14.

³¹ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Tarekat dan Politik: Amalan Untuk Dunia atau Akherat?" *Majalah Pesantren* vol. IX no. 1 (1992), 3-14.

taken by the authorities. A king will also feel glad with the spiritual guidance of a Sufi Sheik. The main motive of the Sheik's presence in the legitimacy of the palace is obtained by the authorities, especially the king, in the eyes of its citizens.

The second typology of political strategy is *the struggle from without* as a political strategy that tends to create a distance with dominant force on the political movement of Qadiriyyah *tareeqat*.³² The view of this *tareeqat* can be seen from the history of the emergence of Qadiriyyah. Qadiriyyah *tareeqat* as the oldest and most spread widely Sufi movement or organization was established by Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. This *tareeqat* has branches all over the world and have an attachment to the center or headquarters in Baghdad.

The tendency of Qadiriyyah *tareeqat* which prefers a move away from this power can be seen from the history of Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani, as written in his *manaqib*. It is said that one night Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani slept in *iwân* (إيوان) or the verandah of King Kisra's palace.³³ On that cold night, suddenly he dreamt that produced sperm. At that moment he woke up and rushed to the bathroom. This event repeated up to forty times. Then on that night he got into the wall of *Iwan* in order not to fall asleep again.³⁴

If the story is understood by *mafhum mukhâlafah*, then it can be concluded that Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani will never sleep in a palace building. This is because when he slept in the palace it can only disturb the inner sanctity, especially when he slept in the palace. The inner sanctity disorder is illustrated by *ihtilâm* or wet dreams that cause great obstacles and require bathing. As in psychological theory, wet dreams are caused by several factors, one of them is related to one's delusion of worldly beauty.³⁵

Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani's unwillingness to approach the power is also reflected in his reluctance to some matters. He never wanted to stand in front of the ruling doors, either the minister's or the king's. He also did not want to pay honour to the king. In addition, he never accepted any gift from the king. This resistance was reflected when he refused the golden prize given by King al-Mustanjid Billâh. It is described that once he received the gift from the king, he instantly pressed the gift bag that the king gave him and suddenly blood came out of the bag. This incident indicates that the king's behavior is indicated to extort the blood of the people.³⁶

It is also told that at one time the contents of the same apple became different when Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani and King Abu Mudzafar Yusuf held. When the two apples were split, the apple held by King Abu Mudzafar Yusuf became filled with caterpillars. While the apple held by Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani remained intact, even issued a fragrant odor.³⁷ This incident suggests a comparison of the king's deeds and hearts that are very different from Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani.

³² Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran-ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1536.

³³ The word of *iwân* can be interpreted as verandah of a big house or palace. See Ahmad Warson Munawwir, *Al-Munawwir Kamus Arab-Indonesia*, (Yogyakarta: Pongpes Al-Munawwir, 1984), 273. Compare to Mahmud Junus, *Kamus Arab-Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Hidayakarya, 1990), 55. See also Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran-ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1533.

³⁴ Ja'far bin Hasan bin Abdil Karim Al-Barzanji, *Terjemah Manaqib (Kisah Kehidupan) Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir Al-Jailani* terj. Moh. Saifullah Al-Aziz, (Surabaya: Terbit Terang, 2000), 46.

³⁵ Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran-ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1534.

³⁶ Ja'far bin Hasan bin Abdil Karim Al-Barzanji, *Al-lujjain al-dani*, (Semarang: Maktabah al-'alawiyah, t.t), 26 dan 48.

³⁷ Ja'far bin Hasan bin Abdil Karim Al-Barzanji, *Al-lujjain al-dani*, (Semarang: Maktabah al-'alawiyah, t.t), 27. Lihat pula Sahri, "Dimensi Politik dalam Ajaran-ajaran Tasawuf (Studi Kasus atas Manaqib Syaikh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani)" *Asy-Syir'ah Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah dan Hukum*, Vol. 45 No. II, Juli-Desember 2011 (1523-1540), 1535.

