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SADC regional integration versus the disintegration of states –a revisit to the European Union-South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA)

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Abstract: *Calls for regional integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region have more or less become the bloc's slogan each time leaders convene for various summits. Yet reality on the ground has been indicative of the same states having become more disintegrated than prior to the attainment of independence. One of the hallmarks of failure for the African post-colonial state has been a perfected attempt to perpetually continue with social political-economic infrastructure put in place by the erstwhile colonialists. It has thus become practically impossible for the African states to physically integrate and demolish the burdening yoke of a disintegrated continent deliberately left by the erstwhile colonialists in a bid to enable the flourishment of neo-colonialism and nip in the bud any prospects of regional integration. This paper traces the feasibility of regional integration in SADC putting on the spotlight the European Union (EU) – South Africa (SA) Trade Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) first implemented in 2004. The EU-SA TDCA was the first reciprocal free trade agreement in Southern Africa. The agreement applies defacto to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – the BLNS states. These states also happen to be in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) together with South Africa. Thus by default, the BLNS states have become party to the EU-SA TDCA with respect to imports from the EU. This impacts on the much desired sub-regional integration precisely on the economies of the member states of SACU in general and the much desperately needed integration within SADC in particular.*

Key Words: *EU, SADC, SACU, regional integration*

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I. Introduction

The increasing integration of the world economies has revived interest in regional integration scheme, (Chauvin and Gaulier, 2002). Hence, the fear of marginalization together with the fact that, most of African countries are too small on their own to negotiate with powerful trading blocs, has led to increased interest towards regional integration. Moreover the contemporary 21st century world has since proved all and sundry that states working together towards a more integrated society tends to benefit more than those working in isolation regardless of how powerful economically and politically they may be. With the global scourges of climate change, diseases and pandemics as well terrorism, integrated societies bear dividend as compared to disintegrated ones. Chauvin and Gaulier (2002) further argue that Africa has been experimenting with the economic integration for quite a long time now (half a century). A number of economic blocs have emerged, all in the states' quest for integration. Eleven economic blocs such as the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). That being the case, progress towards fully integrated regions within the continent has been moving on a sluggish pace due to a number of reasons some of them being: overlapping membership, the lack of authority and bureaucratic sophistication to deal with external powers, political turmoil and upheavals, poverty, hunger and placement as well as civil wars and xenophobia.

It is against this background that SADC like any other region has made strides in the regional integration matrix, yet such efforts are still marred by distortions, double standards and obscurities evidenced by member states' continued enthusiasm in entering into various preferential trade agreements (PTAs) more as individual sovereign states than through the regional bloc of SADC. In that regard the progressive efforts of

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regional integration have thus tend to be stuck more in political connotations alone than encompassing other facets, importantly economic regional integration.

This paper argues that regional integration that is only rooted in politics is not enough. It also argues that with willingness and sincerity South Africa's commitment to regional integration in SADC is the panacea to the ultimate goal of integration. This is unlikely however, given the progress and beneficial strides South Africa has made through other arrangements outside the region such as the European Union-South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA).

Regional integration

Regional integration has become popular during the last decade after the end of the Cold War (Hettne 1999a, xvi). Practically all states of the world belong to some regional cooperation organisation and nearly all regions of the world have at least one organisation, which aims at establishing a free trade area among its members. Integration is the final stage of economic cooperation. In a regionally integrated market, some of the traditional decision-making powers of nation states have been handed over to the regional level, and regional rules and decisions supersede national legislation. In a way this denotes to the ceding of sovereignty by a member state as some of the critical decisions will be handled at regional rather than state-centric level. Furthermore, at least some economic policies are formulated on the regional level. Integration can thus refer both to the process as a whole, but also to a certain advanced level of cooperation. Rodriguez and Rodrick (1999) state that in the wake of globalization, regionalism has received much more attention as a result of growing fears of African marginalisation. Indeed it cannot be argued that harnessing integration at whatever stage or level inevitably contributes to economic growth, solidarity and a more harmonious region. As such, regional integration largely fosters economic growth and development through increased activities related to intra-regional trade and cross border investment.

