Civil Wars in Arab Countries: Different Scenarios But Similar Correlates, a Comparative Study of Syria and Libya

Dr Taha Kassem\(^1\), Ingyrashed\(^2\)

\(^1\)Associate Professor of Political Science and Political Economy

\(^2\)Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport (AASMT) College of Management and Technology (CMT)

Corresponding Author: Dr Taha Kassem

Abstract: Civil wars plagued many Arab countries; Syria and Libya are clear examples. Large numbers of deaths and causalities occurred as a consequence of these wars. Different approaches tried to explain why these wars were fought. These approaches factor in both endogenous and exogenous factors that most researchers adopt the analytical approach to support the argument. The researchers argue that although civil wars in Syria and Libya represent different scenarios, a sectarian-based war in the former, while non-sectarian in the latter; however, authoritarian regimes, greed and grievance and state incapacity are common correlates in both of these countries. These correlates played a significant role in the breakout of civil wars in the previously mentioned countries and make other Arab countries potential spots for other civil wars. Moreover, the interest of involved external actors portray these wars as proxy wars too. The researchers adopt the analytical approach to support the argument.

Keywords: Civil wars-Proxy wars- Internal conflicts- Greed- Grievance-State institutional capacity and policies- International and regional actors.

Date of Submission: 03-08-2019  Date of Acceptance: 19-08-2019

I. INTRODUCTION

Vicious internal conflicts plague several Arab states. Arab civil wars could be distinguished from non-Arab civil wars as the former occur between social entities which become partners whether sect-oriented, tribal or ethnic groups. In Non-Arab, mainly European, civil wars occur between citizens or groups which commit themselves with ideologies and institutions and pursue the victory of these ideologies.\(^1\) Two prominent examples of Arab civil wars are present now in Syria and Libya. Estimates of killed people in the Syrian civil war ranged between 371,222 and 470,000. On 23 April 2016, the United Nations and Arab League Envoy to Syria put out an estimate of 400,000 that were killed in the war.\(^2\) The case of Libya is different from Syria as Libya has two civil wars, the first started in early 2011 between Gadhafi forces and the anti-Gaddafi forces which established a front named the National Transitional Council (NTC) in February 2011. It intended to act as an interim authority in the rebel-controlled areas. The second Libyan civil war (2014) is a continuous clash among adversary groups looking for control of the domain of Libya. The contention has been for the most part between the administration of the Council of Deputies that was chosen by elections in 2014 and globally perceived as the "Libyan Government" or "Tobruk government"; and the adversary Islamist legislature of the General National Congress (GNC), called the "National Salvation Government", situated in the capital Tripoli in 2015 in Libya about 2819, about 1519 and in (2016) and about 1385 were killed in the second Libyan civil war. Debates arose about the nature of these wars: some argue they are the outcome of sectarian strife between ethnic groups; others say that these wars break out between marginalized citizens and the government due to the grievance and harsh economic conditions and others refer these wars to external interventions. This study argues that most, if not all; internal bloody conflicts that arise in Arab countries are mainly motivated and steered by endogenous and exogenous factors. The study will shed light on the conceptual framework where the civil and proxy wars as concepts are delineated and distinguished from each other and a literature review which shows


\(^2\) Robehmed, Sophie (2013). "Bombs and guns have killed 11,500 children in Syria, research shows, including some executed and tortured". The Independent, London.
some of the theories of both civil and proxy wars. In the following sections, a comparative analysis between the civil wars in Syria and Libya and their causes will be made.

II. TYPE OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH METHOD

This research is a mix of explanatory and exploratory research; it tries to explain the nature of civil wars both in Syria and Libya. It explains the major causes behind the breakout of these wars. Moreover, it explores the taxonomy of these wars, are they civil, proxy or do they have a mixed nature? This research adopts the qualitative research method as data are collected from documents, articles in Journals, textbooks and other digital sources. Also, content analysis is conducted to analyze and identify the causes and types of the Syrian and Libyan civil wars.

III. LITERATURE

Civil war is a multifaceted phenomenon that has deep and sophisticated roots that produce crucial repercussions restructuring and redesigning societal, economic, and political systems. Civil wars are fundamentally distinguished from wars between countries. Not only do the different factions continue to exist within the same borders after the war ends but more importantly, defeat can mean the end of one or more of those factions. Civil wars are confused with other forms and types of violent conflicts, that’s why scholars tried to define civil wars and distinguish them from other forms of conflicts. The concept of civil war comprises a wide range of types. Some interested scholars argue that civil wars occur when rebels look for self-rule and control of the central government. Clashes over government control may include rebels from inside the middle or state apparatus, as in military overthrows, or challenges from outside the political system. Other scholars recognize ethnic civil wars, in which the extremists and people responsible for the central government have separate ethnic characters, and push towards progressive clashes, in which opponents go for significant social change. Despite those refinements, a given civil war will frequently join a few components. Sambanis, For instance, consider the following components for internal conflict to be described as a civil war; these components are: fighting occurs inside a territory of a certain state, the government is a principal party in the fighting, and the major rebel groups must be domestically represented and can attack. According to Sambanis, state violence by the government whose motive is to control resources, political power, authority, legitimate use of force, should be persistent and countered. Paul Collier and Ankh Hoeffler defined civil wars as internal contentions with at least 1,000 fighting-based deaths per year; civil wars are distinguished from other types of conflicts by different dimensions. One of the most important dimensions is the threshold of violence and the number of deaths. According to the Correlates of War (COW), a minimum of 1000 deaths in the conflict’s first year and continuous violence in all following years at an average of 1000 deaths per year until the conflict’s end is required. Nicholas Sambanis determines a range of casualties between 500 to 1000 deaths per year; additionally, to differentiate civil wars from massacres in terms of casualties, both “government forces” and rebels must suffer at least 5% of these fatalities. Small and Singer defined civil wars as “armed conflict that involves (a) internal military action, (b) violent participation of the national government of the state, and (c) effective resistance by both sides, armed groups and resistance.” For Collier and Hoeffler the opposition forces must also be delineated. Yet, this feature is very controversial: as in many cases, various rebel forces may be loosely organized than others, having numerous agendas, ethnic or tribal compositions, and wider territorial alliances. Thus rebels must be politically mobilized seeking legitimate authority and recognition in the state. As such, rebels in civil wars are distinctive from terrorists, insurgents, and other more “delocalized” conflicts. Finally, the rebel groups must possess the means to finance themselves to counter the power of the government. Financing is the most important element which makes civil wars evolves to proxy wars. Rebels in all civil wars lack the financial capacity to launch a war and continue to achieve their objective. According to Klare, there are three widespread sources for financing civil wars which are extraction of natural resources, donations from


Sambanis, Nicholas, ibid


Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler, ibid

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2408041734 www.iosrjournals.org 18 | Page
diplomas including militant groups abroad, and subventions from other governments supporting either the government or the rebels. Klare elaborates on natural resources to include primary commodities which can be associated with other features that may cause civil war, such as weak public service, corruption and economic mismanagement. Diasporas are considered these second source of rebel finance. The third source of finance is from states governments supporting either the rebel or the government side. So, these rebels must depend on a source or more of money which can make them able to start and continue fighting. Rebels in Syria and Libya have a variety of regional and international financing sources, regional sources, for example, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar and Turkey and on the international level the USA and Russia.