A little description of the story of Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani shows that Qadiriyyah *tareeqat* prefers not to get close to the ruler. The choice is taken to maintain the dignity of Sufism. As explained in the *manaqib* of Sheik 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani, there are two things that can degrade the dignity of Sufism, they are interested in position and wealth.³⁸

The third typology of political strategy is a *conditional cooperative group*. This congregation group is centered between the first and second typologies. The group only communicates with the government to get benefits that related to the development of its *tareeqat*.³⁹ This *tareeqat* group is a combination of typology of *the struggle from within* and the typology of *the struggle from without*. As the previous description, the typology category of *the struggle from within* is more likely to make a distance with the dominant power or government. Meanwhile the typology category of *the struggle from within* prefers to engage in active interaction with the government.⁴⁰

An example of this typology is the Sattariyyah *tareeqat* movement in Benda, Cirebon. The members of this *tareeqat* consist of various social classes who do *bay'at* to Kyai Soleh. *Bayaat* of this *tareeqat* group is done in an inclusive or open. This *tareeqat* group is an independent community which neither supports nor fights against the government. When Kanoman's royal government held a competition to open a forest as a settlement, the *tareeqat* group participated. As a gift from the palace, this *tareeqat* group then got a share of the land that was opened. The prize land from Kanoman royal government was then used for the construction of Kerep Pesantren as the basis of the Sattariyyah *tareeqat*. This *pesantren* then gets full legitimacy from the government for its services.⁴¹

3.2 The Involvement of the Tareeqat Community in the State

The institution of a *tareeqat* group can be a media that can accommodate the aspirations of the followers and the surrounding community to resist injustice, despotic rulers and various forms of oppression.⁴² *Tareeqat* as a social entity can not be separated from various socio-political problems. The *tareeqat* cannot close its eyes for not responding to such a phenomenon because every *tareeqat* always teaches harmony, well-being, and inner-born happiness.⁴³

The solid social potential of the *tareeqat* plus the bonding of the togetherness and obedience to the spiritual leadership has made the *tareeqat* institute is very potential to be transformed into a resistance movement against unjust political and governmental realities.⁴⁴ The *tareeqat* resistance movement does not only occur in some *tareeqat* centers, but has become a phenomenon throughout the Islamic country.⁴⁵

Tareeqat was initially concerned only in the Muslim spiritual education which concerns in the pious mental formation. Some observers initially viewed *tareeqat* as a closed group and tend to alienate themselves. From the 11th century to the 13th century, *tareeqat* found momentum to develop its role and action. At that time the Islamic political forces began to collapse because of the Mongol attack. *Tareeqat* then appeared to replace

³⁸ Ja'far bin Hasan bin Abdil Karimal-Barzanji *Al-lujjain al-Dâni*, (Semarang: Maktabah al-'alawiyah, t.t.), 26.

³⁹ Imam Suprayogo, *Kyai dan Politik: Membaca Citra Politik Kyai*, (Malang: UIN Malang Press, 2007), 119-121.

⁴⁰ Muh. Saerozi, "Pelajaran Politik Manaqib Sufiyah (Telaah terhadap Kitab Al-Lujjain Al-Dani", *PROFETIKA, Jurnal Studi Islam*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Juli 2007: (142-157), 153.

⁴¹ Ivan Sulistiana, *Tasawuf dan Perubahan Sosial di Cirebon (Kontribusi Tarekat Syattariyyah Terhadap Perkembangan Institusi Keraton, Pondok Pesantren, dan Industri Batik)*, (Cirebon: UIN Jakarta, 2015), 161.

⁴² Agus Riyadi, "Tarekat Sebagai Organisasi Tasawuf (Melacak Peran Tarekat dalam Perkembangan Dakwah Islamiyah)" *Jurnal at-Taqaddum*, Volume 6, Nomor 2, Nopember 2014 (359-385), 381.

