

## Issues and Challenges in Distributed Sensor Networks- A Review

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**Abstract:** Distributed Sensor networks (DSN) is an emerging technology and have great potential to be employed in critical situations like battlefields and commercial applications such as process management, health care monitoring, environmental/earth sensing, industrial monitoring and many more scenarios. One of the major challenges distributed sensor networks face today is security. While the deployment of sensor nodes in an unattended environment makes the networks vulnerable to a variety of potential attacks, the inherent power and memory limitations of sensor nodes makes conventional security solutions unfeasible. The sensing technology combined with processing power and wireless communication makes it profitable for being exploited in great quantity in future. The wireless communication technology also acquires various types of security threats. This paper discusses a wide variety of security, research, computational and design issues along with the challenges faced.

**Keywords:** Distributed Sensor Network, Design issues, Security issues, Defensive mechanisms, Challenges.

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### I. Introduction

A Distributed Sensor Network can be defined as a set of spatially scattered intelligent sensors designed to obtain measurement from the environment, abstract relevant information from the data gathered, and to derive appropriate interferences from the information gained. Typical examples include temperature, light, sound, and humidity. These sensor readings are transmitted over a wireless channel to a running application that makes decisions based on these sensor readings. Many applications have been proposed for distributed sensor networks, and many of these applications have specific quality of service (QoS) requirements that offer additional challenges to the application designer.[18],[19].

We consider two aspects [8] to motivate an application-based viewpoint: First, what aspects of wireless sensors make the implementation of applications more challenging, or at least different?

One widely recognized issue is the limited power available to each wireless sensor node, but other challenges such as limited storage or processing capabilities play a significant role in constraining the application development. Second, what services are required for a wireless sensor network application to achieve its intended purpose? A number of widely applicable services, such as time synchronization and location determination are briefly discussed. Other services are needed to support database requirements, such as message routing, topology management, and data aggregation and storage. In this paper we discuss a wide variety of security, research, computational and design issues along with the challenges faced.

### II. Design Issues And Challenges In Sensor Networks

Several design challenges [4],[5],[16],[20],[21] present themselves to designers of wireless sensor network applications. The limited resources available to individual sensor nodes implies designers must develop highly distributed, fault-tolerant, and energy efficient applications in a small memory-footprint. For wireless sensor network applications to have reasonable longevity, an aggressive energy-management policy is mandatory. This is currently the greatest design challenge in any wireless sensor network application. Several key differences between more traditional ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks exist. [8]

- 1) Individual nodes in a wireless sensor network have limited computational power and storage capacity. They operate on nonrenewable power sources and employ a short-range transceiver to send and receive messages.
- 2) The number of nodes in a wireless sensor network can be several orders of magnitude higher than in an ad hoc network. Thus, algorithm scalability is an important design criterion for sensor network applications.
- 3) Sensor nodes are generally densely deployed in the area of interest. This dense deployment can be leveraged by the application, since nodes in close proximity can collaborate locally prior to relaying information back to the base station.
- 4) Sensor networks are prone to frequent topology changes. This is due to several reasons, such as hardware failure, depleted batteries, intermittent radio interference, environmental factors, or the addition of sensor nodes. As a result, applications require a degree of inherent fault tolerance and the ability to reconfigure themselves as the network topology evolves over time.
- 5) Wireless sensor networks do not employ a point-to-point communication paradigm because they are usually not aware of the entire size of the network and nodes are not uniquely identifiable. Consequently, it is not possible to individually address a specific node. Paradigms, such as directed diffusion [1], employ a data-

centric view of generated sensor data. They identify information produced by the sensor network as <attribute, value> pairs. Nodes request data by disseminating interests for this named data throughout the network. Data that matches the criterion are relayed back toward the querying node.