Scholars have different theories explaining the generic causes of civil wars, based upon different theoretical perspectives. According to political science and economic approaches to civil wars, they are generally initiated by motivation: grievance versus greed. In their article: “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that wars are usually provoked through two factors: social grievances and available opportunities. On the one hand, social grievances are grouped into four main categories which are ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political marginalization, and economic inequality. First, considering All through the literature, ethnic, tribal and religious hostilities are extensively believed to be a direct cause for civil conflict. Although hostility cannot be measured, they can be witnessed in societies that are multi-ethnic/tribal or multi-religious; this diversity is not tolerated. Yet, inter-group tensions are not generally due to diversification but because of the political polarization of the society. Additionally, political repression, excessive state violence, and lack of political rights and freedoms are considered among the main causes of rebellion against the state government. Furthermore, minority groups may fear permanent exclusion and marginalization by the regime even sometimes in democracies. A potentially crucial case is when political allegiance is based on ethnicity and one ethnic group has a majority such as the case of Bahrain in which a ruling minority Sunni is thriving upon the exploitation and marginalization of a majority Shii. Political repression can be measured by looking at the Polity III data set which measures political rights. Also, a measure of political openness is published by Freedom House Index. For Sachs and Warner, conflict risk may increase due to rebels reactions against poor governance. Another dimension of opportunity is weak government control over its territories. This dimension is exacerbated if the terrain is favorable to rebels; forests and mountains provide rebels with a safe haven. According to Herbst, geographic dispersion of the population hinders the government capacity to control its lands. A newly formed rebel collision necessarily needs social coherence to enhance unity. In this case, a diverse society that does not share the same grievances reduces the opportunity for rebellion as different factions have different interests and are connected differently with the regime. In a civil war, rebels defy the authority and rebellion can be considered as pursuing a public good. If the rebellion achieved its objectives, all will live under the new regime, whether they positively endorsed the rebellion or not. Weinstein’s model of rebel enrollment recommends that where there are open doors for enormous benefits, the organization of the rebel groups will move step by step towards those with inspiration for private gains. Finally, social cohesion is considered an opportunity for rebellion against the state. Ethnic and

---


DOI: 10.9790/0837-2408041734
religious cohesion within organized rebels increases the ability of unity against the government. The widely used measure of ethnic diversity is the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. According to Fearon and Laitin, an insurgency is a technic of military conflict that is characterized by “small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas”. This technic is considered a trigger for civil wars as some rebels can develop it while others cannot. Recently, attention is turned to the capacity of the state pre and post-civil wars. Scholars such as Reynal, Mason, Weingarten and Fett examine the effect of state institutional structures on civil war. They examine the effect of state capacity on the rebel decision to continue fighting. Fearon and Laitin elaborate further on state capacity by hypothesizing that “financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices”. Snyder observes that the inability of state normally enhance the opportunities for rebels to benefit from resource extraction. Following these studies, this analysis further investigates the role of the state in civil war outcome. There are also conditions that favor insurgency among which we can consider state weak capacity and institution, widespread poverty and inequality in a society of large population suffering from socioeconomic and political instability. In terms of the outbreak, Collier & Hoeffler, Goodwin & Skocpol, and Elbadawi and Sambanis note that civil war may be less likely to occur in democracies because usually grievances are better addressed and pronounced by the government more efficiently. Democracy could also reduce multiethnic/religious problems. Yet, the lack of democracy could be among people grievances and it also affects the duration of the war as authoritarian states with their big armies and effective bureaucracies are able to end rebellion easily than weaker states. According to Gurr, democracies allow for fewer radicalized elements because they are, by definition, less exclusionary and provide for the resolution of rising conflict; a large army controls borders and hinterlands efficiently, tolerating rebels fewer safe havens. Additionally, an operative bureaucracy is able to control its rural areas and provide services in remount places ending rooms for rebellion. History also plays a crucial and double-edged role in shaping people’s mind about civil war. On the one hand, some populations have a memory of civil war which alienates and discourages them from any potential attempt especially when the memory is extensively painful. The most obvious example is Algeria. Algeria’s population, have in the back of their minds the events of the civil war and accordingly, they don’t allow the country to engage in something similar regardless of the causes. On the other hand, sometimes the history of previous similar events of rebellions makes the country more prone to witness similar events even if the scope is different such as the case of Syria if we consider the events of Hama 1980-2 and the recent events of 2011. Finally, scholars stress that “the risk of conflict is proportional to a country’s population” especially that both opportunities and grievances rise with population increase.

17Goodwin, Jeff & Theda Skocpol. (1989) Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World, Politics and Society 17(4): 489-509
19Fearon, James, ibid.
21Fearon, James, ibid.

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2408041734 www.iosrjournals.org 20 |Page
Analysis: Syria versus Libya: different Scenarios But similar correlates

In reality, “the Arab Spring was just the final chapter of several years of escalating popular unrest”. Among the various conflict trajectories of the Arab Spring, different countries such as Syria, Libya, witnessed the descent of peaceful mass uprisings into violent civil wars. Looking at Syria and Libya, we find that Syria and Libya have different scenarios due to the following facts: The general population in Libya is practically all Sunni Arabs. But, in Syria, a wide range of religious gatherings live in a frequently uneasy blend. The rebels themselves are far less cohesive in Syria than they were in Libya. Keep in mind, the U.S. recognized one rebel government in Libya. In Syria, it's not by any means clear what number of gatherings there are. Libya's a nation of 6 million citizens would already be able to pay its own bills,” clarifies Joshua Landis, the director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, Syria's a nation of 24 million. Just about 33% of them, 7 million, have been dislodged, 2 million outside of the nation; 5 million inside. Furthermore, the economy is wrecked. Libya can pay its very own bills since it's the biggest oil producer in Africa. Syria doesn't have so much oil as its neighbors. That implies remaking would be substantially more costly. The military intervention in Libya had the full endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, including Russia and China. The Arab League supported it, as key individuals from NATO who were eager to contribute considerable military resources. The topography of Libya, where the greater part of the populace was spread out on a tight segment of desert along the Mediterranean Sea made it perfect for NATO planes to watch and assault when Gadhafi troops overwhelmed the rebels; the rebels were a blended sack, yet they held the domain and their initiative was commonly known. None of these conditions wins in Syria, China, and particularly Russia, a long-lasting supporter of the Assad family, have obstructed any UN resolution that would put noteworthy outside pressure on the Assad's regime. As for a besieging effort: Much of Syria is mountainous and its air defense is significantly superior to Libya's. This would make strategic besieging less successful, which means ground troops could be important. The Syrian resistance is profoundly divided and holds no region. Also, it is believed to incorporate al Qaeda groups. Also, Syria is a powerful mix of Alawite, Shiites, Sunnis and Christians that could detonate into a noteworthy sectarian conflict that could spread all around to neighboring nations. Hendrix, Cullen and Sarah M. Glaser. (2007) inspect the connection between climate change and civil war beginning in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the first place, they affirm the Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) result from rain fall shocks trigger clash. This can likewise be deciphered as proof that water deficiencies cause struggle. Notwithstanding, Hendrix and Glaeser (2007) additionally utilize other water measures and find that nations with more freshwater assets per capita are bound to encounter struggle. Notwithstanding having generally minimal by and large freshwater in extent to demand, Syria, similar to the locale in general, encounters high common hydrologic fluctuation. Over the previous century (from 1900 to 2005), there were six critical droughts in Syria, where the normal month to month dimension of winter precipitation, the significant precipitation the major rainfall season dropped to around one-third of normal. Five of these droughts continued just one season; the 6th endured two. Beginning in 2006, notwithstanding, and enduring into 2011, Syria encountered a multi-season, multiyear time of extraordinary dry season that added to agrarian disappointments, economic dislocation, and populace relocation. This dry period has proceeded and is presently being portrayed as the "most exceedingly terrible long-term drought and most extreme arrangement of the set of crop failures since farming developments started in the Fertile Crescent numerous centuries ago. In the current civil war, some analysts have contended that factors identified with drought, including agrarian failure, water deficiencies, and mismanagement of water supplies, have assumed a significant role in adding to the crumbling of social structures and impelling violence. Specifically, the blend of extreme and severe drought, ongoing multiyear crop failures, and the related economic


