IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
Volume 30, Issue 3, Series 7 (March, 2025) 23-34
e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845.
www.iosrjournals.org

Personality, Memory, And Identity: A Construction In Legal Theory For The Validity Of Personality Rights

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Abstract
This article investigates the conceptual construction of personality within Legal Theory, articulating it with the concepts of identity and collective memory to substantiate its application in personality rights. The research is based on the problem of how personality, as a legal category, can be understood beyond its strict normativity, considering its connection with memory and the social processes of recognition. The justification lies in the need for a theoretical deepening that integrates sociological, philosophical, and psychoanalytical aspects, allowing for a broader and more dynamic view of personality as a legal and social phenomenon. Methodologically, a deductive approach is adopted, drawing from Maurice Halbwachs' theory of collective memory and the contributions of Le Goff, Fromm, Giacóia Jr., May, and Rogers to construct a concept of personality that transcends its normative dimension and is embedded within the symbolic and historical structure of Law. The research follows a qualitative, theoretical nature, grounded in an interdisciplinary literature review, analysing how memory and identity operate in the formation of the legal subject. The study concludes that personality is not merely a normative construction but also a legal myth that functions as a mechanism for validating identity within the legal structure, necessitating continuous remembrance and reaffirmation for its legitimation. This approach enables a novel reading of personality rights, considering them not merely as formal categories but as the result of an ongoing process of social recognition and axiological belonging.

Keywords: *Collective memory; Identity; Personality rights; Legal Theory*

Date of Submission: 19-03-2025 Date of Acceptance: 29-03-2025

I. Introduction

The construction of the legal concept of personality must be understood as a normative element aimed at the individualisation of the subject within the legal order, ensuring its validity within the structure of "ought-to-be" (Sollen). However, this traditional approach often disregards the social, cultural, and symbolic processes that structure identity and collective memory as fundamental aspects in the formation of personality.

It is therefore crucial to investigate the theoretical foundations that, in an initial stage, validate, in theoretical terms, the framework and conceptual density of the notions underpinning personality as a right. The legal identity of the person is not an isolated datum but a historically constructed phenomenon, reflecting disputes over belonging and social recognition. Thus, understanding personality beyond its normative formalisation requires a theoretical approach that explores its relationship with memory and the mechanisms that legitimise it within the legal domain.

The central problem of this research consists in investigating how personality can be conceptualised in Legal Theory through the intersection between identity and collective memory, thereby providing a more robust foundation for personality rights. This issue arises from the need to overcome a strictly positivist view of legal personality by incorporating historical and sociological elements that demonstrate its dynamic construction within social relations. The hypothesis advanced in this study is that personality, far from being merely a normative attribute, also constitutes a legal myth, functioning as a continuous process of remembrance that validates the subject's identity within the realm of law.

The justification for this investigation lies in the theoretical and practical relevance of personality within the framework of personality rights, as its concept directly influences the protection of human dignity and the structuring of normative recognition regimes. The incorporation of memory and identity into the discussion on personality not only enables a deeper theoretical inquiry but also broadens the referential

framework sustaining personality rights in their relationship with the collective sphere. Furthermore, this approach facilitates an interdisciplinary dialogue with sociology, psychoanalysis, and philosophy, offering a more complex and consistent framework for the development of policies and legal norms that ensure the effective protection of individuals.

Methodologically, this research adopts a deductive approach, beginning with a theoretical analysis of collective memory as developed by Maurice Halbwachs and Jacques Le Goff, as well as the psychoanalytic perspectives of Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, and Rollo May, in order to establish a broader conception of personality. The study employs a qualitative methodology with an interdisciplinary bibliographical review, seeking to integrate historical, philosophical, and normative elements to understand personality not merely as a legal institution but as a symbolic structure that underpins the recognition of subjects in law. The methodological approach aims to demonstrate how personality emerges from the tension between individualisation and collective belonging, establishing itself as a dynamic and historically conditioned concept.

The first section of the article examines the theoretical foundations of memory and identity, highlighting their central role in the construction of legal personality. Drawing on Halbwachs' contributions, it is demonstrated that collective memory not only structures individual identity but also establishes the normative frameworks through which subjects are socially recognised and validated. In dialogue with Le Goff, the analysis focuses on how memory is embedded in political and social disputes, being instrumentalised in the construction of narratives that define legal belonging and social exclusion.

The second section explores collective memory and its social construction, addressing the relationships between memory, recognition, and legal normativity. It examines how memory differs from history and how its dynamic construction influences the delineation of personality rights. Based on the reflections of Halbwachs and Le Goff, the argument is made that legal identity is not a static datum but rather a construct in constant redefinition, shaped by power struggles and processes of forgetting and remembering.

Finally, the third section delves deeper into the relationship between personality, memory, and law, investigating how personality operates both as a normative status and as a legal myth. Drawing on the contributions of Fromm, Giacóia Jr., and May, it is proposed that personality functions as an element of remembrance and belonging, structured at the intersection between legal normativity and the subjective experience of identity. Thus, it is argued that personality not only legitimises the subject within the legal order but also inscribes them into a continuous process of reaffirmation and recognition.

This study therefore seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary understanding of personality by integrating theoretical elements of memory and identity into its legal construction. The proposed analysis underscores that personality cannot be reduced to a merely normative category, as its existence depends on the historical and social processes that structure it as a mechanism of recognition and belonging in law.

II. Memory And Identity: Theoretical And Interdisciplinary Foundations

In order to construct the legal concept of personality, it is first necessary to engage with theoretical frameworks and deepen their analysis. In this regard, the identity of the subject is not an isolated construction but rather a continuous process of interaction with the collectivity. Since the earliest records of human history, memory has been one of the primary mechanisms through which individuals and groups structure their understanding of the world and of themselves. More than a mere repository of information, memory functions as a system of signification, assigning meaning to experience and delineating the boundaries between what is individual and what is collective. In this sense, identity cannot be understood solely as a subjective phenomenon, as it is continuously shaped and reaffirmed through shared narratives in the social sphere.