Regional integration takes a multi-sectoral approach, which usually incorporates various different forms. It can be functional cooperation in some field of inter-state relations in form of for example economic or political integration. It can take also a broader form when participating states try to incorporate convergence of their policies with different sectors under a single framework. This broader cooperation can be called regionalisation. This is also the type of regional integration that is dominant in the present-day world – regional integration today usually involves integration processes in several sectors (for example, the economy, security, and the environment).

SADC in the context of regional integration

A brief account of the background of SADC is informative in as much understanding its agenda of regional integration vis-a-vis the constraints of the same. In 1980, nine Southern African states - Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - established the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The main pre-occupation of SADCC was to reduce its members' economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa as well as to start the process of regional political and economic integration between these so-called front-line states.

According to Mudyanadzo (2012: 64) SADCC has its roots in the Frontline States (FLS) formed in 1975 with the objective of aiding liberation movements in the remaining white minority-ruled states in Southern Africa. The embedding of Zimbabwe into FLS in 1980 signified the collapse of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), a strategy by apartheid South Africa to establish a constellation system that would secure her sub-regional military, diplomatic and economic hegemony (Bhebhe, 2015). In 1980 the FLS transformed into the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) so as to promote co-operation and integration in the region by lessening dependence on South Africa.

Zimbabwe emerged the largest independent regional state in SADCC becoming the focal point of regional diplomacy through its emphasis on a common regional approach, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), United Nations (UN) and Non Aligned Movement (NAM) (Chimanikire, 2001: 5; Nyakudya, 2013: 83-84). With South Africa gravitating towards attainment of democracy, SADCC incorporated economic integration in its thrust and transformed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 (SADC Treaty, 1992). Understanding the regional background of SADC is critical because as Barner and Taylor (2005: 3) observes, "regions are almost always more than geopolitical divisions; they are also social constructions based on shared interests and inter-subjective understanding." Within the two last decades SADC has transformed and also extended its geographical coverage to cover six more states – the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Namibia, the Republic of South Africa, Madagascar and the Seychelles - and it aims today at a very deep integration, but so far has achieved very little or nothing.

The European Union-South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA)

The European Union- South Africa Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (EU-SA TDCA) is the first reciprocal free trade agreement in Southern Africa and became fully implemented in 2004. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and customs unions have increasingly become popular in the current globalised era. The intention of such agreements is to create a free trade area between the negotiating countries by reducing or eliminating tariffs and trade barriers. There are contentious arguments on whether FTAs are beneficial to the developing world with the most dominating postulation being that free trade is harmful as it forces developing states to lower their export prices further leading to an income transfer from poor countries to rich ones.

Understanding the European Union-South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA)

It is proper in the interest of academic fairness to start with the unpacking of the agreement in question in form of the European Union – South Africa Trade Development Corporation Agreement (TDCA). The agreement was a conclusion of a long term bilateral agreement on trade and development aid. It was viewed as setting a framework for dialogue in order to support the efforts of South Africa to strengthen the economic and social foundation of its transition process following years of global and regional isolation due to the pursued policy of apartheid. South Africa has a population of 46 million people and a GDP of $570.2 billion. It is also the 19th largest economy in the world and thus is an economic powerhouse of Africa. On the other hand the EU has a cumulative population of 494 million people and a GDP of $13, 881 billion. South Africa has a strategic position of being the largest economy in the world and thus the gateway to Africa (Burger, 2006). The TDCA which the two parties entered into was established in January 2000.

A Free Trade Agreement between South Africa and the EU committed South Africa to grant duty-free access to 86% of EU imports over a period of 12 years, while the EU committed to liberalise 95% of South Africa's imports over a 10-year period. It was expected that the TDCA would help to restructure the South African economy and stimulate long term economic growth. The agreement covered "trade and related issues, and cooperation in economic, social and political fields." (Burger, 2006). It also provided "a legal framework for ongoing EU financial assistance on grants and loans for development cooperation, which amounted to R900 million per year. Since 2004, South Africa has had the benefit of 12 more European countries becoming part of the EU – making the EU market now an effective 560 million citizens. However the ongoing processes of Britain's Exit form EU – popularly referred to as BREXIT will inherently lead to the significant drop of the figures. In 2004, almost all EU members had ratified the TDCA (Burger, 2006).