crumbling prompted noteworthy disengagement and relocation of rural communities to the urban communities. These components further added to urban unemployment and economic dislocations and social agitation.29

Although these differences distinguished between the Syrian and Libyan scenarios, however, there are common factors shared between the two states that led them to the same fate after the Arab Spring. Before identifying and analyzing the causes of the civil wars, this study will shed light on a historical background which shows how civil wars erupted in the two states. Marc-Olivier portrayed a tripartite-level scenario to clarify the case in Syria. Olivier postulates that there are three constitutive levels of the Syrian war. The first constitutive level that typifies the Syrian war is, unquestionably, the intrastate battle that has been touching off the nation since the flare-up of the “Arab Spring”. For sure, following a few years of relative stability instigated by the tyranny of the Baath party, the country dove into a time of haphazard-political anarchy after the progressive rebel tidal wave reached Damascus in January 2011.30 Instantaneously, the administration of President Bashar Al-Assad was pounced upon by various on-screen characters anxious to benefit from his vacillating power. Faced with repression, uprisings mistreated in bloodshed, it turned out to be ever clearer that Syria was politically and socially dismantling. On one side, the loyalist powers, of Alawite descent (for example a part of Shia Islam), are fighting for President Al-Assad and are holding Damascus, the larger part of the greater urban areas and the waterfront swamps. On the contrary side, a perplexing descent of revolutionary gatherings dissipated over the northern areas, essentially of Sunni hereditary, are on the whole yearning at toppling the regime notwithstanding their ideological and political diversity.31 The second level is demonstrated inexternal actors which are exploiting the conflict by utilizing the nation as a proxy battlefield. On one side, the United States and other Western countries have offered their help to the rebels (chiefly to the SNC, the Syrian National Coalition), and to Kurdish powers.32 Throughout the years, this help has mostly appeared as financial transfers and armament but they were mainly diplomatic. These Western forces have hence occupied with sporadic crusades of air strikes, yet these interventions have never enabled the SNC to set up itself as a veritable option in contrast to the Assad regime.33 On the opposite side, Russia and China have shaped a freely weave alliance that has embraced the legislative powers that still today fills in as the underwriter of Assad's worldwide legitimacy. At first, the Sino-Russian help was just strategic, the two powers chiefly using their veto right inside the UN Security Council to hinder any movement against Assad regime.34 As the conflict exacerbated, they started giving broad military, financial and strategic help to Assad's troops, to the point where Russia even began leading escalated air strikes on rebels’ held regions. In this manner, it gives the idea that these outer forces are abusing the Syrian war as a political gadget to promote a more extensive conciliatory key plan and are instrumentalizing these residential enemies to improve their worldwide stance in connection to their universal adversaries. Consequently, notwithstanding its civil war ramifications, the Syrian conflict is additionally steadily developing into a newkind of Cold War.35 The third constitutive level that structures the Syrian war is the mosaic of religious threats that comprises a truly determined source of sharpness and that significantly complicates the political scene. Syria comprises various sects of Islam—Shias, Sunnis, Alawites, Sunnis, and others such as Druze, Yazidis and Christians. For a long time, these diverse religious affiliations have existed together in the country, shifting back and forth among harmony and enmity, and they appear to have disguised an inclination to


33Rodgers, L., Gritten, D, ibid.

34Chomsky, N., &Erlich, R. Ibid.

35Olivier, Marc-r, Ibid.
ghettoize in light of these verifiable hatreds.\textsuperscript{36} In parallel to the unfriendly idea of the profound view inside Syria, an immense range of territorial on-screen characters, moved by political and religious interests, have likewise mediated in the conflict to help their coreligionists. On one side, the Sunni governments of the Arabian Gulf have offered deadly implements and financial help to the dissident groups trying to counter the influence of their recorded adversary in the locale, specifically Iran. Among these Sunni states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have evidently added to the steadiness of the resistance and a portion of these nations are even associated with teaming up with increasingly radical organizations like ISIS, Ahrar-al-Sham and the Al-Nustra Front to advance their politico-key motivation.\textsuperscript{37} On the opposite side, a heteroclitic web of Shia heroes is profoundly engaged with the conflict to protect the regime of President Al-Assad, an uncommon Shia leader in this overwhelmingly Sunni locale. Certainly, through its broad financial and military commitments, Iran speaks to the frontal area Shia partner of the regime and, joined by the Lebanese Hezbollah and a few Iraqi state armies that might close by the legislative powers, these actors have all mediated in Syria to verify their interests in the locale. Subsequently, the Syrian war is one more sign of the verifiable conflict among Shiite and Sunnis and this contention certainly adds another layer of multifaceted nature to this as of now profoundly mind-boggling conflict. Eventually, the war that has been driving Syria since 2011 is in a general sense half and half type of conflict that involves common, politico-discretionary and religious ramifications and that incorporates a mind boggling system of neighborhood, regional and international linkages.\textsuperscript{38}

The case in Libya is relatively different from Syria because Libya witnessed two stages of civil wars; the first began in the mid-2011 between Gadhaası powers and the counter forces which set up a front named the National Transitional Council (NTC) in February 2011. NTC planned to go about as an interim government in the renegade controlled territories. The second Libyan civil war (2014) is a persistent conflict among conflicting groups pursuing control of the land of Libya. The Syrian scenario may, with some differences apply to the Libyan civil war. First, the intrastate battle that has been touching off the nation since the flare-up of the "Arab Spring" is demonstrated in the battle between the Gadhaası’s regime and the rebels. Mass uprisings in Libya started on February 15, 2011 in the city of Benghazi, concentrating on human rights, social reform, and political defilement lastly requesting the end of Muammar Gadhaası's rule.\textsuperscript{39} The expressed reason for that challenge was the capture of human rights legal advisor Fathi Terbil. However, rebel organizers were moreover obviously propelled by the ongoing peaceful toppling of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt.