Collective memory, as developed by Maurice Halbwachs, suggests that recollection does not occur randomly or merely on a personal level but rather within collective frameworks of reference that structure how subjects perceive and interpret their experiences. Belonging to specific social groups imposes particular patterns of remembrance, making identity a reflection of the relationship between the individual and the collective. Personal experience is never entirely dissociated from the social and cultural structures in which it is embedded. Thus, identity is not a fixed point but rather a field of tensions in which memories, discourses, and recognitions intersect and are continuously redefined.

In this context, memory plays a central role in the fixation and legitimisation of both individual and collective identities. Remembrance can function as an act of resistance, a strategy of domination, or even an instrument of social manipulation. Memories may be preserved, reinterpreted, or erased, depending on the interests permeating a given society. In the field of law, this dynamic nature of memory has fundamental implications for how the concept of the person is constructed and normatively protected. Understanding the foundations of memory and its relationship with identity is essential for advancing the discussion on how subjects are recognised within legal institutions and how personality rights operate at the intersection of the individual and the collective.

Maurice Halbwachs (2006) argues that the presence of others is not a physical necessity for the recollection of collective memory, as it manifests even in the absence of the individuals who originally contributed to bringing it to mind. The act of recalling an event relevant to a particular group entails retrieving it from a collective perspective. This suggests that even when one is alone, their actions remain continuously shaped by social experience, providing evidence that the connection with the collectivity persists. Thus, the notion of isolation is merely apparent, as memory and individual identity are always intertwined with the social context.

Furthermore, memories can be divided and associated with different social groups simultaneously. Through the influence of these congruent connections, it is possible to observe how lived experiences are shaped. By maintaining an ongoing relationship with a given social circle, memories are formed according to distinct contexts that are shared simultaneously across different groups (Halbwachs, 2006).

Halbwachs (2006) also highlights that this phenomenon occurs within a spatial context. Since "space" is a reality that endures over time, impressions succeed one another, and nothing remains unchanged in the human mind. As a result, the retrieval of memory is dependent on the preservation of the material environment surrounding the subject. This perspective helps to clarify that memory relies on specific spaces that allow for the evocation of "recorded" memories.

To illustrate the coexistence of various groups and spaces, consider a family that has lived in the same city for a long time, creating memories that belong both to the family's dynamics and to the urban environment as a whole. However, when an individual loses direct physical contact with one of these groups, their connection with these recollections weakens as they integrate into new spaces or groups. Consequently, the memories that were previously sustained by the simultaneous influence of both collectives become less accessible and more abstract (Halbwachs, 2006).

From this analysis of Halbwachs, it is possible to understand that for memory to resurface in a person's mind, there must be a revival of similar sequences of perceptions. For instance, one might have the impression that they would never again recall a particular scene from many years ago. However, upon encountering that place again, the memory resurfaces immediately, as if it were "embedded" in the environment. According to Halbwachs (2006, p. 69):

"Temos de confiar no acaso, esperar que muitos sistemas de ondas, nos ambientes sociais em que transitamos materialmente ou em pensamento, se cruzem de novo e façam vibrar como antigamente o aparelho registrador que é a nossa consciência individual. Mas aqui o tipo de causalidade é o mesmo, e não poderia ser senão o mesmo de outrora. A sucessão de lembranças, mesmo as mais pessoais, sempre se explica pelas mudanças que se produzem em nossas relações com os diversos ambientes coletivos, ou seja, em definitivo, pelas transformações desses ambientes, cada um tomado em separado, e em seu conjunto."

With a focused perspective on Halbwachs' research, he suggests that memory is not evoked randomly but is instead stimulated by contextual factors. Thus, when revisiting a place where a significant moment occurred, an individual can recall it through the same sensory stimuli that were present at the time of the original experience. Memory, therefore, is intensely connected to physical space and the experiences lived within it.

Memory is not activated solely through a conscious effort of reflection but often through a sensitive disposition determined by external perceptions. The author suggests that the difficulty in recalling a specific memory arises from the inability to regroup the various images and sensations that constitute it. When a memory resurfaces, it does not do so as a result of deliberate reasoning but rather due to the particular arrangement of objects in space, which triggers an involuntary association. Thus, external perceptions act as triggers for memory, not because they inherently contain anything beyond the perceived objects themselves, but because they place the subject in a favourable state for retrieving past experiences. In this sense, forgetting does not necessarily result from the impossibility of remembering but from the difficulty of reliving an experience with the intensity necessary to recover its details (Halbwachs, 2006).

Analysing Halbwachs' work, Rivera (2018) observes that the sociologist did not merely highlight a difference in degree between individual and collective memory but rather demonstrated that memory is always collective, resulting from the interplay between individual and collective identities.

Moreover, it is important to emphasise that the collective nature of memory leads to a plurality of recollections, which does not necessarily mean that all memories will converge on the same events. Manzi (2007) provides examples of discrepancies between events and memories, such as the Holocaust in East and West Germany and the Argentine military dictatorship, which indicate the existence of different memories depending on the political positions of the groups interviewed.

In each individual mind, the influences of different environments experienced throughout life are uniquely organised. Although each mind is shaped by multiple contexts that influence its development, the sequence in which these states occur cannot be entirely explained by any one of them. This sequence appears as

singular to each human being, making these internal states seem interconnected within each consciousness (Halbwachs, 2006).

The uniqueness of this phenomenon can be observed in the so-called social frameworks of memory, which may include family, religious groups, friends, and other collective – and group-based – contexts that influence how events are remembered or perceived throughout life. Social structuring ultimately forges a selective form of collective memory, wherein certain groups opt to preserve or forget parts of history according to their interests.