The main provisions of the FTA were agreements on:

- An asymmetric timetable;
- Identification and protection of sensitive products
- The integration of South Africa into the global economy
- The introduction of the 'rules of origin' doctrine; and
- Cooperation in diverse fields.

In addition to the above, the provisions of the TDCA extend to cooperation in fields as diverse as:

- Social cooperation, where both parties committed to initiating dialogue on this subject in order to tackle question relating to the social problems of a society coming out of an era of Apartheid. They both guaranteed basic social rights such as the freedom of association;
- Cooperation to protect the environment;
- Cultural cooperation;
- Cooperation in the fight against drugs and money laundering; and
- Cooperation in the field of health and, in particular the fight against AIDS, (Europa [Online: 2007]).

Implications of EU –SA TDCA

Although the EU-SA TDCA was signed between the EU and South Africa, it applies defacto to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). These states happen to be in the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) together with the South Africa. Thus through backdoor or rather by default, the BLNS countries have become party to the EU-SA TDCA with respect to imports from the EU. This has both negative and positive implications as shall be exhibited in the discussion. Negatively it impacts on the much desired sub-regional integration, precisely on the economies of the member states, whereas positively it broadens the markets and destinations of SADC and SACU goods, as well as fostering competition and increasing international cooperation with the world's most powerful and integrated bloc.

The dynamics of EU-SA trade development corporation agreement and how it affects SADC and SACU can best be understood in the context of two theories of international relations in form of interdependency and dependency theories. In brief the theory of interdependency postulates that the international system is characterised by a web of interconnected relationships of actors through a complex emerging network of state and non-state actors through trade, finance, travel and communications.

The result is that state boarders are increasingly becoming permeable to all of these methods of interconnections. Dependency theory on the other hand postulates that countries in the developing world are not developing because the international system is actually preventing them from doing so. The world system was in fact exploitative and characterised by the dominance of some countries over others. As shall be highlighted whilst the discussion continues to unfold, the EU-SA trade dynamics vis-a-vis SADC and SACU have remained highly characterised with both dependency and interdependency of member states from the former's regions.

Davies et al (1993:56) states that "although the BLNS states are no contracting parties to this free trade agreement, the porous nature of BLNS borders implies that goods entering the SA market under the free trade agreement could easily end up in BLNS." Therefore, this makes BLNS countries reciprocal access to the markets of the EU. South Africa is the largest trading partner for the BLNS countries within SACU. It is considered to be the biggest and the most developed economy in the region, hence essential for these countries.

The problem encountered by the BLNS countries in that it may not be possible for them to formulate trade policies independently given the limited degree of freedom of tariff policies and the dominance of the South Africa. Thus the domestic BLNS industries are likely to face competition of imports from the EU as prices from the EU are likely to face competition of imports from the EU are likely to be lower, (Ibid: 59). This can have a negative implication for the infant industries in the BLNS countries because of the heavier competition from the manufactured exports from industrialised nations of Europe. Thus, the enlarged market for the European goods can result in de-industrialisation of the BLNS countries. SACU is by definition a subset of the SADC regional group. The main reason for the establishment of SACU was that of regional integration and the facilitation of trade between the members of the Agreement in order to improve.

According to Keet (1997:89) "it has long been recognised in the EU and amongst the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) members of the Lome Convention, and expressed in the Lome Convention itself, that the grouping of countries into larger economic units is an important basis for effective and sustainable development."

In Africa, the strategic objective of re-grouping African countries and re-integrating the continent was a fundamental reaction to the legacy of colonialism; to arbitrarily created, artificial, largely non-viable and distorted economies, characterised by pronounced under-development and deep external dependence. Regional groupings in Africa were conceived in the 1960s and 1970s as more rational economic units and formally endorsed in the Lagos Plan of 1980.

These putative regions would provide larger markets and economies of scale in investment and production, with combined or complementary resources, and would generally be more effective frameworks within which to correct disarticulated and ineffective economic structures.

In the case of Southern Africa there had long been both de facto as well as de jure processes of regional 'integration'. The latter, for example, took the form of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which incorporated Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, and later Namibia, under the economic domination of South Africa. But there was also a long-standing and wider functional 'integration' in the form of multi-faceted operational, technical and economic interdependencies throughout the region.