To replicatethese protests (the previously mentioned Horizontal Contagion) went out over prominent sites and long range interpersonal communication destinations for weeks, prompting the confinement of a large number of rebels.\textsuperscript{40} As the NTC set its plan and assembly and Gadhaası regime broke down, the quiet challenges formed into a grizzly thoughtful war that was just authoritatively finished with Gadhaasley's demise on October 20, 2011 and the NTC's presentation of victory supported by the NATO-led military intervention in line with the UN Resolution (1973) to protect civilians under attack in Libya. Although this intervention managed to end the rule of Gadhaasley, it failed to restore the public order in Libya. This situation, three years later (2014), motivated the militias who fought against Gadhaasley to develop divergent interests and entrench their control over a number of cities and villages in Libya. This prompted a fragmentation of authority, which in turn added to the multiplication of terrorist associations that further undermined any reconciliation endeavors and the conceivable foundation of a state apparatus. Gadhaasley's brutal and repressive regime, regional division of Libya into NTC and following groups, allied rebel forces, and the impact of the UN, NATO intervention, and the Arab League together pushed Libya's contention inflexibly from quiet dissent to grizzly affable war.\textsuperscript{41} Unavoidably, the competition among different groups dragged a series of external actors into the politics of Libya, which


\textsuperscript{38} Olivier, Marc-r, Ibid.


\textsuperscript{40} Guttentag, Matt. (2012). Greed, Grievance, And Gadhaasley: How Well Do Rational Choice Frameworks Explain The Libyan Uprising of 2011? International Affairs Review • Volume XX, Number 3

\textsuperscript{41} Bhardwaj, Maya. (2017)
transformed the nation's contention into a proxy war. For the second and third level in the Syrian scenario, although external actors interfere intensively in the internal conflict in Libya; however, it wasn’t the Cold War scenario or a religious-based intervention such as Iran and Hezbollah’s support to the Alawite Assad regime and the Saudi support of the Sunnis but an interest-oriented intervention.

Although the scenarios of the civil wars in Syria and Libya are different, as delineated previously; however the two countries suffered from similar deficiencies which nurtured and consolidated internal conflicts inside them. These deficiencies are varied and numerous, but this study will focus on greed and grievances, state incapacity and the role of external actors, international and regional actors in these wars.

4.1 Greed & Grievance

The possibility of civil war gives an appropriate mask both to greed and grievance. Many scholars argued that greed and Grievances were widespread throughout the Arab region. Collier and Hoeffler, in the greed argument, postulates that on-screen actorsin a circumstance of unavoidable conflict play out a cost-benefit analysis that led them to see the potential profits of encounter as being more prominent than its conceivable results. In this specific situation, the supporters of greed explanation highlight that avidity; economic gains and the perception of encounter as rational speculation to achieve an ideal result are the most intense impetuses of conflict. In this way, the parties inside a conflict are viewed as rational actors catalyzed by the possibilities of self-enrichment (loot-seeking) are believed to be very related to the beginning of conflict than ethnic or political complaints (Justice-seeking). Rebels are thought by some business analysts to be opportunists and their grievances are most intentionally fashioned. Some economic analysts utilize the term 'predators of productive economic practices' they believe that rebels are not legends battling for a sensible reason but rather desire for power and fortune. Rebels use war as a way to abuse regular folks, they may seek after government to carry out barbarities which offer them a chance to battle for a genuine or false reason. These patterns exploded by 2011 through the domino theory. Collier and Hoeffler contend that all uprisings are joined by an account of greed and grievances, although greed based analysis would prompt little support. As a result, their fundamental clarification for the episode of contention is greed: rebels are keen on the benefits that they can make from primary commodities.

Initially, in the greed argument, the primary commodity exports factor has obviously had a significant effect in Syria since the country is very reliant on its oil, mineral and gas reserve. In the course of the recent two decades, this area of the economy has contributed around 25% to the nation's total out GDP, a rate that exasperates Syria's vulnerability as indicated by the Collier-Hoeffler Model. Obviously, such an abundance of coveted resources is regularly parallel with the predominance and the power of conflict and is probably going to go about as an operator of precariousness as opposed to as an underwriter of success, catch that is generally known as the "asset revile or resource curse". For the situation of Syria, these assets have undeniably been instrumentalised by various on-screen actors, for example, ISIS, diverse radical groups and governmental forces that utilized them as irreplaceable financial supplies and as strong political influences. Consequently, the lootable, effectively assessable and stationary character of these primary commodities, synchronized with the fragility of the Syrian regime, has irrefutably created various chances for the rebels, enabling them to convert their aggressive plans into actions. In that sense, the connection between Syria's primary commodities and the upheaval of the war can be clarified by trading such commodities motivates, makes disobedience plausible and maybe even appealing. Moreover, Syria's economic growth rate continues to decline during the ongoing war that started in 2011, declining by more than 70% from 2010 to 2017; a situation that pushes 82% of its populace

---

42Collier and Hoeffler, Ibid.
44Collier and Hoeffler, Ibid
48Collier and Hoeffler, Ibid
under the poverty line.\footnote{World Bank. (2016). Youth Unemployment: Syrian Arab Republic. World Bank. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org} In addition, it appears that unemployed youth has added to the catalysis of the conflict. The estimates of jobless Syrians between the age of 15 and 24 have been drifting around 20% since the 1990s and have remained well above 30% since the episode of the war.\footnote{Borshchevskaya, A. (2013, January 24). Russia’s Many Interests in Syria. The Washington Institute. Retrieved from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org} This shortage of economic chances has certainly reinforced a strong assumption of dissatisfaction and fear among these youths and the belligerents of the conflict have clearly benefited from this frustrated youth base whose individuals speak to “prime possibility for enlistment”. Evidently, youth unemployment has produced a significant measure of voracity in these jobless Syrians youth who, by joining a rebellious group or an Islamist militia for instance, figured out how to procure what they saw as a lot of the pie and, simultaneously, a feeling of relief.\footnote{Ballantine, K., & Sherman, J. (2003). The Political Economy of Armed Conflicts: Beyond Greed and Grievance. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.} On the external actors’ level, greed argument is also demonstrated. The role of the economic and political interests of external actors must, for this situation like in numerous others, be incorporated into the conflict condition. Concerning Syria, this factor is by all accounts especially significant since the nation speaks to a standout amongst the most essential customer of Russia’s weapons industry, Moscow reporting 78% of Syria’s weapons come from Russia during the period 2007 and 2012.\footnote{https://www.indexmundi.com/syria/economy_profile.html} The Russian government likewise has solid economic and politico-vital impetuses to ensure its last military toehold in the Mediterranean, in particular, the Tartouz base situated on Syria’s western coast.\footnote{https://www.indexmundi.com/syria/economy_profile.html} On the opposite side, the Western help to the radical groups is by all accounts impelled by a longing to confront and restrict Russian and Chinese influence in the region. In fact, the exponential inclusion of the United States and of European countries in the war lies on significant geostrategic and political interests. In this way, the exogenous intervention in the Syrian conflict has been fuelled by inspirations that relate to greed as comprehended by Collier and Hoeffler (for example of financial nature) yet they were additionally actuated by political greed.