Collective memory finds a different approach in Jacques Le Goff's work compared to Halbwachs. While the latter, from a sociological perspective, argues that collective memory is shaped by social groups and their reference frameworks, Le Goff (1990), as a historian, emphasises how memory is constructed, contested, and used to shape narratives over time. This dynamic means that history is constantly pressured by collective memory.

The evolution of societies demonstrates how collective memory plays a significant role within the social sphere, affecting both dominant and subordinate classes, whether in the struggle for power or survival. Le Goff (1990) stresses that memory is an essential element for both individual and collective identity, the pursuit of which remains one of the fundamental activities of contemporary citizens and societies.

In Le Goff's view (1990), collective memory serves as an instrument of power, enabling the domination of struggles over tradition and remembrance, in order to construct a memory representative of a given people or population. Collective memory plays a fundamental role in shaping history, acting simultaneously as both its source and its product. Consequently, professionals who work with memory—such as anthropologists, historians, journalists, and sociologists—bear the responsibility of ensuring that their work contributes to the democratisation of access to the past. The preservation of memory should not serve as an instrument of domination but as a means of liberation, benefiting both the present and the future. Thus, scientific objectivity demands an ethical commitment to constructing a memory that emancipates rather than perpetuates oppressive structures (Le Goff, 1990).

For Halbwachs (2006), collective memory is not equivalent to history, arguing that the term "historical memory" is not the most precise, as it merges concepts that contrast in several aspects, with history being the organisation of events that have gained prominence in people's recollections.

Memory, therefore, is not merely an individual tool for recalling the past but a mechanism deeply influenced by social and historical contexts. The distinction between individual and collective memory does not lie solely in the number of individuals sharing a particular recollection but in the symbolic structure that determines which elements of the past are preserved and which are discarded. As the reflections of Halbwachs and Le Goff demonstrate, collective memory functions as a contested domain where different groups attempt to impose their narratives and versions of history. Thus, when engaging in the discussion on the social construction of memory, it becomes crucial to analyse the challenges posed by the constant reformulation of the past and how these processes affect the constitution of social identity and, consequently, the legal recognition of subjects.

In this way, collective memory not only shapes the identity of individuals within a society but also constitutes the very framework upon which notions of belonging and recognition are built. The manner in which individuals identify themselves and are identified legally is intrinsically related to the process of constructing and reconstructing shared memory, which selects, preserves, or silences particular elements of collective experience. This interplay between remembering and forgetting not only shapes social identity but also directly influences the normative categories that regulate life in society. As we delve into the field of collective memory and its social construction, it becomes essential to reflect on how this dynamic structures the legal recognition of subjects and establishes the foundations for the consolidation of personality rights.

III. Collective Memory And Its Social Construction: Influences And Challenges

If collective memory shapes both individual and social identity, it becomes essential to understand how this phenomenon operates within the normative field and legal structures. Law, as a system of recognition and protection of subjects, functions based on categories that are not immutable but rather the result of a process of historical and social construction. The legal identity of a person is not a given reality but a concept that is redefined over time, influenced by political, cultural, and symbolic forces that determine who can be recognised and under what conditions. In this sense, investigating how collective memory structures belonging and recognition within a society allows for a closer connection between theory and law, revealing that the constitution of legal personality is, to a great extent, a reflection of disputes over identity and memory within the social sphere.

Regarding historical memory, Halbwachs (2006, p. 99) asserts that it is "the sequence of events whose remembrance history preserves; however, it is not history itself, nor its contexts, that constitute the essence of what we call collective memory." Thus, historical memory seeks a more objective systematisation of events,

based on documentary records and scientific methodologies that propose an analytical reconstruction of the past. In contrast, collective memory is subjective, shaped by the social context and emotions embedded within the fabric of society.

Moreover, collective memory can be distinguished from history in two main aspects, according to Halbwachs. First, collective memory is continuous, whereas history is periodised. Collective memory operates as a continuous flow of thought within a social group, preserving only what remains alive in the collective consciousness, depending on its relevance to a given group in the present time. History, on the other hand, is structured into distinct periods, as if they were acts in a theatrical play, each with its own context (Halbwachs, 2006).

The second aspect concerns the transformation of groups and the rupture between historical periods. Since collective memory belongs to specific groups, when these groups change, memory also undergoes transformations. Thus, when a particular period ceases to be of interest, it is not merely one group that forgets its past; rather, one group is replaced by another, bringing new ways of thinking, acting, and remembering. For history, this transition represents a complete renewal of interests and values, whereas collective memory persists only within the limits of those who experience it (Halbwachs, 2006). While history can connect events and organise them into narratives, collective memory remains fragmented and positioned within a specific group (Halbwachs, 2006). According to Le Goff (1990, p. 426):

"Tornarem-se senhores da memória e do esquecimento é uma das grandes preocupações das classes, dos grupos, dos indivíduos que dominaram e dominam as sociedades históricas. Os esquecimentos e os silêncios da história são reveladores desses mecanismos de manipulação da memória coletiva."

Halbwachs also associates language as a means of interpreting memory for human beings. Memory is constructed and maintained within a social environment, relying on the interaction between actors and spectators to give meaning to the narrative—similar to a theatrical play—so that, for memory to be understood, it depends on the use of a common language (Rivera, 2018).

Yates (2007) states that the art of memory is a set of mnemonic techniques developed since Antiquity to organise and preserve information in the mind. It is based on the principle of associating mental images with specific locations, where information is stored visually and spatially. This technique was essential in oral tradition societies, where memorisation was fundamental for speeches and discourse.