Even with the limitations individual sensor nodes possess and the design challenges application developers face, several advantages exist for instrumenting an area with a wireless sensor network:[8]

- 1) Due to the dense deployment of a greater number of nodes, a higher level of fault tolerance is achievable in wireless sensor networks.
- 2) Coverage of a large area is possible through the union of coverage of several small sensors.
- 3) Coverage of a particular area and terrain can be shaped as needed to overcome any potential barriers or holes in the area under observation.
- 4) It is possible to incrementally extend coverage of the observed area and density by deploying additional sensor nodes within the region of interest.
- 5) An improvement in sensing quality is achieved by combining multiple, independent sensor readings. Local collaboration between nearby sensor nodes achieves a higher level of confidence in observed phenomena.
- 6) Since nodes are deployed in close proximity to the sensed event, this overcomes any ambient environmental factors that might otherwise interfere with observation of the desired phenomenon.

### **2.1 Data Aggregation:**

Redundancy exists in sensor data in both the temporal and spatial domains. That is, readings collected by a single sensor at different times or among neighboring sensors may be highly correlated, and contain redundant information. Instead of transmitting all the highly correlated information to subscribers, it may be more effective for some intermediate sensor node(s) to digest the information received and come up with a concise digest, in order to reduce the amount of raw data to be transmitted (and hence the power incurred, and bandwidth consumed, in transmission). This technique is termed as data aggregation (also called data fusion). Data fusion can also be integrated with routing. Compared with traditional address-centric routing, which finds the shortest paths between pairs of end nodes, data-fusion-centric routing aims to locate routes that lead to the largest degree of data aggregation [41].

The aggregation typically follows a tree topology rooted at the sink. Each leaf node would deliver its collected data to its parent node. Intermediate sensor nodes of the tree may optionally perform certain operations (e.g., sum, maximum, minimum, mean, etc.) on the received data and forward the result. Because the wireless medium is shared, transmissions to forward the data need to be coordinated in order to reduce interference and avoid collision. The fundamental challenge can be stated as: How can the aggregation transmissions be scheduled in a wireless sensor network such that no collision may occur and the total number of time slots used (referred to as aggregation latency) is minimized? This is known as the Minimum-Latency Aggregation Scheduling (MLAS) problem in the literature. The MLAS problem is typically approached in two steps: (i) data aggregation tree construction and (ii) link transmission scheduling. For (ii), we assume the simplest mode in which every non-leaf node in the tree will make only one transmission, after all the data from its child nodes have been received. A correct solution to the MLAS problem requires that no concurrent transmissions interfering with each other should take place. If steps (i) and (ii) are carried out simultaneously in a solution, we have a “joint” design.

### **2.2 Time Synchronization**

Sensor networks are used to monitor real-world phenomena. For such monitoring applications, physical time often plays a crucial role. For example, the times of occurrence of physical events are often crucial for the observer to associate event reports with the originating physical events. Also, methods for localization of sensor nodes based on the measurement of time of flight or difference of arrival time of certain signals also require synchronized time. Providing synchronized physical time is a complex task due to various challenging characteristics of sensor networks like energy and other resources, network dynamics, infrastructure and configuration.[17],[37].

Different applications like beam-forming array, data aggregation, recognition of duplicate detection of same event from different sensors, ordering of logged events have different synchronization requirements and also any single synchronization mechanism is not appropriate for all circumstances sensors should have multiple methods available to them so that they can dynamically trade precision for energy, or scope for convergence time. Existing time synchronization methods like NTP conserve use of bandwidth and try to keep the clock synchronization at all times but are not aware of the stringent energy constraints and the heterogeneity of the hardware that may be deployed in sensor networks.

### **2.3 Localization**

In emerging sensor network applications it is necessary to accurately orient the nodes with respect to a global coordinate system in order to report data that is geographically meaningful. Furthermore, basic middle ware services such as routing often rely on location information (e.g., geographic routing). Application contexts and potential massive scale make it unrealistic to rely on careful placement or uniform arrangement of sensors. Rather than use globally accessible beacons or expensive GPS to localize each sensor, we would like the sensors to self-organize a coordinate system.