As opposed to the greed-based theory as proposed by Collier and Hoeffler, other scholars contend that the notable record demonstrates grievances as an imperative inspiration for violent rebellion. Frances Stewart recognizes two sorts of disparities: vertical and horizontal. The former alludes to disparities as estimated on a societal dimension between people, while the later estimates imbalances between social groups, where one social group is underestimated compared to others.\footnote{Stewart, F. (2013). Approaches Towards Inequality and Inequity: Concepts, measures and policies. Florence: UNICEF Office of Research} No doubt that the most striking and strong case of inter-group contempt in Syria is the one between Shia and Sunni sects. Established in hundreds of years of foe conjunction, this detestation is exacerbated by the political scene of the nation that, for a long time, has favored the Shia minority (generally 10% of the populace) to the detriment of the Sunni lion’s share (over 70%).\footnote{https://www.indexmundi.com/syria/economy_profile.html} Undoubtedly, since the 1963 coup instigated by the Baath party, Syria has been uninterrupted governed by the Assad family of Shia affiliation, that continuously executed a fundamental culture of preferentialism for its coreligionists.\footnote{https://www.indexmundi.com/syria/economy_profile.html} Consequently, as the socio-political and economic benefits of the few progressively supplanted the requirements of the many, this asymmetry between the Shias’ capacity domination and their real statistic portrayal has step by step created a powerful estimation of grievances among marginalized Syrians. Fundamentally, the political and monetary segregation that has been afflicting the Sunni lion’s share for the most recent decades gives off an impression of being intensely adjusted with the statutes of the even imbalance hypothesis sketched out by Frances Stewart. In reality, over the political underestimation of the Sunni dominant part, Syria is additionally a standout amongst the most unequal Middle Eastern nation as far as income distribution (GINI file), its diverse districts are in all respects unequally enriched as far as frameworks and open administrations and the improvement of rural regions is seriously hampered by the convergence of...
socioeconomic opportunities in urban areas. The connection between income and civil war has been inspected in its a wide range of viewpoints. Analysts have dissected the correlation between the level, the development, the structure and distribution of income and eruption of conflicts. The level of income per capita is incorporated into most empirical studies of civil war. It was discovered noteworthy in the studies of attitudes and frames of mind to resistance. As the historical evidence shows, numerous nations are gotten in a contention trap, so low income could be the outcome of past clash and a reason new clash. The socioeconomic disappointments are especially striking in the northern and southern areas of Syria where the framework shortage and the financial dubiousness are outstandingly intense. Henceforth, the underestimated communities inside the Syrian populace have supposedly occupied with this conflict trying to amend these imbalances while the advantageous groups have at the same time tried to protect their benefits utilizing similar strategies. In this manner, the patent cover between these “socially defined” units and the asymmetry of their comparing political and economic methods has positively been a standout amongst the most significant cause of complaint in Syria and has definitely established one of the fundamental reasons for the flare-up and of the heightening of the war.

In Libya, the decision to establish the state was the result of Cold War rivalries era highlighting the competing interests of Western allies vis a vis the Soviet Union. After long debates, the Security Council announced in 1949 that the area’s diverse populations should be brought together as a nationstate. Since the ascendance of Gadhafi to power (1969), he has been extracting and using the country’s oil revenues to benefit himself and his close tribal entourage on the detriment of the rest of the improvised population. Throughout the last four decades, Gadhafi drove a radical, sporadic, and hazy political and economic framework. Politically, Gadhafi made a complex structure of regularly changing principles that prompted steady turnover of nearby authorities, visit revamping of the official power structure, and no space for free thoughtful society. He viably made two parallel overseeing structures: an incredible “progressive area” which he ran alongside his inward circles, and a practically subservient bureaucratic division accountable for running the official committees. Moreover, Gadhafi took measures to address the underlying tribalism that he thought was threatening his power. Not long after the overthrow of king Idris, Gadhafi started attempting to destroy the tribal framework as a political element and consign it to an absolutely social establishment, in this was weakening the capacity of tribes to fill in as non-regime arranging forces.

According to the greed-based analysis, the nation emphatically depends on primary commodity exports as oil, and it had estimated unemployment of 30% in 2004. When the fighting started, economic interests triggered rebels that need to exploit the contention. Proof for this in Libya is given by Dirk Vandewalle in a meeting with Foreign Affairs on ‘rebels civilian armies’ which created in Libya amid the war that still endeavor to benefit from viciousness after the toppling of Gadhafi. The role of oil can be found in this light: aside from being a lifesaver for the revolutionary development, rebels could rapidly get a motivating force for or built up an

60 Patel, P. ibid
61 Olivier, Marc-r. Ibid.
62 Guttentag, Matt.Ibid.
enthusiasm for, control over oil. Oil may likewise have assumed a significant role in financing the continuation, if not the flare-up, of the war. Late in the war, it was uncovered that a great part of the rebels ‘financing originated from foreign countries and governments, most obviously from the tiny energy-producing Gulf state of Qatar. Moreover, Qatar was the main Arab state to officially recognize the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya, a declaration that came one day after Qatar Petroleum signed an oil marketing deal with the rebels. It is improbable that the rebels would have had the capacity to keep up themselves all through the war without this financing and diplomatic cover. In this sense, on an applied dimension Collier and Hoeffler’s general practicality framework may be fairly suitable in clarifying oil’s role; however extraction of rents from oil was not a prompt impetus for the radicals themselves, the remote financing acquired because of the nearness of oil made it possible for the dissidents to keep on battling.

Regarding the grievance-based argument, first, the Libyan people have suffered under the economic biased policies of the Gadafi’s regime. During the 1990s, international sanctions were imposed on Libya that for the most part hit the more unfortunate residents. To exacerbate the situation, the sanctions regime was mishandled by the rich class, who figured out how to auction sustenance remittances and increased remarkable access to foreign products. Meanwhile, public services were disintegrated. Subsequently, the gap between the rich and poor in Libya augmented. In 2003 this compounded, as subsidies were removed, consequently further irritated Libyans. The blend of poor business opportunities and the way that education levels emphatically expanded in late decades can be viewed as a noteworthy cause of vertical economic grievance, as it was incomprehensible for residents to deal with the standards that they were prepared for. Second, political power was consistently in the hands of the regime. Territorial political bodies were insufficient, and Gadafi was the only one to settle on political choices. It was a dictator police state without ideological groups which damaged the legitimate privileges of every one of those that contradicted it. Restriction to the regime was kept low through dread. Reactions to dissents were brutal, and opponents confronted torment and executions. These measures guaranteed the regime’s hang on power for quite a while, yet in addition, caused broad disdain. Thirdly, in a nation that customarily esteemed a calm way of life, the Gadafi’s sons showed their Western extravagances to the entire populace which further exasperated disdain. Fourthly, the contention in Libya is described as a solid local division. Generally, the east has been the focal point of rebellion against Gadafi. Amid the second half of the 1990s, Benghazi had been the focal point of an Islamist uprising against the regime. As indicated by Pargenter, Gadafi’s reaction was to keep the East in a ‘consistent condition of underdevelopment’, as a result of challenging the regime. The Gadafi’s arrangements towards the East were essential in shaping the fundamental disdain for delayed disobedience. In 2001, 76% of the natives in Benghazi


72 Pargeter, Alison, Ibid

73 Ibid.
felt estranged from the political procedure and looked for a change. It was the East that at long last rose to face the region, with Benghazi as its most imperative city. Fifthly, Gadhafi had since quite a while ago abused the tribal conflict in Libya. In the beginning, Gadhafi played out the distinctive clans against one another, with three clans as the fundamental columns under his regime. After an endeavored overthrow by the Warfalla clan in 1993, the Libyan authority comprised completely of individuals from the Gadaffi, the leader’s very own clan. Along these lines Gadhafi guaranteed their steadfastness to the regime. As a result, the remainder of the populace had no point of view at portrayal or improving its position and was kept on a chain through compulsion. It is contended that innate loyalties molded devotions amid the upset, despite the fact that they were less essential than the territorial division.