⁴³ Ivan Sulistiana, *Tasawuf dan Perubahan Sosial di Cirebon (Kontribusi Tarekat Syattariyyah Terhadap Perkembangan Institusi Keraton, Pondok Pesantren, dan Industri Batik)*, (Cirebon: UIN Jakarta, 2015), 161.

⁴⁴ Tarekat dari sisi institusional dapat berevolusi secara organis dari sebuah sistem sosial-organik menjadi sistem religio-politik. Lihat Ajid Thohir, *Gerakan Politik Kaum Tarekat; Telaah Historis Gerakan Politik Antikolonialisme Tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyyah di Pulau Jawa* (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2002), 34.

⁴⁵ Abd. Syukur, "Mekanisme Pertahanan Diri Kaum Tarekat", *Islamica*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Maret 2010 (211-228), 217.

the political function in carrying out Islamic *da'wah* throughout the world, although it used different paradigms and *da'wah* approaches.⁴⁶

Tareeqat is often imaged as old, has no socio-political, and apolitical sensitivity. And yet the history of the Islamic world shows the role of *tareeqat* in various countries in the political struggle against the colonialism. The *tareeqat* community contributed to the resurrection and the formation of the state.⁴⁷ The role of the *tareeqat* in the stage of social-historical life can be said to be quite complex. *Tareeqat* is required to play a role in the demands of the times. Besides playing its role as an educational institution and Islamic *da'wah*, *tareeqat* also becomes a social community and economic institution. *Tareeqat* can even become a military oriented of socio-politically institution.

3.3 The Role of Islamic Education, *Dakwah*, Economy and Politics

The orientation of *tareeqat* education, as already described, is to establish the ideal moral of *ilahiyyah*. This orientation has been going on since the early period of Sufism, when many Muslims, primarily who engaged in the field of government, were tempted by the luxury of materials and forgot the moral principles of *ilahiyyah*.⁴⁸ The outbreak of *hubb al-dunyâ* has struck the Muslims. In these circumstances, Sufi elites were then moved to create a Sufi doctrine that was used as a tool to form the *ilahiyyah* morals and to feel the spiritual joy by drawing closer to Allah.

The practice of moral forging by the Sufis is conducted in certain places such as *zâwiyah*, *ribâth* and *khanaqah*, as described earlier. This is actually not much different from the temples and hermits in the Hindu-Buddhist and monastic in the Christian tradition.⁴⁹ These places then develop in such a way with some modifications to become modern institutions. For example an institution in Indonesia, especially in Java is *pesantren* institution. The institute then adapts to the modern education system, with a school system or *madrasah* with a set of curriculum. *Pesantren* then transformed not only by teaching the religion education but also modern science.⁵⁰

Tareeqat finds momentum in the Islamic *da'wah* at a time when Islamic political forces are weakening. The attack on Baghdad by the Mongol army in 1258 AD had a huge impact on Islamic civilization and scholarship because many intellectual heritage of Islam destroyed. At that time, Sufi teachers have been persistent in bringing the message of Islamic *da'wah* to different regions with different *da'wah* patterns. *Da'wah* movement is no longer using political power and military conquest. Islamic *da'wah* movement is conducted through trade to parts of the world.⁵¹

Tareeqat uses the acculturative-evolutive pattern in *da'wah*. *Da'wah* movement which is conducted by the *tareeqat* teachers more use local traditions or culture as media for *da'wah*. The *tareeqat* teachers transform the local culture into a new culture that is imbued or wrapped with Islamic values. As an example of *tareeqat da'wah* result is *pesantren* system which is a modification of dormitory system in Hindu-Buddhist culture. This *pesantren* model when it is drawn in the history of Islam still has a relationship with the *zâwiyah* system in the early development of Sufism. The adaptive-compromistic cultural approach in this Islamic *da'wah* according to some researchers causes Islam to be firmly rooted in some areas that have been Islamized.⁵²

When viewing the history of Islam in the archipelago, especially on the island of Java, it can be ascertained that all Islamic propagators are *tareeqat* leaders. Various kinds of *tareeqat* that entered into Indonesia have been able to attract many followers from various community groups. Some of the reasons that

⁴⁶ <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/islam-digest-koran/15/11/22/ny7qpt1-peran-tarekat-lintas-benua> Diakses 12 Nopember 2016 pkl. 20.12 WIB.