The invention of writing enabled the development of memory techniques, such as mnemonics, created by the Greeks and widely disseminated in the Middle Ages (Gondar, 2008). Writing, as a form of language and communication, serves as an aid to fortified memory, as it reinforces a sense of belonging to a social group and strengthens metamemory. A writer who describes the past enables a group to appropriate this past through the account they provide (Candau, 2023).

According to Halbwachs (2006), when an individual is part of a social group and uses a specific language associated with that group, even if they later distance themselves but continue to use that language, the influence of the group is still exerted upon them. Thus, Rivera (2018, p. 1,181) argues that:

Rivera asserts that memory itself depends on the support of the collectivity to which the individual belongs, and this connection is also articulated with personal identity:

"A memória, assim, depende de suportes coletivos, de marcos sociais. Uma pessoa tirada bruscamente de seu meio social e transportada para uma outra sociedade na qual a língua, as pessoas, os lugares e os costumes são muito diferentes parece perder a faculdade de se lembrar do que fizera e daquilo que vivera. Para recuperar as lembranças foi necessário mostrar-lhe pelo menos algumas imagens do grupo e dos lugares de sua sociedade de origem. A jovem recupera uma identidade mínima no momento em que sua memória é ativada, mas essa não se ativa isoladamente, sem apoiar-se no grupo social implicado nas experiências lembradas. Nessa perspectiva pode se afirmar, com Halbwachs, que a memória é uma condição da identidade dos grupos e das pessoas. Ao mesmo tempo, a memória de um indivíduo isolado mostra-se incapaz de gerar uma identidade. Memória coletiva e identidade têm em comum o fato de ser resultado de processos coletivos."

Thus, the investigation of collective memory is added as a crucial element in the construction of personal identity, as it is through the revisitation of the past that the individual narrates themselves and consolidates their identity, situating themselves within groups and society as a whole.

Beyond serving as a safeguard for individuality, memory also acts as a link that connects human beings to a group of belonging, permeated by the transmission of culture and the formation of essential bonds for the construction of social acceptance. By sharing stories, values, and events, individuals collectively conceive meanings that reinforce both individual and collective identity.

Souza (2014) discusses the symbolic role of memory in relation to identity, as the way in which the past is recalled determines how individual identity is reconstructed in the present. Memory aids individuals in conducting a critical self-evaluation, altering their perspective on how they see themselves and even how they are perceived by others. Thus, it can be said that "social representations constitute the raw material for the formation of collective memory" (Oliveira & Bertoni, 2019, p. 257).

Often, we attribute to ourselves ideas and feelings that, in reality, have been inspired by the environment in which we are immersed. Our attunement with the group is so intense that we lose track of the origin of these thoughts, assuming them as our own. Reflections extracted from newspapers, books, or conversations become so familiar that we forget their true source. In this way, the illusion of originality may lead us to believe that we have always had these thoughts, when, in fact, we are merely an echo of what surrounds us. In this sense, the effectiveness of an orator lies precisely in creating the sensation that their words merely reveal what already existed within each listener, giving voice to thoughts they believe to be entirely their own (Halbwachs, 2006).

When Halbwachs highlights identity as an "echo," he reflects on how an idea that appears to be exclusive to an individual may, in reality, be permeated by the stimuli of the groups with which they coexist. This fusion of influences creates a sense of harmony, where the boundaries between what is genuinely personal and what is collectively shared become blurred. Consequently, the feeling of autonomy over one's beliefs and emotions may become diluted, as instead of being a reflection of originality, the individual becomes an echo of a shared and coexisting social environment.

The need to remember is closely linked to social identity due to the collective process of memory. By recalling common values and symbols, the individual reinforces their connection with the group, validating their position within it. The absence of shared memories can lead to a sense of disconnection or an identity crisis, as the individual loses the frame of reference that gives them meaning. According to Candau (2023, p. 126):

"A necessidade de recordar é, portanto, real, mesmo que apenas para que não nos tornemos seres "pobres e vazios". Mas, na realidade, mais do que necessidade de memória, o que parece existir é uma necessidade metamemorial, ou seja, uma necessidade da ideia de memória que se manifesta sob múltiplas modalidades nas sociedades modernas. Essa necessidade é indissociável da busca pelo esquecimento, que ocorre concomitante ao lembrar"

Living within a collective denotes a fundamental need for a place of one's own in society, serving as a means of personal identification within a symbolic order. "We all need to identify ourselves. Those who fail to do so suffer immensely and are perceived by others as strangers and, consequently, as dangerous" (Nominé, 2018, p. 20).

Processes related to social identity involve a favourable inclination toward one's own group and attitudes of prejudice and discrimination against members of external groups. These phenomena tend to intensify when conflicts of interest arise between groups, reinforcing the boundaries that separate them and amplifying social polarisation (Manzi, 2007).

It belongs to human nature to engage in social categorisation, whether of oneself or of other groups, with a tendency to value one's own group while devaluing outsiders. Collective memory is a central component of intergroup processes, as in situations of conflict, memory often serves to deepen existing tensions (Manzi, 2007).

Candau (2023) understands genealogy as a search for identity, becoming even more relevant as individuals feel increasingly distant from their origins. This process is driven by contemporary identity dynamics, which ultimately shape perceptions of the past. Thus, the construction of memory may vary depending on the means employed, the scope and depth of memory, or even the type of familial lineage emphasised in its formation. As a consequence, recollections that are not inscribed in the present time carry no identity-related significance and amount to nothing in terms of remembrance (Candau, 2023).

The family also holds significant importance within the realm of collective memory, being the primary social group in which an individual begins their life and undergoes a formative period of identification and personality construction. The relevance of the family unit as an essential reference in reconstructing the past stems from the fact that family is not only the object of individual memories but also the environment in which these memories can be reactivated (Barros, 1989).