This de facto regional economy had been created not only through the initiatives of business forces but through the deliberate policies of the colonial administrations and settler governments in the region, and more latterly by the apartheid regime. The common feature of these inter-locking processes was that they all worked heavily towards the advantage of the South African economy.

Since the birth of a democratic South Africa, regional co-operation is also seen - in addition to the broader African aims - to be an important framework, through programmes within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), within which to address the gross imbalances created both within and between the economies of the region - above all between South Africa and the surrounding countries.

A further implication of this re-balancing and developmental approach is that it would - like the European Community/Union have to be both politically directed or 'policy driven' as noted by Erwin (1998:90), as well as under-pinned by both public and private investment, by both governmental initiatives and entrepreneurial forces.

SADC has more recently had to take on board the additional demand of relating its developmental needs and plans to the challenges of the emerging liberalised global economy. The basic strategic challenge to the countries of Southern Africa, in this respect, is how to use the regional framework - which the WTO 'allows' - to create an interim economic 'breathing space' within which to develop and diversify their economies, improve their production and productivity and their export capacities preparatory to - and in order to be able to - participate more meaningfully in the highly competitive liberalised global economy, (Ibid: 91).

At the same time, a united region could provide a stronger collective political base from which to engage in joint strategising for more effective engagement in multilateral institutions such as the WTO. This is now assuming added significance as the countries of Southern Africa and the rest of the ACP grouping are faced with a new challenge from the EU to replace the long-standing Lome Convention with a new framework for their future relations. The EU's proposals carry significant implications for the ACP countries, individually, and also with respect to the future prospects for regional economic groupings, such as SADC.

According to SACU Parliamentary Liaison Group (1998:67) “regional groupings that enter into trade negotiations with the EU will become free trade areas to European exporters quite rapidly, although it is presented as being a 'gradual' process.” In this last respect, however, it is not entirely clear what time frames are being proposed, or are 'possible' in WTO terms.

What seems to be on the table are three main processes and phases: the negotiation, in the period 1998-2000, of an overall Framework Agreement between the EU and the ACP, laying out the general principles and objectives for their post-Lome relations; followed by a series of negotiations, between 2000 and 2005, by the EU with the respective ACP regions or sub-regions towards the formulation of separate, tailored Regional Economic Partnership Agreements; succeeded by a transitional period for the implementation of the new arrangements, which is interpreted by various sources as requiring five, ten, fifteen or even twenty years, (Ibid: 67)

The FTA between South Africa and the EU sparked mixed feelings among SADC members as some feared it would lead to lower intra-regional trade while others say it will encourage competition. Fears among South Africa’s neighbours, particularly those in the SACU, were that duty free imports from the EU will lead to loss of revenue. While the impact on tariff-based revenue was seen as direct, and could easily be compensated for, there were other more indirect and possibly much farther reaching, effects. This has to do with cheaper, and sometimes heavily subsidised, EU products flooding SADC countries.

For instance, EU beef is heavily subsidised and thus pose a potential threat to beef farmers in the region, particularly Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Intra-SADC trade currently ranges between 10-20 percent and is likely to be reduced with the advent of cheaper EU products through South Africa. The FTA is also seen by many as a further complication to negotiations on the SADC Trade Protocol. “The SA-EU agreement has grave implications for the region, (Ibid: 70).

The agreement was signed at a time when SADC states were calling for more trade within SADC. The SADC Trade Protocol seeks to create a free trade area in the SADC region within a period of eight years. There are a number of significant problems about the EU's RFTA proposals, and a number of important questions to be posed on the direct implications of reciprocal inter-regional free trade agreements per se, and more particularly in the Southern Africa context of the aims and complex features, processes and progress of the current SADC trade negotiations, and the phasing in of the forthcoming regional trade integration processes.

IMANI (1999: 56) state that;

the fact that all the countries participating in the SADC trade negotiations are also ACP members and have hitherto utilised Lome rights in various ways and to different degrees, although South Africa has only partial membership and different trade terms with the EU; the very different levels of development between SADC member states, which include seven LDCs (Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), together with seven other 'developing' economies at very different levels of development even amongst themselves (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe).