⁴⁷ <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/islam-digest-koran/15/11/22/ny7qpt1-peran-tarekat-lintas-benua> Diakses 12 Nopember 2016 pkl. 20.12 WIB.

⁴⁸ Abd al-Rahmân Ibn Khaldûn, *Muqaddimah ibn Khaldûn* (Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr, 1406 H.), 611.

⁴⁹ Abû al Wafâ al-Ghânimî al-Taftâzânî, *Sufi dari Zaman ke Zaman*, terj. Ahmad Rofi'i 'Utsman (Bandung: Pustaka, 1985), 235.

⁵⁰ Mastuhu, *Dinamika Sistem Pendidikan Pesantren* (Jakarta: INIS, 1994), 59 - 60.

⁵¹ H.A.R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 87. Lihat pula Sir Thomas W. Arnold, *al-Da'wah ilâ al-Islâm; Baḥṡh fî Târîkh Nashr al-'Aqîdah al-Islâmiyyah*, terj. Hasan Ibrahim Hasan dkk. (Kairo: Maktabah al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, 1970), 26.

⁵² H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1945), 25.

may explain this include: first, *tareeqat* that emphasizes practical and ethical practices can attract the attention of the people who are preached. *Da'wah* or the spread of Islam is done through the example of the actions of the *tareeqat* teachers. Islamic *da'wah* is not conducted through theoretical religious teachings. Second, regular meetings conducted among *tareeqat* followers can indirectly assist *tareeqat* members in fulfilling their various needs. Third, the *tareeqat* organization includes women persuasively. The participation of women in this *tareeqat* cannot be done in other Islamic institutions.⁵³

It is noted that *tasawuf* plays an important role in the history of religion and culture in Malayan-Indonesia. It is even said that the form of Sufi is the most suitable form with the mentality of Southeast Asian people.⁵⁴ The success of the *tasawuf* movement in promoting Islam in Southeast Asia can be seen from several things.⁵⁵ First, the spread of Islam to the East area when it was more oriented to the spiritual aspect than the intellectual awakening, science and technology. The fall of Baghdad City caused the glory of Islamic intellectuals moved to the West, while the Sufism *da'wah* movement led to the East. Islamic *da'wah* movement to Southeast Asia is much pioneered by the Sufis and traders.⁵⁶

The Second, the spreading of Islam by the Sufis does not recognize discrimination that causes Islam is accepted by all segments of society.⁵⁷ This is different from the pre-Islamic religious teachings, Hinduism-Buddhism. The differences of Islam and the previous religion caused many people converted to Islam. Sufi *da'wah* that emphasizes justice and harmony in law and morality makes Islam more interesting. Islam is getting stronger in the archipelago with many kings embraced Islam because of the influence of the Sufis.

The third, the spread of Islam by the Sufis adapts to local culture and customs. The Sufis are very careful in conveying *da'wah*. They put forward an Islamization effort, not putting forward the elements of *khurafat* in the society. As an example is the *dakwah* of wali songo in Java used cultural media in the form of *wayang kulit*. This *da'wah* media was chosen to combine elements of Sufism with mystical elements as well as local culture.⁵⁸ Through this media, the message of *dakwah* is delivered to the society.