Some of the design goals of localization in wireless sensor networks are:

- **RF-based:** Normally, the sensors have some kind of short-range radio transceivers for communication. By leveraging this radio for localization the high cost and size requirements of GPS can be avoided.
- **Receiver-based:** For greater scalability, the responsibility for localization must lie with the receiving node that needs to be localized and not with the reference points.
- **Ad Hoc:** For easy deployment, the solution should not require preplanning or extensive infrastructure.
- **Low Energy:** Since the sensors have modest processing capabilities, the mechanisms should minimize computation and message costs to reduce power consumption.
- **Adaptive Fidelity:** The accuracy of the localization algorithms should be adaptive to the granularity of available reference points.

Localization methods typically rely on some form of communication between reference points with known positions and the receiver node that needs to be located. Various localization techniques can be classified into two broad categories based on the granularity of information inferred during the communication. Fine-grained localization systems (e.g., GPS) provide high precision location information, typically estimated ranges or angles relative to beacons (reference points) and compute location of the unknown node using trilateration (position estimation from distance to three points) or triangulation (position estimation from angles to three points). Coarse-grained localization systems estimate unknown node location from proximity to beacons or landmarks

### **2.4 Node Deployment**

Node deployment [11][45] in WSNs is application dependent and affects the performance of the routing protocol. The deployment can be either deterministic or randomized. In deterministic deployment, the sensors are manually placed and data is routed through pre-determined paths. However, in random node deployment, the sensor nodes are scattered randomly creating an infrastructure in an ad hoc manner. If the resultant distribution of nodes is not uniform, optimal clustering becomes necessary to allow connectivity and enable energy efficient network operation. Intersensor communication is normally within short transmission ranges due to energy and bandwidth limitations. Therefore, it is most likely that a route will consist of multiple wireless hops.

### **2.5 Network Dynamics**

Most of the network architectures assume that sensor nodes are stationary. However, mobility of both BS's and sensor nodes is sometimes necessary in many applications. Routing messages from or to moving nodes is more challenging since route stability becomes an important issue, in addition to energy, bandwidth etc. Moreover, the sensed phenomenon can be either dynamic or static depending on the application, e.g., it is dynamic in a target detection/tracking application, while it is static in forest monitoring for early fire prevention. Monitoring static events allows the network to work in a reactive mode, simply generating traffic when reporting. Dynamic events in most applications require periodic reporting and consequently generate significant traffic to be routed to the BS [12].

### **2.6 Energy Efficiency**

Once the WSN is functional it becomes difficult to replace or recharge the battery of sensor nodes. This further poses the challenge to maintain sensors in hostile and harsh environment and scaling of sensor network to hundreds or thousands of nodes. Therefore, an energy-efficient mechanism is required to save energy and prolong the network lifetime [12].

### **2.7 Node/Link Heterogeneity**

In many studies, all sensor nodes were assumed to be homogeneous, i.e., having equal capacity in terms of computation, communication, and power. However, depending on the application a sensor node can have different role or capability. The existence of heterogeneous set of sensors raises many technical issues related to data routing. These special sensors can be either deployed independently or the different functionalities can be included in the same sensor nodes. Even data reading and reporting can be generated from these sensors at different rates, subject to diverse quality of service constraints, and can follow multiple data reporting models.

For example, hierarchical protocols designate a cluster-head (CH) node different from the normal sensors. These cluster heads can be chosen from the deployed sensors or can be more powerful than other sensor nodes in terms of energy, bandwidth, and memory. Hence, the burden of transmission to the BS is handled by the set of cluster-heads [12].

### **2.8 Fault tolerance and reliability**

For many WSN applications, data must be delivered reliably over the noisy, error-prone, and time-varying wireless channel. In such cases, data verification and correction on each layer of the network are critical to provide accurate results. Additionally, sensor nodes are expected to perform self-testing, self-calibrating, self-repair and self-recovery procedures during their lifetime.