The vastly wider disparities between any of the SADC countries (including SA) and any of the member states of the EU, in levels of economic development, production structures and trade capacities; the very different stages or levels of integration, and the very different political resources and institutional capacities of the SADC as a region compared to the EU as a region.

The EU's proposed time-frame(s) for the negotiation and implementation of new inter-regional trade relations between the EU and SADC are thoroughly unrealistic. They are premature, in the first instance, because the SADC trade negotiations on regional trade integration will only be completed, optimistically, towards the end of 1999, and implemented from 2000 to 2008 (that is, the minimum 8 year period originally envisaged in the Maseru Trade Protocol in 1996), but very possibly not until 2010 or even 2012 (according to the ten or twelve year phasing-in 'allowed' in WTO terms, if SADC chooses to us them), or even further ahead (if suggestions from SADC in the WTO for more flexible time frames are adopted, (Ibid: 57).

What this means, fundamentally, is that any proposed RFTA between the EU and SADC should not be negotiated and could not be implemented until 2010, 2012, or even further ahead. It would only be by that stage that the new SADC trade terms will have been fully implemented, and their separate national and combined intra-regional effects have become clearer.

The EU's proposal was also unrealistic because of the very different stages which the two respective regions have reached in their processes of economic, political and institutional integration. Unlike the EU (of today) SADC is still at an embryonic stage of integration. Not only does SADC not yet have the institutional capacities, but it has barely begun the process of policy convergence amongst its members that the EU has achieved (after many difficult decades of negotiation and experience).

Of key significance, in this context, is that the member states of SADC do not have a common approach to their external trade policies, let alone a common external tariff (CET), that would enable them to jointly negotiate their trade relations with the EU. The decision to raise the level of integration of SADC from a preferential or free trade area to a customs union, with a common external tariff, may yet emerge as a practical necessity for the integrated regional economy.

At this stage, however, the member states of SADC have very different conceptualisations of the strategic role of trade and tariff policies as instruments of economic development and diversification. In fact, in many of the countries of Southern Africa, import and export tariffs are viewed as little more than sources of government revenue.

The timing of the negotiation and the phasing-in of a regional free trade agreement with the EU complicated the current trade negotiations and forthcoming SADC trade integration process in another way.

If all the member states of SADC were to agree to enter into negotiations on a REPA with the EU, and to do so in the 2000-2005 period stipulated by the EU, this would have imposing a multiple and burdensome negotiating agenda upon them. Most of the countries would have great difficulties in coping with this. Even South Africa, in its own right, and with much greater technical and human resources than the rest of SADC, struggled to cope with its recent (and ongoing) negotiations with the EU, simultaneously with its ongoing negotiations with SACU, as well as concurrent multi-dimensional negotiations with all the other SADC states, separately and together.

According to Keet (1994:33) “the most significant feature of the SADC regional trade integration process is that it has to be asymmetrical between South Africa and the other SADC states, because of the vast disparities in economic development and trade flows between SA and the rest.” But trade terms have to be variable also between the other relatively more developed SADC economies and the LDCs in recognition of their different levels of development and respective vulnerabilities

And these variable trade terms have to be integrated into a carefully phased, and gradually incremental process. If the implementation of this complex multi-dimensional intra-SADC process had to take place simultaneously with another differing regional trade liberalisation process with the EU, the co-ordination and sequencing of the many differing tariff and other trade terms would be extremely difficult to manage.

Keet (1994:33) further states that the EU might as a result of current analyses and debates, further studies and deeper, long-term dynamic impact assessments, and as a result of forthcoming negotiations eventually concede that its proposed inter-regional reciprocal FTAs will have to be much more gradual processes of anything up to twenty years from 2005, and initially incorporating only 'elements of reciprocity.

This might be welcome in some quarters as placing less pressures on these economies and thus being less unfavourable to SADC development prospects. With its greater complexity, however, such a modified, more variable and more gradual process with the EU would, paradoxically, further compound the difficulties of co-ordination and sequencing on the ground in Southern Africa.

In the hypothetical case of the whole of SADC entering into a reciprocal FTA with the EU, this would seriously erode, or effectively nullify, one of the fundamental purposes of the SADC trade agreement, which is to provide the lesser and least developed economies within the grouping with a period of preferential access into the South African market, and into each other's markets over third parties from the outside.

