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Antinatalism As An Ethical Choice: A Buddhist Perspective On Ethical Rejection Of Procreation

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Abstract:
Background*: Contemporary antinatalist philosophy challenges the moral permissibility of procreation by emphasising the inevitability of suffering inherent in human existence. Buddhist ethics similarly foreground suffering (dukkha) as a defining condition of life, while proposing liberation from suffering through ethical discipline and insight. This paper examines whether the ethical rejection of procreation defended by modern antinatalism can be meaningfully interpreted through Buddhist ethical thought.*
Methodology*: A qualitative, conceptual study was conducted using thematic analysis of canonical Buddhist texts and contemporary antinatalist literature, particularly David Benatar's asymmetry argument. Ethical hermeneutics guided the comparative interpretation.*
Research Findings*: Both traditions converge in viewing birth as morally problematic due to suffering, yet diverge in their ethical resolutions: antinatalism endorses non-procreation, whereas Buddhism advocates transcendence through liberation (nirvāṇa).*
Conclusion: *The study proposes 'spiritual antinatalism' as a middle position, grounded in non-maleficence and moral restraint, contributing to contemporary debates in bioethics and reproductive responsibility.*
Key Word: *Antinatalism; Buddhist ethics; Procreation; Non-maleficence; Reproductive responsibility.*

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I. Introduction

Is procreation a morally neutral choice, or does it raise serious ethical concerns in light of the inevitability of suffering? Within contemporary reproductive ethics, debates typically emphasise autonomy, parental responsibility, and harm prevention in relation to specific risks, such as genetic disorders or social disadvantage. Far less frequently is procreation itself subjected to systematic moral scrutiny. Antinatalist philosophy directly challenges this omission by questioning whether bringing new life into existence can ever be ethically justified given the pervasive and unavoidable character of human suffering[1].

Antinatalism maintains that procreation is morally problematic because it exposes a future person to harm without their consent. David Benatar's influential asymmetry argument contends that while the presence of pain is bad and the presence of pleasure is good, the absence of pain is good even when no one benefits from it, whereas the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived of it[2]. On this view, non-existence is morally preferable to existence, since it avoids harm without wronging anyone. This position has gained increasing attention in contemporary ethics, bioethics, and environmental philosophy, particularly in discussions of population ethics, climate change, and intergenerational responsibility[3].

Strikingly, concerns central to antinatalist reasoning resonate with themes found in Buddhist ethics. Buddhist philosophy identifies suffering (dukkha) as a fundamental characteristic of conditioned existence. According to the First Noble Truth, birth itself is suffering, initiating a cycle of aging, illness, loss, and death (samsāra) from which liberation is sought[3,4]. While Buddhism does not explicitly condemn procreation, it consistently frames attachment to existence, including familial and reproductive attachments, as a source of suffering that binds beings to cyclic rebirth. Ethical discipline, detachment, and insight are presented as means of minimising harm and ultimately transcending suffering altogether.

Despite these apparent parallels, the relationship between Buddhist ethics and modern antinatalism remains underexplored in contemporary scholarship. Existing studies tend to treat antinatalism as a product of modern secular pessimism, while Buddhist discussions of birth and suffering are often confined to religious or soteriological contexts. As a result, the ethical implications of procreation at the intersection of these traditions

have not been systematically analysed. This gap is particularly significant in light of growing bioethical concerns surrounding non-maleficence, reproductive responsibility, and environmental sustainability[5].

This paper addresses that gap by offering a comparative ethical analysis of Buddhist teachings on suffering and rebirth alongside contemporary antinatalist philosophy. Rather than treating Buddhism as simply endorsing non-existence, the analysis examines how Buddhist ethics conceptualise harm, responsibility, and moral restraint in relation to birth. In doing so, the paper critically evaluates whether antinatalist conclusions about the moral wrongness of procreation can be meaningfully interpreted within a Buddhist ethical framework, or whether fundamental philosophical differences limit such alignment.

Methodologically, the study adopts a qualitative, conceptual approach grounded in thematic analysis and ethical hermeneutics. Canonical Buddhist texts, including early discourses from the Pāli Canon, are examined alongside key antinatalist works, with particular attention to Benatar's asymmetry argument. Themes relating to suffering, moral responsibility, non-harm, and liberation are identified and comparatively analysed to clarify points of convergence and divergence between the two traditions.