### **2.9 Scalability**

Sensor networks should be scalable or flexible. Sensor networks dynamically adopt changes in node density and topology. Sometimes few nodes are added to the sensor networks existed nodes for the purpose of coverage issue. So sensor network is flexible to adapt these changes.

### **2.10 Data Centric Routing**

In data-centric routing protocol, whenever a sink requires any data it sends a query message to the different part of the sensor network field. After receiving this query message sensors node replies and sends data to the sink. In data-centric protocol attribute based naming is used which specifies the properties of the data.

## **III. Security Issues And Challenges In Dsn**

### **3.1 Security Requirements [2]-[6],[13][14][42]:**

#### **1) Availability**

Availability determines whether a node has the ability to use the resources and whether the network is available for the messages to communicate. However, failure of the base station will eventually threaten the entire sensor network. Thus availability is of primary importance for maintaining an operational network.

#### **2) Authentication**

Authentication ensures the reliability of the message by identifying its origin. Attacks in sensor networks do not just involve the alteration of packets; adversaries can also inject additional false packets []. Data authentication verifies the identity of the senders and receivers. Data authentication is achieved through symmetric or asymmetric mechanisms where sending and receiving nodes share secret keys. Due to the wireless nature of the media and the unattended nature of sensor networks, it is extremely challenging to ensure authentication.

#### **3) Confidentiality**

Confidentiality is the ability to conceal messages from a passive attacker so that any message communicated via the sensor network remains confidential. This is the most important issue in network security. A sensor node should not reveal its data to the neighbors.

#### **4) Integrity**

Data integrity in sensor networks is needed to ensure the reliability of the data and refers to the ability to confirm that a message has not been tampered with, altered or changed. Even if the network has confidentiality measures, there is still a possibility that the data integrity has been compromised by alterations. The integrity of the network will be in trouble when:

- A malicious node present in the network injects false data.
- Unstable conditions due to wireless channel caused damage or loss of data. [4]

#### **5) Data Freshness**

Even if confidentiality and data integrity are assured, there is a need to ensure the freshness of each message. Informally, data freshness [] suggests that the data is recent, and it ensures that no old messages have been replayed. To solve this problem a nonce, or another time related counter, can be added into the packet to ensure data freshness

### **3.2 Security Attacks:**

Attackers can be classified into two types: i) external attackers that are not authorized participants of the sensor network and ii) internal attackers that have compromised a legitimate sensor and use it to launch attacks in the network. Furthermore, attackers can be classified into passive and active. Passive attackers monitor

network traffic without interfering with it. Their aim is to eavesdrop on the exchanged information and to acquire private data or to infer about information-sensitive applications that execute in the sensors. Active attackers disrupt network operation by launching several types of attacks that cause DoS (denial of service) in the DSN.

### **1) Denial of Service (DoS)**

A Denial of Service attack in sensor networks in general is defined as any event that eliminates the network's capacity to perform its desired function. DoS attacks in distributed sensor networks may be carried out at different layers like the physical, link, network and transport layers. This occurs by the unintentional failure of sensor nodes. The simplest DoS attack tries to exhaust the resources available to the victim node, by transmitting additional unwanted packets and thus prevents legitimate sensor network users from tapping work or resources to which these nodes are deployed. In DSNs, several types of Denial of Service attacks in different layers might be performed, i.e. at physical layer, the Denial of Service attacks could be jamming and tampering, at link layer, collision, exhaustion, unfairness, at network layer, neglect and greed, homing, misdirection, black holes and at transport layer this attack could be performed by malicious flooding and resynchronizations.

### **2) Spoofed, altered or replay of routing information**

The most outstanding attack on routing is to alter, spoof, or just replay routing information and it is known as false routing information. Malicious nodes simply drop data packets quietly, modify the data content, generate false error messages or redirects the traffic.[17]

### **3) Selective forwarding**

In this attack an attacker comprise itself in a data stream lane and can selectively drop only distinct packets. In sensor networks it is assumed that nodes faithfully forward received messages but some compromised node might refuse to forward packets, though neighbors may start using another route.