4.2 Authoritarian Regimes and State institutional capacity

State institutional capacity is a major determinant of its operations; two different institutional trends are observed between Libya and Syria. Before the uprising, President Bashar El Assadanounced that Syria was stable and that the country lacked the overt structural problems that dogged Tunisia and Egypt. Yet, he ignored the fact that Syria was, however, “no stranger to uprising” especially that various unrests also rocked the country in 1964, 1973 and 1980–1982, with the latter culminating in the notorious Hama massacre during which 20,000 people were killed in three weeks by government forces. These previous historical upheavals worked differently in different states. On the one hand, it can facilitate the eruption of rebellion especially if we consider the case of Syria, we find that the 1980-82 grievances were neither addressed nor efficient reforms were implemented; which cumulated until the explosion of the Arab Spring. On the other hand, the memories of previous upheavals and its accompanying violence and insecurity may deter societies from rebelling against their authoritarian regimes. This argument can be relatively applied to Libya that did not witness before the mass civil war, hence the society was ready to explode without fear. Bashar inherited the state with strong politicized fully functioned institutions. Yet, due to his policies, he created at the heart of the regime the “crony capitalists - the rent-seeking alliances of political brokers” controlled by Asad’s mother’s family and the bourgeoisie. Regime patrons developed partnerships with the bourgeoisie. It was the new bourgeoisie, not the Ba’ath Party that financed Asad’s 2007 re-election campaign. Bashar perceived the party apparatus, civil society and the workers and peasants unions as obstacles to reforms as he believed in the need to achieve economic reforms first which will be preceded with political ones. He decided to cut all funds. Additionally, he infiltrated the party by elements with conflicting orientations to weaken it; thus it declined as a recruitment channel to high office. In 2010 on the eve of the revolt, he dissolved the second-rank branch and sub-branch leaderships. This hampered the regime’s organized channels to its constituency and infiltration of neighborhoods and villages. The gap was generally filled by the security services, which were highly corrupt. Many scholars explain violence erupting in Syria as a response to the government’s failure to solve the humanitarian crisis prompted by the 2006–2010 droughts leading to the economic crisis exacerbated by the unintended consequences of El Asad inefficient reforms. This means that in some cases events are driven by external

79 Ibid.

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2408041734 www.iorsjournals.org 28|Page
factors yet exacerbated by domestic ignorance or inefficiency. In 2000, the regime adopted detrimental state policies, Bashar al-Asad’s decided to open the economy to the global market and adapt globalization measures. His priorities were to foster modernizing and reinforce state institutions through administrative reform. In fact, the regime chose a ‘middle’ way through the expansion of the private sector while reforming the public sector. However, this middle way reform, “designed to retain the regime’s old base while adding new support and failed as they were superficial and not real. The technocrats coopted in the system lacked capacity, experience, will and networks to implement policies; hence reforms did not produce any societal improvement yet deepened grievances. Although the Syrian regime was not explicitly highlighting ethnic polarization, all implemented policies were deeply fractionalizing the society. Hence, the society is divided with sectarian rifts as 74% of the population is Sunni, and the remaining 36% is divided among significant minorities such as Christians, Alawites, and non-Sunni Muslims each makeup about 10%. The smaller minorities are the Druze living in the mountains and the Kurds mainly in the northeast. The Druze are loyal to the regime governing their lands, while, the Kurds have always suffered from discrimination by the government. They have been denied basic human rights. Historically, Alawite minority seized power from the Sunni through a military coup in late 1966. Given the tension between sects in Syria due to widespread inequality, discrimination and poverty, arming the opposition led to “a catastrophe”. According to French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe "The Syrian people are deeply divided, and if we give arms to a certain faction of the Syrian opposition, we would make a civil war among Christians, Alawite, Sunnis and Shites," This materialized after 2011. It is the divisions in the Syrian opposition camp that prevented them from uniting against Bashar or gaining significant international support.

Libya has been known to be a state without structure. Gaddafi was not interested in establishing functioning institutions to the extent that when his regime collapsed, Gaddafi took the state with him. The collapse of the regime put the state itself at risk and left a vacuum in which authority became contested. As Fahim reports, “In the absence of a strong government, a shadow state was emerging, centered on the power of militias made up of men who fought Colonel Gadhafi and never put down their arms.” The Gaddafi regime was based on the security sector for its survival hence the collapse of the security establishment meant its end. The fall of the regime signaled the close of a repressive system which led systematic and perpetual violence against diverse groups in the country. Almost the whole army defected. Accordingly, when Gaddafi was captured by the rebels and killed, the state had no remaining institutions. In fact, Libya had a weak structured military, air force and navy. The management of public and private sector was controlled by Gaddafi family members and patrons. Individuals were appointed upon their loyalty to the regime. The implosion of institutions left a vacuum that was filled by rebels who refused to disarm. This vacuum tooled and generated conflicts over power and resources. “To build a functional state, Libya needs to prevail over the four-decade old Gaddafi-led authoritarian legacy which prevented the development of authentic national institutions. Gaddafi policies were sharp and decisive. The parliament was prorogued; the cabinet was banished; their ministries were destroyed; and the army was reduced in size, and organized with new trainers. Later on, the Cyrenaican Defense Force was pushed to slowly disintegrate, and it was replaced “by platoons of Gadhafi bodyguards (including cadres of female “Practorians”. Gadhafi’s own tribal members were placed in the top echelon of command. The tribal federations then were the only available foundation for governance. To guide

84 Ibid.
his policies, Gadhafi wrote and published The Green Book. Accordingly, he ended political life by denying all freedom of association, participation or expression. He wiped all political parties and trade organizations. The resultant idiosyncratic system was a form of tribal headed by Gaddafi autocratic ruler. Regime durability was rooted upon grants to loyal tribes and the armament of their local militias. The opposition was treated with extreme harshness, including imprisonment and sometimes public execution.88 Libyans had a weak sense of national identity. The collapse of Gaddafi allowed for disunity that could not be stopped by a transitional government without a monopoly on the use of force. Historically, Libya was divided into three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan which have different ethnic/tribal structures. Since 2012, disunity manifested itself as provinces including Cyrenaica demanded more autonomy and a bigger share in the state’s resources and powers. First, in June 2013, Cyrenaica claimed self-rule by tribal representatives and the establishment of the Cyrenaica defense forces. Secondly, a deeper ethnic problem emerged with the Berbers in western Libya in the JabalNafusa and the Tabu ethnic group from southern Libya claimed more rights and freedoms. The Berbers (the majority of the Libyans) asked for the recognition of their language as an official language and claimed constitutional protection or they will arm themselves against any coming authority. Moreover, radical Islamist groups found opportunities to grow in Libya as a failed state that lacked control over its terrain and borders.89