The fourth, the spread of Islam in the archipelago is conducted through *tasawuf* literature in Malayan language.⁵⁹ As the spread of Islam in Baghdad and Syria in the days of Ibn Arabi and al-Ghazali, literature is one of the effective *da'wah* media. The people who play a lot in *da'wah* through literature in Malay are Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani and Hamzah Fansuri. Both wrote many literary works such as *Syair Perahu* and *Mir'atul Mu'minîn*.⁶⁰ Islamic *da'wah* through the media of this literature is then continued by Sheikh Nur al-Din al-Raniri, Abd al-Ra'uf Singkel and Bukhari al-Jauhari.

The fifth, the spread of Islam is helped by the attitude and positive role of *ulama*. The role of *ulama* further strengthens the Sufi-oriented *da'wah* movement in society and country.⁶¹ The role of these *ulamas* is then developed not only exclusively, but growing in some broader aspects, such as literature, education, social,

⁵³ KH. Sahal Mahfudh, *Nuansa Fiqih Sosial*, (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 1992), 347. Lihat pula H. Muhammad Munif, "Dakwah Melalui Organisasi Nahdlatul 'Ulama", *Al Misbâh*, Vol. 9 No. 2, Juli-Desemner 2013 (261-274), 267.

⁵⁴ A. Hashimy, *Sejarah Masuk dan Berkembangnya Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Penerbit PT. Al-Ma'rifah, 1981), 147.

⁵⁵Badlihisam Mohd Nasir dan Othman Haji Talib, "Tasawuf Dalam Gerakan Dakwah TanahAir", *Jurnal Usuluddin*, Bil 18 [2003] 1-24, 3.

⁵⁶ Vladimir Braginsky, *Tasawwuf dan Sastera Melayu: Kajian dan Teks Teks*, (Jakarta: RUE, 1993), ix.

⁵⁷Badlihisam Mohd Nasir dan Othman Haji Talib, "Tasawuf Dalam Gerakan Dakwah TanahAir", *Jurnal Usuluddin*, Bil 18 [2003] 1-24, 4.

⁵⁸Muhammad Abu Bakar, "Sufi in the Malay-Indonesia World", dalam Syed Hossein Nasr (ed.), *Islamic Spirituality Manifestations*, (New York: SCM, 1991), 267.

⁵⁹Badlihisam Mohd Nasir dan Othman Haji Talib, "Tasawuf Dalam Gerakan Dakwah TanahAir", *Jurnal Usuluddin*, Bil 18 [2003] 1-24, 4.

⁶⁰Mana Sikana, *Sastera Islam di Malaysia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbitan Sarjana, 1983), 6.

⁶¹Badlihisam Mohd Nasir dan Othman Haji Talib, "Tasawuf Dalam Gerakan Dakwah TanahAir", *Jurnal Usuluddin*, Bil 18 [2003] 1-24, 5.

economic, and political. It is even said that the Sufi *ulama* is the most sensitive group to the changing times. Sufi *ulamas* are also able to ignite the spirit of society to defend the country from the threat of invaders.

Although the approach and the active role of the Sufi *ulemas* in spreading Islam is large, but not all are in the name of the *tareeqat*.⁶² Many of them do *da'wah* on behalf of individuals. The Sufi's *Da'wah* movement is then developed not only around *da'wah*, but also in the struggle against the invaders. After independence, the *tareeqat* still plays a role in various areas of community life. In the context of Malaysian state, for example, it is known some names such as Tok Pulau Manis, Tok Ku Paloh and Abdul Rahman Limbong as a persistent Sufi figures against British colonialism. After the independence of Malaysia, it is also known some Sufi figures who are directly involved in politics, such as Burhanuddin al-Helmy who is a follower of Naqshabandiyah tariqa and several other names.⁶³ Besides the role of *tareeqat* as an educational institution and Islamic *da'wah*, *tareeqat* also has the roles of community social and economic social. The *tareeqat* serves as a vehicle for socialization of community ideas and becomes a vehicle for interaction among *tareeqat* members. The kinship system and the spiritual brotherhood can turn into a vehicle for *tareeqat* members to exchange ideas and solve the problems. The intense meetings among the *tareeqat* members will ultimately lead to various social activities. For example, the *tareeqat* group will make the movement of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, social aid agencies and others that related to social, economic, moral issues and so forth.⁶⁴