The social construction of memory not only organises individuals' sense of belonging to specific groups but also defines the normative contours of legal identity. The recognition of a person within the legal framework does not occur spontaneously or naturally; it depends on a process of legitimation that intertwines historical, cultural, and normative elements, establishing boundaries between those who can be included in the concept of personhood and those who remain on the margins of legal protection structures. This dynamic reveals a paradox: while legal identity seeks to ensure the autonomy and individualisation of the subject, it simultaneously binds them to a collective spectrum that validates their existence. This tension between the individualisation and collectivisation of legal identity leads to a fundamental problem in personality rights: the need to understand personality not merely as a normative attribute but as a phenomenon structured by memory, recognition, and social belonging. It is at this point that personality theory intersects with the idea of a legal myth, where the subject's identity is not solely defined by positive law but by the constant necessity of remembrance and reaffirmation within the normative order.

Collective memory, while conferring meaning and stability to individual identity, also carries within it

an inherent movement of exclusion and continuous redefinition. Law, as a normative system of recognition, is permeated by this tension between preservation and transformation, as its conceptual structure depends on the social memory that legitimises and modifies it. This paradoxical relationship between normativity and memory underscores that legal identity is not a static datum but a dynamic construct that requires ongoing remembrance and reaffirmation. However, if legal identity is sustained by this interplay of belonging and differentiation, personality emerges as an even more complex phenomenon, transcending normativity and inscribing itself within the realm of myth. Thus, as we move forward in discussing personality, memory, and law, it will be necessary to explore how this normative construction oscillates between a legal status and a foundational myth, demonstrating that the notion of personhood is embedded both in the legal order and in the symbolic structure of collective memory.

IV. Personality, Memory, And Law: Between Identity And Legal Myth

The relationship between collective memory and identity, as explored in the previous sections, not only defines how individuals are recognised within a given group but also structures the very normative mechanisms that organise the concept of personhood. In law, individual identity does not exist in isolation; rather, it is constantly reaffirmed through a process of remembrance and social validation. This dynamic between memory, identity, and normative recognition is not merely descriptive but plays a central role in the construction of personality rights.

In this context, personality emerges as a legal concept that not only confers normative status upon the individual but also operates as a mechanism of belonging and differentiation. Although the notion of personhood has historically been developed to ensure the subject's separation from their environment, there exists an opposing movement that necessitates the reaffirmation of collectivity for this individualisation to be recognised. Thus, personality rights do not function solely as a system of subjective protection but as an instrument that regulates the individual's insertion into the public and social sphere.

However, personality cannot be reduced to a merely objective legal category. As a psychological and social phenomenon, it also manifests as a dynamic process of signification, in which the subject not only identifies as a person but also navigates the implications of this identity within a normative system. Here, the concepts of remorse, guilt, and recognition play a fundamental role in shaping how individuals negotiate their permanence within the normative spectrum of identity. In this sense, personality does not simply arise from the relationship between the subject and their environment but can be understood as an anomic space between legal normativity and the subjective experience of identity.

From this perspective, personality can be conceived not merely as a normative given but as a mythological structure—a legal myth that functions as a memory of validation for the subject. If legal identity must be continuously reaffirmed to ensure its normative efficacy, then personality operates as an element of remembrance and belonging while simultaneously imposing upon the subject the necessity of differentiation from the collective. As we shall see, this interplay between the individualisation and collectivisation of legal identity presents a fundamental challenge to personality rights: the need to function at the intersection of recognition, normativity, and memory.

Although personality is structured to individualise the subject, it requires the reaffirmation of collective concepts, positioning itself as a paradoxical element: while it differentiates the individual from their environment, it simultaneously maintains their connection to the collective spectrum. In Freudian terms, this process can be understood through the tension between the id and the superego, where the need for affection reinforces the normativisation of personal identity within the public sphere. For Horney, this dynamic reveals a psychological dependency, in which the guilt of being an individual generates an obsessive movement toward collective integration, avoiding exclusion. Thus, although personality emerges as a phenomenon of differentiation, it politically operates as a mechanism of uniformisation, imposing upon the individual the necessity of conforming to a universal concept of personhood.

"A third typical feature is a part of his general dependence upon others. This is his unconscious tendency to rate himself by what others think of him. His self-esteem rises and falls with their approval or disapproval, their affection or lack of it. Hence any rejection is actually catastrophic for him. If someone fails to return an invitation he may be reasonable about it consciously, but in accordance with the logic of the particular inner world in which he lives, the barometer of his self-esteem drops to zero. In other words any criticism, rejection, or desertion is a terrifying danger, and he may make the most abject effort to win back the regard of the person who has thus threatened him. His offering of the other cheek is not occasioned by some mysterious "masochistic" drive but is the only logical thing he can do on the basis of his inner premises." (Horney, 2007, p. 36-37).

The act of remembrance is at play here. The fundamental issue with this remembrance lies precisely in its content—culpable, as it defines personality—that is, the retrieval of the individual. This sentiment aligns more closely with remorse, that is, a moral awareness of this public ego. Thus, "the term denotes the

phenomenon of self-censorship, the distressing moral suffering that arises following an action contrary to duty—and manifests itself in the well-known morsus conscientiae, the dwelling of conscience (remorse) or bad conscience (schlechtes Gewissen)" (Giacóia Jr., 2021, p. 10). This is because remorse is the phenomenon most closely linked to this distancing and reapproaching of the individual. While a person is shaped by others and invariably returns to the self through the formation of personality, this personality expresses an effect that precedes the individual, ultimately reinserting them into the shared sphere of all other phenomena and, consequently, bringing forth the spectre of normality—that is, the banishment of the anomic space within the axiological framework of personhood.

In this dynamic of personality, remorse appears to be a constant mechanism for reintegration into the public and universal concept of personhood. The term morsus in Latin, being the perfect passive participle of the verb mordeo (to bite), evokes the impression of a timeless, anomic rumination—something that precedes the individual yet remains external to them in a persistent condition of being outside the self.