The central argument advanced is that while Buddhism and antinatalism converge in recognising birth as ethically problematic due to the inevitability of suffering, they diverge in their proposed ethical resolutions. Antinatalism endorses non-procreation as a moral imperative aimed at preventing harm, whereas Buddhism prioritises liberation from suffering through ethical discipline and insight rather than the rejection of existence itself. On this basis, the paper introduces the notion of spiritual restraint, a form of ethical non-procreation grounded in non-maleficence and moral responsibility rather than nihilism, as a conceptual bridge between these perspectives.

By situating antinatalist arguments within a broader ethical and philosophical context, this study contributes to contemporary debates in bioethics and reproductive ethics. It challenges the assumption that procreation is morally neutral and invites renewed reflection on the ethical dimensions of reproductive choice, particularly in a world increasingly shaped by existential vulnerability, environmental crisis, and concerns about preventable suffering.

Objectives

1. To explore conceptual parallels between Buddhist teachings on suffering and modern antinatalist philosophy.
2. To examine ethical arguments concerning moral responsibility in procreation.
3. To analyse divergences between Buddhist liberation and antinatalist non-existence.
4. To assess environmental and non-harm considerations in reproductive ethics.

Research Questions

1. How do Buddhism and antinatalism conceptualise suffering in relation to birth?
2. What ethical arguments against procreation emerge from each framework?
3. How does liberation (nirvāṇa) differ from non-existence as a response to suffering?
4. Can Buddhism be interpreted as a form of spiritual antinatalism?

Antinatalism in Contemporary Ethical Theory

Antinatalism is the ethical position that bringing new sentient beings into existence is morally impermissible due to the harm inherent in existence itself. While pessimistic reflections on birth can be traced to ancient sources, antinatalism has been most systematically developed in contemporary philosophy through the work of David Benatar. In Better Never to Have Been, Benatar (2006) argues that coming into existence is always a harm, irrespective of the quality of life a person may experience.

Central to Benatar's position is the asymmetry argument, which distinguishes between the moral significance of pain and pleasure. According to this argument, the presence of pain is bad and the presence of pleasure is good; however, the absence of pain is good even when there is no subject to benefit from it, whereas the absence of pleasure is not bad unless someone is deprived of it. This asymmetry implies that non-existence avoids harm without constituting a deprivation, thereby rendering procreation morally unjustifiable[2].

Benatar's position has generated extensive debate within moral philosophy and bioethics. Critics have challenged the asymmetry on grounds ranging from hypothetical consent to comparative accounts of harm[6]. Others have questioned whether non-existence can meaningfully be said to be "better" for anyone at all. Nevertheless, even critical engagements acknowledge that antinatalism raises a serious challenge to the assumption that procreation is morally neutral or inherently permissible[7].

Beyond its metaphysical claims, antinatalism has increasingly been discussed in applied ethical contexts. In bioethics, it intersects with debates on non-maleficence, reproductive responsibility, and the moral limits of parental autonomy[8]. In environmental ethics, antinatalist arguments have been invoked in discussions of overpopulation, climate change, and intergenerational justice, where reducing birth rates is framed as a means of minimising future harm[9].

Reproductive Ethics and the Principle of Non-Maleficence

Within mainstream reproductive ethics, procreation is typically regarded as a personal right grounded in autonomy and freedom of choice. Ethical scrutiny tends to focus on specific conditions under which reproduction may be morally questionable, such as cases involving severe genetic disorders, foreseeable suffering, or social injustice[1]. The principle of non-maleficence—commonly formulated as the obligation to avoid causing harm—plays a central role in these debates.

Antinatalist philosophy extends the scope of non-maleficence beyond particular risks to encompass existence itself. From this perspective, procreation is ethically problematic not because it may result in harm, but because it inevitably does so. Since future persons cannot consent to being brought into existence, the imposition of suffering raises questions about moral responsibility and justification[6]. This extension of non-maleficence challenges dominant bioethical frameworks that prioritise autonomy over harm avoidance.