IV. CONCLUSION

The role of community social and economic social of the *tareeqat* group, can be seen in the development of the *tareeqat* in Senegal, especially after it gained independence in 1960. The former French colony has 78.5% Muslim population.⁶⁵ Meanwhile 97% of Muslim citizens of the country are joined in three big *tareeqats*. The Tijaniyah *tareeqat* as the largest *tareeqat* in Senegal has 1.4 million members. The Muridiyah *tareeqat* has about 575,000 members, and the Qadiriyyah *tareeqat* has about 400 thousand followers. The country's *tareeqat* seeks to play its role in the economic by opening the unused land for agricultural land. The cleared agricultural land is utilized by faithful *tareeqat* students (*murid*) to plant beans. This can certainly improve the *tareeqat* community's economy and the economy of the country in general.⁶⁶

The social role of the *tareeqat* community in Indonesia for example can be seen in the development of the Qadiriyyah wa Naqshabandiyah *tareeqat* in Suryalaya, Tasikmalaya. This *tareeqat* group, through its various rituals, is able to function as a psychotherapy and rehabilitation method for narcotics or drugs addicts. The method of *tareeqat dhikr* practiced in *pesantren* Suryalaya is able to recover the victims and drug addicts become human beings who have *akhlakul karimah*.⁶⁷

While in the economic, the role of *tareeqat* can be seen in the development of the Sattariyyah *tareeqat* in Rembang, Central Java. This *tareeqat* is more concerned in the community welfare. The Sattariyyah *tareeqat* in Rembang seeks to create prosperity and welfare in the form of financial institutions and capital for its followers and the surrounding community. Not only that, this Sattariyyah *tareeqat* also formed several units in assisting and

⁶²Badlihisam Mohd Nasir dan Othman Haji Talib, "Tasawuf Dalam Gerakan Dakwah Tanah Air", *Jurnal Usuluddin*, Bil 18 [2003] 1-24, 5.

⁶³ Mohamed Abu Bakar, "Ulamak Pondok dan Politik Kepartian di Malaysia, 1945-1985" dalam Norazit Selat, *Ekonomi dan Politik Melayu* (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, 1997), 144-185. Gerakan dakwah tarekat di Malaydia dapat dilihat dalam Badlihisam Mohd Nasir dan Othman Haji Talib, "Tasawuf Dalam Gerakan Dakwah Tanah Air", *Jurnal Usuluddin*, Bil 18 [2003] 1-24

⁶⁴ Abd. Syakur, "Mekanisme Pertahanan Diri Kaum Tarekat", *Islamica*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Maret 2010 (211-228), 216

⁶⁵ Selain agama Islam, penduduk senegal juga menganut agama lokal dan Katolik Roma. Pengikut agama lokal sebanyak 18% dari jumlah penduduk. Sementara pengikut agama Katolik Roma sebesar 3,5%.

⁶⁶ Elizabeth Sirriyeh, *Sufi dan Anti Sufi*, terj. Ade Alimah, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Sufi, 2003), 212.

⁶⁷ Harisuddin Aqib, *Al Hikmah: Memahami Teosofi Tarekat Qadiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyah* (Surabaya: Dunia Ilmu, 2000), 217.

fostering citizens in business and production skills. Thus, cultures such as discipline of worship, creating and trading indirectly become institutionalized in the community tareeqat.⁶⁸

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⁶⁸ Abd. Syakur, "Mekanisme Pertahanan Diri Kaum Tarekat", *Islamica*, Vol. 4, No. 2, Maret 2010 (211-228), 217.