For Horney, this process may also lead to a movement against others, as "aggressive people take for granted that everyone is hostile. As a result, they adopt a strategy of moving against people. The neurotically aggressive individual is as compulsive as the submissive one, and their behaviour is likewise driven by basic anxiety" (Feist & Roberts, 2015, p. 118). This dynamic appears to be caused by guilt or the act of revisiting the self. It is as if it were a force outside the body—a production of original will, not through bodily instinct or the form of the id, but rather a force formed within personality itself, thereby granting it a certain absolute independence, even though it is subsequent to the individual and presupposes them.

The condition of movement against proximity is not a paradox but an effect; if remorse is produced by the identification of personality in response to the fear of banishment from the axiological framework of personhood, then the realisation of an entirely personal ego results in the backlash effect of one's axiological power. This can manifest as vanity—a concept well defined within the framework of personality and its subsequent development—or as the desire to know an ego that exists beyond the body.

Here, we observe a particularly unique effect of personality: its search for the reindividualisation of the person. The distancing from others is an idiosyncratic condition inherent to the creation of personhood—that is, the observation of Others through the Self. As previously established, the person comes to be formed through the rationalising condition of the self, the separation from the environment, and, consequently, the absorption of the Other within the spectrum of self-recognition. This process leads to axiological massification, which, despite originating from the Self, ultimately nullifies it in favour of constructing an anomic space within the conceptual framework of personhood.

When personality, already formed within the person, returns to individualisation, it simultaneously seeks acceptance from others to avoid being expelled from the axiological space it inhabits while also reflecting the Self in fear of the Other. The behaviours suggested by the id prompt the individual, in recognising all Others as a universal category of the Self, to seek, at the same time, both proximity and withdrawal in an attempt to maintain their own distinct existence.

Remorse comes into conflict with power, which is particularly intriguing given the structure of personality—remorse stems from a return to the individual, whereas power emerges from the progress of the self.

Here lies the paradigm of personality: it exists beyond axiological structures yet remains embedded within the individual, functioning as a bridge between the before and after—or, more precisely, between the body and axiological power, or even between the milieu and the *non-milieu*.

"A hominização inicia-se pois, com a criação de uma memória de vontade, a condição de possibilidades da promessa. Essa memória é o resultado da atividade de uma força atuando violentamente contra outra força poderosa: a voragem animal do esquecimento, na tarefa da criação de uma faculdade de lembrança, de um poder lembrar-se de uma memória ativa, transfiguradora do esquecimento, isto é um paradoxo vivo: um poder-não-esquecer." (Giacóia Jr., 2021, p. 29).

Personality, according to Oswaldo Giacóia Jr., operates as a "power-not-to-forget," validating the connection between body and axiology. It maintains the continuity between the collective memory of the person and individual potency, functioning as a selective mechanism of remembrance that prevents the reduction of identity to a mere symbol. From this perspective, Erich Fromm suggests that the legitimisation of the individual as a person requires both submission to the other and a pursuit of transcendence. Personal identity is not limited to individual experience but is constructed within a dynamic of mutual recognition, where the relationship with the other strengthens the person's axiological framework, shaping the first stage of their social and normative validation.

Obeying one's own reason or conviction does not constitute submission but rather an assertion of autonomy, as these judgments form an integral part of the individual's identity. By following them, the person maintains their authenticity, in contrast to heteronomous obedience, which implies relinquishing one's autonomy in favour of another's will or judgment. Thus, the term "obedience" can only be applied

metaphorically when referring to adherence to one's own reason, as its meaning fundamentally differs from that present in obedience imposed by an external authority (Fromm, 1981, p. 6).

Fromm identifies a form of heteronomous obedience that binds the individual to the other as a condition for their identity. In this sense, personality manifests a tension between individualisation and dependence: while it constitutes itself as a concept of exceptionality that removes the subject from the phenomenological realm, its reindividualisation requires the negation of this very realm to preserve its identity. This paradox implies that personality is structured as an anomic space, transcending phenomenological chronology by situating itself simultaneously before and after the individual. Thus, personality not only legitimises identity outside the phenomenological milieu but also reorganises the relationship between body and axiology, functioning as a post-axiological mechanism that reinterprets the subject's existence in the world.

"Tal como outros animais, os humanos são jogados no mundo sem seu consentimento ou desejo e, depois, são removidos dele – novamente sem seu consentimento ou sua vontade. Mas ao contrário de outros animais, os seres humanos são impulsionados pela necessidade de transcendência, definida como a ânsia de se colocar acima de uma existência passiva e acidentar e entrar no reino da intencionalidade e da liberdade". (Feist; Roberts, 2015, p. 132).

Thus, as the body evolves cognitively, it also separates from its ontic characteristic, thereby losing its "home" in the natural world. At the same time, its capacity for thought enabled humans to realise that they were without a home, without roots. "The consequent feelings of isolation and helplessness became unbearable" (Feist & Roberts, 2015, p. 133). Consequently, since a complete ontological relocation is necessary, yet a return to the ontic world is impossible, the person reorganises itself as a collective concept and assumes a place—though not a nomic one—by transferring to a framework of legitimacy, thus readjusting itself between the individual and the collective.

The dynamic between dependence on the Other and the separation of the Self results in a transcendence that shifts the subject into a non-temporal space, beyond the chronology of individual perception. The person, as an axiological subject, is appropriated beyond the space of the individual, without needing to conform to the rules of phenomenological experience. From this perspective, when the individual is recognised as both a phenomenological and ontological object, they transition to a rational perception that places them outside their immediate space. This movement leads to the legitimisation of the person through the Other, forming a collective concept of identity. Personality, therefore, emerges as a foundational construct that justifies both ontological existence and the validation of the concept of personhood, creating a balance between individualisation and the preservation of collective legitimacy, without the subject losing their essence or regressing into the phenomenological realm.