Recent bioethical discussions have begun to acknowledge this challenge, particularly in relation to climate ethics and sustainability. If reproductive choices contribute cumulatively to environmental degradation and intergenerational suffering, then procreation may warrant moral evaluation not only at the individual level but also within broader ethical and social contexts[9].

Buddhist Ethics: Suffering, Birth, and Moral Responsibility

Buddhist ethical thought is grounded in the recognition of suffering (dukkha) as a defining feature of conditioned existence. The Four Noble Truths articulate suffering as arising from birth, aging, sickness, death, and attachment to impermanent phenomena[3,4]. Within this framework, birth is not celebrated as an unequivocal good but is understood as the initial condition that enables the continuation of suffering through samsāra, the cycle of rebirth.

Unlike antinatalism, Buddhism does not frame existence itself as a harm to be avoided through non-existence. Instead, it proposes liberation (nirvāṇa) as the cessation of suffering, achieved through ethical conduct, mental discipline, and insight into impermanence and non-self (anattā)[10]. Nevertheless, Buddhist teachings consistently encourage detachment from worldly desires, including attachment to lineage, reproduction, and identity, particularly within monastic and renunciatory contexts.

The ethical principle of ahimsa (non-harm) further reinforces Buddhist concern with minimising suffering. While Buddhism does not explicitly prohibit procreation, it frames ethical life as one oriented toward compassion, restraint, and the reduction of harm to all sentient beings. Scholars have noted that this ethical orientation can give rise to critical reflection on reproduction, especially when birth is understood as perpetuating suffering rather than alleviating it[5,9].

Buddhism and Antinatalism: Points of Convergence and Tension

Despite their distinct metaphysical commitments, Buddhist ethics and antinatalist philosophy converge in their shared recognition of suffering as central to moral evaluation. Both question the assumption that existence is inherently beneficial and both emphasise responsibility for preventable harm. However, they diverge sharply in their ethical conclusions. Antinatalism treats non-procreation as a moral imperative aimed at preventing harm through non-existence, whereas Buddhism maintains a teleological orientation toward liberation rather than annihilation.

Existing scholarship has rarely brought these perspectives into sustained dialogue. Where comparisons are made, Buddhism is often portrayed either as implicitly antinatalist or as fundamentally incompatible with antinatalist conclusions due to its soteriological aims. This lack of systematic comparative analysis leaves open important questions about how Buddhist ethics might inform contemporary debates on reproductive responsibility, non-maleficence, and bioethics more broadly.

II. Methodology

This This study adopts a qualitative, conceptual methodology grounded in thematic analysis and ethical hermeneutics. Canonical Buddhist texts (e.g., Dhammapada, Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta) and contemporary antinatalist literature were purposively selected based on their relevance to suffering, birth, and moral responsibility.

Following Braun and Clarke's six-phase thematic analysis, key ethical themes were identified, refined, and interpreted comparatively. The study is normative and interpretative in nature and does not involve empirical data or human participants.

Research Design

This study adopts a qualitative, conceptual research design grounded in comparative ethical analysis. Rather than reporting empirical data, the paper examines normative arguments and ethical frameworks in order to clarify conceptual relationships between contemporary antinatalist philosophy and Buddhist ethical thought.

This approach is appropriate given the philosophical nature of the research problem and the absence of measurable variables. The study is positioned within normative ethics and applied bioethics, with an interdisciplinary orientation that integrates philosophy of religion and comparative ethics.

Sources and Data Selection

The primary sources for antinatalist philosophy include peer-reviewed philosophical literature, with particular emphasis on David Benatar's formulation of the asymmetry argument and subsequent scholarly critiques and developments. Secondary sources consist of contemporary discussions in bioethics and reproductive ethics addressing non-maleficence, procreative responsibility, and harm prevention.

For Buddhist ethics, the analysis draws on canonical texts (including selected suttas of the Pāli Canon) as well as authoritative secondary scholarship in Buddhist philosophy and ethics. The selected sources focus on core doctrinal concepts relevant to the study, including dukkha (suffering), samsāra (cycle of rebirth), nirvāṇa (liberation), and ahimsa (non-harm).