The conflict has severely and negatively affected the populace of Libya and Syria however, it has likewise given chances to new actors inside their prospering war economies. In Syria, the weakening of Assad regime and progressing civil conflicts has comparatively prompted the making of new equipped groups and a wide scope of new economic elites, some lined up with the regime and others with a wide exhibit of rebel groups. Others have created noteworthy incomes through their capacity to bargain crosswise over front lines. The emergence of these actors, by and large, dug in negative motivating forces for the propagation of contention and the interruption of contention mediation endeavors. In Libya, the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, the expansion of militant groups and the disintegration of the state's coercive hold have delivered a situation helpful for an arrangement of contention business people and equipped players to assemble new – or develop existing types of income.90

War economy elements are to a great extent subject to state incapacity. Control of an area and economic infrastructure is an integral asset of income generation in Libya and Syria. Without state authorization, ground-breaking insurance markets have developed in which militant groups instrumentalised violence. In Syria, the checkpoint between attacked rebel-held Eastern Ghouta and regime held domain around it was for some time called “The Million Checkpoint” in light of the measure of benefit that could be created from the casual tax collection of products going through. In 2015, the arrangement of payoffs made sugar multiple times as costly in Eastern Ghouta as in Damascus, and this obviously was reliant on the upkeep of threats between powers in the Eastern Ghouta and those that enclosed the zone.91 In Libya, oil blockades controlled by militias have been utilized as an important weapon to blackmail the state. The blockades in the oil bow from 2013-6 driven by Ibrahim Jadran is accounted to have cost the state coffers over $100bn and got Jadhra an installment of over $40m from the UN-backed government. The blockades didn't finish by the installment but instead continued afterJadrans’s forces were expelled from the territory. Direct oil sales likewise produce critical incomes. Much has been made of the alleged Islamic State’s control of oil fields and the income is created from them. In any case, it was nearby clans not Islamic State that separated and refined the oil. Islamic State taxed that production. In his study (2015), Abdulaziz Hallaj assessed that IS was making $2-3 million per day from oil smuggling; around a quarter was appropriated by leaders to their adherents. A reassertion of state power over these advantages would subsequently, at any rate, decrease these chances.92 In Libya, the absence of state control and power has prompted open challenge inside Libya's smuggling sector and, because of the fast proliferation of weapons; dealers have turned out to be progressively dependent on armed groups. Thus, these armed groups

88 Ibid.
have turned out to be all the more straightforwardly engaged with smuggling activity. In this manner, a solid state with a solid security area introduces a noteworthy danger to such groups. Oil smuggling has turned into an exceptionally worthwhile income hot spot for smugglers who utilize deceitful administrative work to get to refined petroleum at an exceedingly financed rate and either sneak it out of the nation or offer it locally on the black market rate (which is a lot higher than the official rate). Regardless of its knowledge of the degree of oil smuggling, the state has had the capacity to do little practically speaking to stop it. Also, no critical international consideration has been given to the development of human smuggling in Libya: in 2010 around 15,000 refugees and displaced people landed Libyan shores to reach Europe. By 2016, that number had expanded to more than 162,000, making human smuggling a worthwhile source of income.

The circumstances in Syria are different. While the regime has access to the state coffers, it faces an asset lack. The regime's endeavors to navigate EU sanctions have driven it to engage another companion of businesspeople, with whom its interests are firmly adjusted. These people have solid motivating forces to act against the arrival of other business people who left Syria at the start of contention as they will compromise their position. The absence of resources has likewise constrained the Syrian regime to sub-contract roles and responsibilities earlier appointed to the state. The Tiger Forces and the Desert Hawks – two driving regime adjusted forces are supported by affluent people instead of the state. The Tiger Forces are financed by Rami Makhlouf (Assad's maternal cousin) and contain a critical number of previous smugglers and criminal components that were enlisted for criminal activities in Hama. The Desert Hawks, in the meantime, were established by Mohamed and Ayman Jaber, who had initially made their fortune from oil sneaking to Iraq as a component of oil for sustenance during the 1990s. In spite of vowing loyalty to Assad, both the Tiger Forces and the Desert Hawks have kept on running their own smuggling activities and practice with a great deal of autonomy.

4.2 Foreign intervention: International and Regional Actors

Finally, external patronage obviously keeps on playing an immediate and significant role in the propagation of contention in Syria and Libya. Eight years into Syria's civil war, the nation is at more serious risk than any time in the recent history of being invaded by the proxy wars of different countries. External supporters of the two sides treat the contention as a zero-sum game situation with broad and, for certain actors existential ramifications for their own vital positions, and are along these lines ready to counteract any result they would view as disadvantageous. Their diplomatic, financial, military assistance fans the flames of contention and reinforces the hand of radicals on the two sides. Optimists and pessimists don’t expect that the contention will be either settled politically or won militarily. The conflicting parties in Syria have been receiving increasingly open support from outside actors. Well beyond the interior power battle, the contention has obtained the character of a proxy war in which global, territorial and subnational clashes are battled out. One bone of conflict is the explanation and enforcement of global standards, with the United States and other Western states backing the Syrian resistance while Russia and China support the Assad regime with support and veto in the UN Security Council and, on account of Russia, arms conveyances. Moscow and Beijing oppose the application of the international responsibility to protect. In Russian-American relations, there are additionally indications of contention over zones of influence echoing the style of the Cold War. However, it is overall the contention over Iran’s provincial or regional role that stirs the civil war in Syria. From the point of view of the Gulf States, an issue of first importance for Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Syrian crisis offers a chance to switch Tehran's extensive development in impact since the 2003 Iraq War and fortify their own positions. Israel has appeared, mainly out of worry over spill-over impacts: destabilization of its borders with Syria, the utilization of chemical

93 Easton, Tim, Ibid.

94 Ibid.


Therefore, over six years, the circumstance. he control of General Khalifa intervention, news commitment with Russia as a chance to attract the United States to his side by taking steps to furnish the conventional American adversary with a chance to set up a military exertion to retake the whole foothold in the central Mediterranean. This prompted a fracture of power, which thus added to the multiplicity of criminal associations that further undermined any reconciliation endeavors and the conceivable foundation of a state device. Definitively, the contention among different groups dragged external actors to the political issues of Libya, which transformed the nation's contention into a proxy war. Unfortunately, the intervention was a failure as the alliance neglected to set out an arrangement for rebuilding public order in Libya. Therefore, over six years, the circumstances in Libya are essentially increasingly risky. The militias who battled against Gadhafi created separating interests and found esteem in digging in their command over urban areas and towns. This prompted a fracture of power, which thus added to the multiplication of criminal associations that further undermined any reconciliation endeavors and the conceivable foundation of a state device. Definitively, the contention among different groups dragged external actors to the political issues of Libya, which transformed the nation's contention into a proxy war. NATO's departure and assurance not to "possess" the Libyan issue prompted a fast collapse on the ground. The competition between local factions and their international supporters achieved its peak in the late spring of 2014 when the nation was divided into two sections, one in Tobruk in the east under the control of General Khalifa Haftar and the chosen House of Representatives, and one in the west driven by Islamist-inclining civilian army leaders in the city of Misrata. While by and large, the factional contentions in Libya have genuine roots, they have been exacerbated by the interests of external actors which include Russia, the US and some European countries on the international level and Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the regional level.