### **4) Sinkhole attacks**

The main goal of an adversary in sinkhole attack is to attract all the traffic toward itself through an agreement node. Sinkhole attacks [10] typically work by making a compromised node look especially attractive to surrounding nodes.

### **5) Sybil attacks**

In Sybil attack [10], a single node makes replicas of it and distributes it in multiple locations of the network. Authentication and encryption techniques can prevent an outsider to launch a Sybil attack on the sensor network.

### **6) Wormhole attacks**

In wormhole attack, more than two malicious colluding sensor nodes does a virtual tunnel in the sensor network, which is used to forward message packets between the tunnel edge points. This tunnel establishes shorter links in the network. In which adversary documents forwards packets at one location in the sensor network, tunnels them to different location, and re-forwards them into the sensor network. In sensor network when sender node sends a message to another receiver node in the network, then the receiving node tries to send the message to its neighboring nodes. The neighbor sensor nodes assume that the message was sent by the sender node (this is normally out of range), so they tries to forward the message to the originating node, but this message never comes because it is too far away. Wormhole attack is a great threat to sensor networks since, this type of attack will not require compromising a sensor in the network instead; it could be performed even at the starting phase during the sensors initializes to identify its neighboring information. This Wormhole attacks are very difficult to stop since routing information given by a sensor node is very difficult to check. The wormhole attack is possible even when the attacker has not compromised with any hosts nodes and even if all communication provides confidentiality and are authenticated also.

### **7) Hello flood attack**

In this, HELLO packets will have high radio transmission range and these are used as weapons in DSN. This processing power sends HELLO packets to a number of sensor nodes, which are deployed, in a large area within a Sensor Network. The sensor devices are thus persuaded that the adversary is their neighboring node. As a result of this, while forwarding the messages to the base station, the victim sensor nodes try to go through the attacker as they are aware, that it is their neighbors and are spoofed by the attacker.[17]

8) Acknowledgement spoofing

The routing algorithm of a number of sensor networks depends on the explicit or implicit acknowledgement from the link layer. Because of this innate medium of broadcast medium, the attacker can be spoofing the acknowledgement from the link layer for sniffed packets that are meant for adjacent nodes. The aim of this attack is to make the sender nodes believe that the receiving node is in vicinity or even that a disabled/dead node is still alive.

IV. Measures To Overcome Issues And Challenges In Distributed Sensor Networks:

Table1: Various design issues and challenges and their requirements

Issue/Challenge	Requirements
Data Aggregation [41]	Energy efficient and low delay
Time Synchronization [37]	Rapid flooding, keeping track of neighboring nodes, overhead in terms of computation and memory allocation.
Localization [48]	Flooding, power consumption, number of anchors required for accurate localization
Node Deployment [45]	Energy and bandwidth limitations
Network Dynamics	Route stability, energy, and bandwidth.
Node/Link Heterogeneity [12][45]	Data routing issues.
Energy Efficiency [44][47]	MAC Scheduler, Data reduction, sleep/wake-up schemes, radio optimization and energy efficient routing.
Fault tolerance and reliability [12]	Reliability requirements: Noise-free, error-free, time-invariant wireless channel, error control, error detection and error correction techniques.Sensor nodes are expected to performself-testing, self-calibrating, self-repair and self-recovery proceduresduring their lifetime. Fault tolerance can be achieved with the help of redundant nodes.
Data Centric Routing [49][50]	Energy efficiency
Scalability	Topology control mechanisms
Security Requirements [4]	Availability of resources and base station
Availability	
Authentication	Authentication techniques like MAC (Message Authentication code)
Confidentiality	Encryption techniques
Integrity	Encryption techniques
Data Freshness	a nonce, or another time-related counter, can be added into the packet to ensure data freshness.