All sources were selected based on their relevance, scholarly credibility, and contribution to contemporary ethical debate. Non-academic, popular, or para-scientific sources were excluded.

Analytical Framework

The study employs thematic analysis as an interpretive tool to identify recurring ethical concerns across both traditions. Key themes include suffering, harm prevention, moral responsibility, consent, and the ethical evaluation of birth. These themes were not imposed a priori but emerged through close reading of the selected texts.

Ethical hermeneutics guides the comparative interpretation. Rather than assuming equivalence between philosophical and religious frameworks, the analysis respects their distinct ontological and soteriological commitments while examining functional similarities and divergences in ethical reasoning. This method allows for comparison without reductionism or doctrinal conflation.

Comparative Procedure

The analysis proceeds in three stages:

1. Reconstruction of Arguments

Core antinatalist arguments and Buddhist ethical positions concerning birth and suffering are reconstructed in their strongest formulations.

2. Comparative Evaluation

Points of convergence and divergence are identified with respect to non-maleficence, moral restraint, and the ethical status of procreation.

3. Conceptual Synthesis

On the basis of this comparison, the paper introduces the concept of "spiritual antinatalism" as a heuristic proposal rather than a doctrinal claim.

III. Research Findings

The comparative analysis of contemporary antinatalist philosophy and Buddhist ethical thought yielded four central thematic findings. These findings clarify both the ethical overlap between the two traditions and the limits of their compatibility.

Birth as a Moral Problem Grounded in Suffering

Both antinatalist philosophy and Buddhist ethics identify suffering as a morally salient feature of existence. In antinatalist thought, suffering is understood as an unavoidable consequence of being brought into existence, encompassing physical pain, psychological distress, illness, aging, and death. Because these harms are inherent rather than contingent, procreation is framed as a morally problematic act that introduces a new subject to foreseeable suffering without consent[2].

Buddhist ethics similarly recognises suffering (dukkha) as intrinsic to conditioned existence. Canonical teachings explicitly describe birth as the initial condition for subsequent forms of suffering. The Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta states: "Birth is suffering, aging is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering". From this perspective, birth is not morally neutral but is embedded within the broader problem of saṃsāra, the ongoing cycle of rebirth, dissatisfaction, and impermanence. Buddhist metaphors portraying rebirth as entrapment—such as the image of a burning house—reinforce the view that existence is a condition from which liberation is sought rather than one to be perpetuated[3,4,7].

This shared emphasis on suffering establishes a foundational point of convergence between the two traditions.

Divergent Ethical Responses to Suffering

Despite this convergence, the ethical responses proposed by antinatalism and Buddhism diverge in fundamental ways. Antinatalism advances a preventative ethical solution: suffering should be avoided by refraining from creating new lives. Non-procreation is therefore interpreted as a morally obligatory act grounded in harm avoidance and responsibility toward potential persons[2].

By contrast, Buddhist ethics does not treat non-existence as a moral goal. Rather than preventing birth as such, Buddhism seeks to transform the conditions that give rise to suffering. Liberation (nirvāṇa) represents the cessation of suffering through ethical conduct, mental discipline, and insight into impermanence and non-self. Ethical evaluation is thus oriented toward personal and collective transformation rather than the elimination of existence[3,11].

This divergence reflects deeper metaphysical differences. Antinatalism presupposes a secular evaluative framework in which existence is assessed primarily in terms of harm and benefit, whereas Buddhism embeds ethical reasoning within a soteriological framework oriented toward liberation from suffering.

Non-Maleficence and Moral Restraint

A further point of convergence emerges around the principle of non-maleficence. Antinatalist arguments are grounded in the claim that procreation violates the obligation to avoid causing harm, since existence inevitably involves suffering. From this perspective, moral responsibility extends to actions that foreseeably impose harm, even when such actions are socially normalised[2,6]. The impossibility of obtaining consent from an unborn individual further complicates the moral legitimacy of procreation.

Buddhist ethics similarly emphasises restraint and non-harm (ahimsa) as central moral virtues. While this principle is most explicitly applied to intentional acts such as killing or violence, its broader ethical orientation encourages minimisation of suffering wherever possible. In this sense, reproductive restraint can be interpreted as ethically meaningful, particularly when procreation is motivated by desire, attachment, or social expectation rather than compassion.