The same applies to South Africa in relation to the other SADC countries. In spite of considerable external admonitions and pressures not to "discriminate against third parties" in the global economy these preferences are being negotiated between the SADC states.

There are various suggestions that, because of the problems identified above, the terms of any EU-SADC FTA should be asymmetrical in timing and product coverage, and gradual in implementation; with full implementation being completed only in ten, fifteen or even twenty years. There may be some merit in such proposals, but it cannot be confidently predicted or guaranteed in advance when (or whether) national and intra-regional economic restructuring and new patterns of investment and production will have gone fast enough or far enough to enable them cope with the dangers of reciprocal free trade.

In fact, in the very process of merely introducing increasingly free trade with so powerful an economy as the EU, future production potential in the weaker economies of Southern Africa (including even South Africa) may be insidiously and imperceptibly pre-empted, before they have begun to be implemented or even identified. The effect would be that these economies would continue to be trapped in their existing production patterns - euphemistically defined by neo-classical economic theorists, as their 'comparative advantages' - with little opportunity to develop new productive capacities, new comparative and competitive advantages, including higher value-added processing and manufacturing capacities.

One objection based on the 'non-discrimination' principle of the WTO has already been resolved through the EU's extension of Lome preferential trade provisions to include non-ACP LDCs as from the year 2000. The alleged time prescriptions for the progression of regional trade arrangements into full-blown free trade areas, or customs unions, are not relevant to the ACP since such terms (Article XXIV) do not apply to agreements between developed and developing countries, let alone LDCs.

In fact the WTO provision that is most applicable to the ACP, in terms of the EU's relations with them, is the Enabling Clause which allows the EU if it is willing to do so, to make concessions to LDCs and developing countries that do not have to be reciprocated. To the contrary, in proposing that such countries will have to reciprocate trade liberalisation to European exporters, the EU is actually in direct contradiction with both the letter and the spirit of the Special and Differential Terms (SDTs) for LDCs and developing countries within the WTO. The EU may wish to downplay or ignore the WTO's Different and More Favourable terms for developing and especially least developed countries. The ACP cannot do so and should not allow the EU to do so.

The feasibility of SADC integration in the post EU-SA TDCA phase

SADC has its own frameworks for regional integration which need to be complemented and not competed with. However with the world slowly sliding back to state-centric approach as evidenced by Britain's expressed desire to exit EU as well as Donald Trump's popular slogan of "America first" what it means is that nation states are re-orienting their global perceptions towards state survival than regional cooperation. SADC is no exception. It's a region endowed with natural resources but whose economies of individual member states are largely distorted and marred with disparities. As such the concept of regional integration in SADC has largely remained political. The bloc is well oriented in political solidarity and politics rooted in the notions of liberation struggle. However in terms of the regional economies, it leaves a lot to be desired. SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDIP) has largely remained on paper and not in practices. A typical example of a region in a false start towards integration has been the Wold Cup hosted by South Africa in 2010. Not a single state other than the host itself had any meaningful dividends from the world's biggest soccer jamboree. Although South Africa had mutually assured the region that almost all members' states would benefit from the rare venture coming to the region, during the initial world cup, South Africa became a competitor than a regional partner. This resulted in almost all its hotels and football facilities fully booked to carter for the World Cup at the expense of the rest in the region. In light of such predicaments, feasibility of a well-integrated region becomes very gloom.

II. Conclusion

In conclusion, a lot still need to be done in as much as regional integration is concerned. Although South Africa's relative advantage is critical towards the pursuit of its won national state interests, it is critical that it fully plays its role as the largest and biggest economy in the region and the continent to the extent that all those who share geographic and regional proximity to it benefits. As such, when South Africa goes to negotiate FTAs like the subject of the discussion in form of the TDCA it ought to do as region than alone. This is so when considering that one or the other its negotiations will inevitably have a bearing on the entire SADC family and not necessarily South Africa alone. As such, the future of a proper and fully fledged regional integration in SADC is heavily reliant on South Africa which to a greater extent has been reluctant to fulfil this role as it has chosen to go it alone in most circumstances, with the TDCA being evident.

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