Table2: Various security attacks and their countermeasures

Type of attack	OSI layer	Characteristic[26][28]	Countermeasures
Denial of Service (DoS)[31]	Physical layer	Jamming,Tampering	Frequency hopping [2],[15], UWB(Ultra Wide Band) transmission technique, Changing and Protecting the key.JAM (Avoidance of jammed region by using coalesced neighbor nodes),Wormhole based (Uses wormholes to avoid jamming) [3][32]
	Link layer	Collision, Exhaustion, Unfairness	Time diversity and CRC [2][15], protecting the Network ID along with any information required for device joining [15]. Error correction code, rate limitation,small frames [6]
	Network layer	Neglect and greed, homing, misdirection, black holes.[31]	Restricting malicious node to join the network by secure network set up phase, REWARD routing protocol(Uses geographic routing, Takes advantage of the broadcastinter-radio behavior to watch neighbor transmissions and detectblackhole attacks)[2],[36]
	Transport layer	Flooding and de-synchronization	Limit the number of connections that an entity can make. Authenticating all the packets exchanged between sensor nodes along with all the control fields in transport header. The adversary cannot spoof the packets and header and thus this attack can be prevented.[2],[17] Client puzzles, Authentication [6],[38]
Spoofed, altered or replay of routing information	Link layer	Malicious nodes simply drop data packets, modify the data content, generate false error messages or redirects the traffic.	Authentication [2][15], On Communication Security (Efficient resource management, Protects the network even if partof the network is compromised) [3]
Selective forwarding [40]	Network layer	Attackers drop packets they have to route	Multipath routing, CHEMAS (Checkpoint-based Multi-hop Acknowledgement Scheme), a lightweight security scheme for detecting selective forwarding attacks. This scheme

			randomly selects a number of intermediate nodes as checkpoints which are responsible for generating acknowledgement. According to this scheme, along a forwarding path, if a checkpoint node does not receive enough acknowledgements from the downstream checkpoint nodes it can detect abnormal packet loss and identify suspect nodes.
<b>Sinkhole attacks</b>	Link layer, Network layer	Attacker broadcasts false routing related information so that neighboring nodes send them their packets and steal information or drops them	Data consistency & Network flow information approach, Hop count Monitoring Scheme, RSSI based Scheme, Monitoring nodes CPU Usage, Mobile Agent based approach, Using Message Digest Algorithm. [15][35]
<b>Sybil attacks</b>	Physical layer	Node replication by stealing sensors identities, that is, MAC address, IP address, and so forth	Physically Protecting the devices [15]
	Data link layer		Changing the key regularly [15], key management [9]
	Network layer		Reset the devices and change the session keys, Suspicious node detection by signal strength
<b>Wormhole attacks [30][31]</b>	Link layer	Adversaries exchange packets through a long-distance and low-latency links affecting routing making legitimate sensors believe that they are neighbors with sensors of another area	Packet leashes, directional antenna, Network Neighbor Number (NNT) Test based on Hypothesis testing which detects the increase in the number of neighbors of the sensors, All Distance Test (ADT), detects the decrease of the lengths of the shortest paths between all pairs of sensors. [15]
	Network layer		
<b>Hello flood attack</b>	Network layer	Use of high transmission range HELLO packets so that nodes go through attacker while transmitting packets to base station	“Identity verification protocol” [39] checks the bi-directionality of link with encrypted echo-back mechanism. A “probabilistic based” proposal, which drives some randomly chosen nodes to acknowledge to base station regarding hello requests, which then further examines the request authenticity
<b>Acknowledgement spoofing</b>	Link layer	Spoofs the acknowledgement for the sniffed packets and gives an illusion that receiver is in its vicinity and even disabled/dead node is alive	Good encryption techniques and proper authentication for communication. [32]

### V. Conclusion

In this paper, we have addressed various design issues in distributed sensor networks and also challenges faced. Security requirements, attacks and countermeasures are also discussed. Drawbacks and requirements associated with countermeasures presents open research issues and researchers can work in that direction for designing secure protocols.

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