Or, as Carl Rogers might observe, through the development of life forms in which self-concept includes all aspects of being and experiences perceived in the individual's awareness. Accordingly, Rogers (1957, p. 198) explains that availability to awareness would be: "When an experience can be symbolized freely, without defensive denial and distortion, then it is available to awareness." Therefore, this notion of awareness must be legitimised by itself and not displaced by the possibility of its removal from its context, or, in the case of personality, by this anomic or non-contextual state.

When Rogers speaks of awareness, it is important to note that the word he uses is awareness, as he differentiates between the terms "awareness" and "consciousness"—a distinction that must be considered. For Rogers (1957, p. 198): "These three terms are defined as synonymous. To use Angyal's expression, consciousness (or awareness) is the symbolization of some of our experience. Awareness is thus seen as the symbolic representation (not necessarily in verbal symbols) of some portion of our experience. This representation may have varying degrees of sharpness or vividness, from a dim awareness of something existing as ground, to a sharp awareness of something which is in focus as figure."

Thus, the dimension of awareness expressed by Rogers aligns with what is presented here, as awareness is related to a spectrum of experience but internalised through rationalisation. In other words, the individual's experience is represented within their context, not due to their ontic existence but because their ontological relationship with experience utilises the phenomenon to apprehend itself as a possible concept. This occurs through the key mechanism of personality, which functions as a relation of awareness both within the individual and within the person—not as a mere point, but as a postulated element or a counter-temporal apprehension, preceding both elements while simultaneously emerging as their subsequent result in a linear fashion.

What is absorbed by the anomia of personality is not merely the phenomenon but the entirety of awareness-perception, an element that is non-naturalistic and beyond the mere appropriation of the phenomenon.

However, even if we can define the anomic temporal position of personality, this does not explain its nature unless we consider an auto-nature of personality. The issue with this is that it would strip personality of its genealogy—that is, it would render it a tautegorical product of the person within a movement of axiological

reindividualisation.

Moreover, this perception remains anomic. However, if there exists an open space of exception where personality serves as the categorical legitimisation of a non-milieu—a space-time void but a pure axiology without direct derivation—one final hypothesis must be explored before advancing toward the genealogical definition of personality in relation to the person and the individual: personality as myth.

The discussion of the mythologem of personality will be addressed more thoroughly in the second chapter of this work. However, given the theoretical line established here, we may turn to Rollo Reese May, in his exploration of myth as a rational determination of the human being. Without delving into the conceptual-philosophical intricacies of the term "myth"—at least for now—we can borrow from Jess and Gregory Feist and Tomi-Ann Roberts (2015, p. 224) a competent definition of myth according to May.

The concept of identity myth in May is linked to memory and the self-declaration of the person. Personality seeks to insert the person into the phenomenon while maintaining a connection between body and person, thus creating a meta-phenomenological dialectic. Personality is seen as a myth that validates memory, transcending the phenomenological concept of the individual in favour of the ontological position of the person. Thus, personality is not merely a structure but a formula of memory that reaffirms the condition of personhood and its place outside the phenomenological milieu, preserving a relationship of legitimacy. For May, memory depends on the mythologem, in which myth does not represent the reality of being but instead constructs an anomic and transcendental reality of memory.

"Memory depends mainly upon myth. Some event occurs in our minds, in actuality or in fantasy; we form it in memory, molding it like clay day after day—and soon we have made out of that event a myth. We then keep the myth in memory as a guide to future similar situations. The myth does not tell us much about the possessive patient's literal history, but it does tell us a great deal about the person who does the remembering. For the person reforms the event, shapes it, adds color here and a few details there; and then we have a revelation of this person and his or her attitude toward life. As Sartre would say, 'The myth is a behavior of transcendence.'" (May, 1991, p. 54).

At the same time, we may consider this transcendent withdrawal from the phenomenon through a mythologem of personality—yet can we consider it real? This very question forms a remote yet possible connection between law and personality, because, as in Kant, isolated rationality in ought-to-be (Sollen) is existence. The separation between the phenomenon and the product of reason may be independent, even though they remain interdependent in process. Thus, myth becomes a possible foundation.

The foundational myth of personality withdraws from the possibility of temporal determination not as a fanciful apprehension but as a fundamental hypothesis of memory between body and ontology.

It is in the feeling generated by the separation of the body in the production of the I for the Other that guilt arises, through the distance between the milieu and the non-milieu; and in order to alleviate this pain, personality functions as a foundational myth of the mechanical condition of the phenomenon.

The space between the feeling of rupture or displacement from the individual to the person constitutes the unease of memory, making the subject part of a whole to which they do not belong—an axiological structure of identities distanced by their spectrum of awareness-perception, by the phenomenon of their individuality. However, at the same time, this mythological option for personality rescues the person's individuality while keeping it distinct from the individuality of the body.

In other words, forgetting moves toward the pain of inclusion within the milieu, which equates the body to any other phenomenological object and exposes it to a sacralised rational perception. This is because, once already endowed with an ontological concept, returning to the individual would mean the same as stripping them of their humanity—given that, from the perspective of personhood, this would entail the subsequent removal of the rationally granted concept.

Thus, for the person to individualise, even though their legitimisation depends on the uniformisation of the identity concept shared with other objects removed from the observational milieu—that is, the Others in relation to the I—the myth of personality is established. It creates a non-mechanical temporality in defining the presuppositions of existence within an axiological concept, resembling the emulation of a phenomenological process. However, at its core lies the procedural function of the mythologem of personality: the interplay of forgetting and remembering as a means of situating the condition of the body itself.