On the international level, Haftar views commitment with Russia as a chance to attract the United States to his side by taking steps to furnish the conventional American adversary with a chance to set up a foothold in the central Mediterranean. The inability and reluctance of Egypt to support military exertion to retake the whole countrydiverted Haftar’s attention towards a more powerful actor, Russia. Russia has clear vital interests in Libya that are not constrained to Moscow's assumed enthusiasm for building up a military base or engaging in the sale of military equipment. Rather, Russia's advantage lies in anticipating power in a zone of basic significance to Western interests and subsequently confronting similar NATO members defying Moscow on its eastern front. Clearly, even as it militarily bolsters Haftar or claims to, Russia keeps on declaring support

---

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
for the UN-drove arrangements and the PC/GNA in Tripoli. This indicates concerns with respect to a Russian mediation in Libya similar to that in Syria have been blown out of proportion. In effect, Moscow is playing the two sides by supporting the LNA while also expressing readiness to help Serraj’s administration and act as a power broker in the midst of missing Western leadership. This gives Russia the chance to fill the void of initiative left by the West, particularly the United States, in Libya. Russia is far-fetched to submit completely to Haftar or endeavor to set up a base in Libya at any point in the near future.¹⁰⁴

In his first speech to the American people on war against Libya, President Barack Obama put forth a defense for US intervention right to implement military operations anywhere in the world where it sees its “interests and values” at stake. What are these interests on account of Libya? While Washington had looked for a strong beneficial relationship with the Gaddafi regime, it had dependably seemed Gaddafi by dint of his radical posing and historical antagonism against imperialism as an inconsistent partner. Also, the US administration saw with great concern that both Russia and China were building up associations with Libya, as far as oil bargains, framework tasks and arms contracts, which undermined US interests in the Mediterranean and North Africa. The objective of the military activity is to endorse an increasingly malleable regime, an out-and-out US puppet in Tripoli;¹⁰⁵ UK, France, and Italy have additionally assumed an influential role in this proxy war. Italy has stayed consistent and sound in its support for Serraj’s PC/GNA while additionally perceiving the significance of incorporating Haftar in a settlement.¹⁰⁶ Although the conduct of the United Kingdom and France has been more obscure, the two countries have logically upheld the LPA and Serraj, their extraordinary tasks powers have effectively helped Haftar’s troops in their battle against Islamists in Benghazi and in other eastern areas.¹⁰⁷ France has an enthusiasm for keeping up impact in the southern part of Libya and in this manner has not delayed helping various groups in the nation independent of the ramifications for the political exchanges process. Europe likewise seems progressively worried about stemming the risk from an intensifying worsening migration crisis radiating from Libya’s shores than with the requirement for Libyan compromise.

On the regional level, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt assumed some roles in the Libyan war. Qatar in 2011 transparently upheld the rebel against Gadhafi and effectively worked to reinforce powers near its Islamist partners. Qatar was the primary nation to recognize the Libyan rebels and had started sending those arms right off the bat in 2011 as they battled to topple Gadhafi. Media reports additionally propose that Qatari Special Forces were sent to Libya and probably some Libyan revolutionaries got military training in Qatar.¹⁰⁸ The little Gulf nation keeps on doing as such today. Due to US and UN pressures, Qatar suspended its endorsement to its Libyan proxies in 2015; however, it resumed its support in 2016. The Qatari-Emirati competition, more fueled when Saudi Arabia and its partners severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, has been the noteworthy factor in the continuation of the present Libyan Civil War, substantially more so than nationalistic or Islamist ideologies. Qatar and the UAE both punch over their weight in the contention in light of the fact that dissimilar to in Yemen or Syria, the role of the United States and other powers is to some degree suspended. Of significance for both Gulf States is the economic opportunity in post-war Libya. The nation is home to a portion of the last critical underexplored oil and gas bowls in the Middle East. Outside the oil segment, Qatar has financial arrangements with Libya that date to the Gadhafi time. The UAE, as an early speculator in Libya, has additionally looked for controlling positions in the Libyan financial sector. Doha’s interests in Libya are not just financial and political; commitment in Libya is a type of intensity projection through which Qatar underpins the foundation of sympathetic regimes in regions of key significance. It is likewise broadly known that a huge piece of the help that Qatar gives to its partners is completed in a joint effort with Turkey. Turkish President, Erdoğan has frequently spoken with compassion toward the reason for Islamists

¹⁰⁴ MezranKarim, Ibid.
¹⁰⁸ MezranKarim, Ibid.
¹⁰⁹ Hammond, Joseph. (2017), Qatar and Arab powers are already at war in Libya. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com

DOI: 10.9790/0837-2408041734  www.iosrjournals.org  33 | Page
in Libya. In addition, Gurbuz urged that economic interests are of great significance for Turkey in establishing its policy in Libya; therefore, the proceeded security and survival of Ankara’s ally in Tripoli is as yet basic for the existence and extension of Turkey’s financial advantages in Libya. However, Nicholas Heras, the Middle East Security Fellow at The Center for a New American Security, urged against overstating Turkey’s role in Libya. “Turkey has engaged in more of a soft power approach to Libya, (more) trying to build lines of influence than actually trying to mobilize militias.”

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia hold an oppositely restricted vision to that of Qatar. In the recent decade, both these states have come to see the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam as a threat to their existence. Accordingly, they have propelled a decided crusade against political Islam over the area. These endeavors created in June 2017 at the point when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain severed political ties with Qatar and moved to separate Doha by cutting land, ocean, and air courses to it. Egypt’s national security strategy sees the foundation of an Islamist free zone of order on its western frontiers as an essential objective. This has guided Egypt’s solid and resolute help for Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and its activities against Islamists in Benghazi. Obviously, Egypt’s interests are not restricted to the foundation of a security zone on its frontiers. Egypt perceivesthe economic gains that would stem from exercising influence over the east of Libya. Cairo would want to acquire worthwhile focal points through reconstruction instead of a draw in with Haftar in a more extended, more costly, and likely risky military battle to win all of Libya.

IV. CONCLUSION

In spite of the fact that both the Libyan and Syrian civil wars began in peaceful demonstrations and they confronted highly aggressive repression from entrenched tyrant regimes which ended up with severe civil wars, scenarios in the two countries are different. The Syrian scenario is mainly portrayed in a sort of sectarian strife between the religious Shiite Alawite regime of Bashar Al Assad, the Syrian president, which brutally faced the unarmed Sunni demonstrations which pursued political reforms in the beginning. On the other side, the Libyan scenario wasn’t a sectarian-based scenario. In the first war (2011) the scenario might be described as a quasi-tribal based scenario between the Gadhafia, the small tribe of Muammar Gadhafi the ruler and marginalized large tribes. The scenario in the second war (2014) is portrayed by some scholars as a quasi-sectarian between the Islamists groups and the secular government in Tobruk. Although the Scenarios of wars in Syria and Libya are somehow different, similar war correlates are common in the two countries. Both countries suffered from authoritarian regimes, weak states, greed and grievances and political and economic marginalization. Moreover, when regional and international actors interfere, they interfered pursuing their own interests regardless of terminating the wars or reconciliation between the conflicting parties. Consequently, these two wars will not end except when one of the conflicting parties is totally destroyed.

Dr Taha Kassem. "Civil Wars in Arab Countries: Different Scenarios But Similar Correlates, a Comparative Study of Syria and Libya." IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), vol. 24 no. 08, 2019, pp. 17-34.

112 Ibid.