This memory is dependent on forgetting. Forgetting the unease of the individual placed in the world—or within the milieu—becomes a survival mechanism, alleviating the pain and resentment of their position in existence. The individual, categorised ontically as an animal, nonetheless differs from other animals, as they cannot simply find themselves. In this sense, this purposeless individual discovers in their axiology the loss of their animal innocence and their teleological disillusionment.

Thus, the myth of personality emerges as a remedy for the unease of Aufklärung—that is, when the subject loses their minority (immaturity) or lack of understanding regarding their relationship with the milieu, the myth of personality takes its place as a means of countering this feeling.

"With the loss of "innocence" and the rudimentary beginnings of ethical sensitivity, the myth goes on to indicate, the person falls heir to the particular burdens of self-consciousness, anxiety and guilt feeling. He likewise has an awareness—though it may not appear till later—that he is "of dust." That is to say, he realizes that he will some time die; he becomes conscious of his own finiteness". (May, 1981, p.124).

Thus, consciousness—the perception of its non-place as a means of justifying its separation from the place where the phenomenological object, the being, is found—becomes, in ontological terms, compelled to align itself with the foundation of a myth that enables its individuation without perceiving itself as equal to the milieu.

In this sense, personality as myth presents itself as the legitimisation of a non-place and a non-temporal ontology, thereby giving a teratological nature to the personalissima expression, which exists both before and after the person. This dual positioning renders personality mythological, for although it is, in a linear sense, a product of axiology—emerging a posteriori from the rational identification of the body—it remains foundational to the structure of self-recognition in relation to others. However, these others can only be equally identifiable if they conform to an ethical-functional framework of the category of personhood.

The preservation of guilt and the fear of sacralisation are integral to the mythologem of personality's foundation. While personality is the post-supposition of the ontology of the person, it is also a logical creation outside of time—that is, an anomic space. This allows for the maintenance of the person as a concept of remembrance and of constant morsus, as its own form of legitimising this concept.

Personality, within this paradigm, therefore, despite attempts to establish itself as either a legal or an ontological nature, still presents, at this stage, a mythical nature. Its appropriation of place, then, is rooted in negation: to be a person is to occupy a highly specific place, in which being a person implies not being a person—a paradox to be further explored.

Thus, personality can be understood as a phenomenon that moves between the normative construction of the subject and their psychic and social experience. On one hand, legal identity requires a continuous process of remembrance and recognition to stabilise itself. On the other hand, this very dynamic imposes upon the subject a paradoxical state of both belonging and differentiation. In this sense, personality is not merely a legal attribute of the person but also manifests as an anomic space—a myth that validates identity within the normative structure. This displacement between the individual and the collective, between legal axiology and subjective experience, illustrates how personality rights operate within a field of tensions between normativity and memory, constantly reaffirming their own existence while simultaneously redefining their boundaries.

Thus, understanding personality as both a legal and mythological phenomenon enables a deeper reflection on the challenges of the legal protection of identity and its relationship with processes of recognition and social belonging.

V. Conclusion

This research concludes that personality, as a legal concept, transcends its mere normativity and constitutes itself as a dynamic and relational phenomenon, rooted in processes of identity and collective memory. Throughout the study, it has been demonstrated that the subject's legal identity cannot be understood in isolation but rather as a historical and social construct, shaped by narrative disputes and mechanisms of recognition and belonging. Through the intersection of Legal Theory, sociology, and psychoanalysis, it has been possible to deepen the understanding of personality as a space of tension between individualisation and collectivisation, between normativity and legal mythology.

The central hypothesis of the study, which posited the need to conceptualise personality through the intersection of identity and memory, has been substantiated as it was verified that personal identity is continuously shaped by the social context and shared reference frameworks. Halbwachs and Le Goff were essential in demonstrating that collective memory not only structures individual identity but also defines the contours of legal normativity, regulating who can be recognised as a legal subject and under what conditions. Thus, memory functions as a field of dispute, where different groups attempt to impose their narratives of belonging and exclusion.

The qualitative and deductive methodological approach adopted allowed for an interdisciplinary analysis that engaged with various fields of knowledge to construct a more robust conception of legal personality. The bibliographical review demonstrated that legal identity is simultaneously a mechanism of recognition and an instrument of collective normatisation, operating within a space of continuous remembrance. Furthermore, the research evidenced that personality cannot be reduced to a fixed legal concept, as it exists within a permanent interplay between memory, identity, and law.

Within the scope of personality rights, the results indicate that personality should not be viewed solely as a subjective attribute but as a construct that legitimises and regulates the existence of subjects within the public sphere. Drawing from the reflections of Fromm and Horney, it was observed that personality involves a psychic process of reaffirmation and belonging, in which the subject seeks to validate their identity in relation to

the collective. This process highlights that personality functions both as a normative mechanism and as a legal myth, ensuring the continuity of individual identity while reaffirming the symbolic structure of legal recognition.

Moreover, it was found that personality not only organises the relationship between the subject and the social environment but also establishes an anomic space in which individual identity can be preserved without dissolving into the collective. As argued by Giacóia Jr. and May, personality functions as a "power-not-to-forget," a space of active remembrance that secures individualisation within legal normativity. This paradoxical characteristic of personality—simultaneously individualising and collectivising—reaffirms its complexity and its centrality in understanding personality rights.

Finally, the research underscores the necessity of expanding the legal approach to personality, considering its dynamic nature and its entanglement with collective memory. This study contributes to a deeper reflection on personality rights, proposing an understanding that surpasses a positivist perspective and incorporates fundamental symbolic and historical elements for the consolidation of a more inclusive legal identity that aligns with social dynamics.

Thus, it is concluded that personality cannot be conceived solely as a legal attribute but as a phenomenon structured by the interaction between memory, identity, and normativity. The articulation of these elements enables not only the construction of a more robust theoretical concept but also the foundation of personality rights within an interdisciplinary perspective—one capable of integrating the subject into the complex framework of legal and social recognition..

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