However, Buddhism stops short of framing procreation as intrinsically harmful. Moral responsibility is assessed primarily in relation to intention and mental states rather than outcomes alone.

Reframing Antinatalism as a Spiritual-Ethical Position

The final finding concerns the possibility of a conceptual synthesis. While Buddhism does not endorse antinatalism in its strict philosophical form, its ethical emphasis on suffering, restraint, and liberation allows for a reinterpretation of antinatalist concerns within a spiritual framework.

This reinterpretation does not entail a rejection of existence but instead promotes voluntary restraint from procreation as an ethically reflective choice rather than a universal moral prohibition. Environmental considerations further strengthen this position. Buddhist commitments to ahiṃsā and moderation align with contemporary antinatalist arguments linking population growth to ecological degradation and collective suffering[10].

Within this context, the concept of spiritual antinatalism emerges as a middle position: one that acknowledges the moral seriousness of bringing new life into a world characterised by suffering while avoiding the nihilistic implications often attributed to antinatalism. Non-procreation is thus reframed as an expression of compassion, non-attachment, and responsibility rather than as a categorical moral demand. A structured table comparing (see Table 1) key concepts between Buddhism and Antinatalism.

Table no 1: Comparison: Buddhism vs. Antinatalism

Aspect	Buddhism	Antinatalism	Aspect	Buddhism	Antinatalism	Aspect
View on Existence	Life is suffering (Dukkha)	Existence is a net harm	View on Existence	Life is suffering (Dukkha)	Existence is a net harm	View on Existence
Solution of Suffering	Attain Nirvana (liberation from rebirth	Avoiding birth (non-existence)	Solution of Suffering	Attain Nirvana (liberation from rebirth	Avoiding birth (non-existence)	Solution of Suffering
View of Rebirth	Suffering exists and Rebirth is undisirable but can be transcended	Existence is inherently harmful. (No Rebirth=No Suffering)	View of Rebirth	Suffering exists and Rebirth is undisirable but can be transcended	Existence is inherently harmful. (No Rebirth=No Suffering)	View of Rebirth

Ethical Stance on Procreation	Encourages detachment, but does not explicitly forbid procreation	Rejects procreation as unethical. (Moral obligation to avoid procreation)	Ethical Stance on Procreation	Encourages detachment, but does not explicitly forbid procreation	Rejects procreation as unethical. (Moral obligation to avoid procreation)	Ethical Stance on Procreation
Ultimate Goal	End of Samsara (rebirth cycle)	Prevention of suffering through non-existence	Ultimate Goal	End of Samsara (rebirth cycle)	Prevention of suffering through non-existence	Ultimate Goal
Environmental Concern	Emphasizes non-violence (Ahimsa)	Advocates reducing population burden	Environmental Concern	Emphasizes non-violence (Ahimsa)	Advocates reducing population burden	Environmental Concern

While both perspectives aim to eliminate suffering, Buddhism focuses on transcendence, whereas Antinatalism sees non-existence as the only solution. Some scholars argue that Antinatalism aligns with extreme Buddhist renunciation, while others highlight their ethical differences (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Thematic Alignment between Buddhism and Antinatalism

IV. Discussion

The comparative analysis presented in this paper contributes to ongoing ethical debates concerning procreation, suffering, and moral responsibility by placing contemporary antinatalist philosophy in dialogue with Buddhist ethical thought. While the two traditions operate within distinct philosophical and metaphysical frameworks, their shared concern with suffering allows for a productive ethical comparison that challenges dominant assumptions in reproductive ethics.

Ethical Dialogue between Antinatalism and Buddhist Thought

The comparative analysis presented in this study contributes to ongoing ethical debates concerning procreation, suffering, and moral responsibility by placing contemporary antinatalist philosophy in dialogue with Buddhist ethical thought. Although these traditions operate within distinct metaphysical frameworks, their shared recognition of suffering as a morally significant feature of existence enables a productive ethical comparison that challenges dominant assumptions in reproductive ethics[11,12].

Antinatalist philosophy treats suffering as an unavoidable consequence of existence and therefore regards procreation as a morally problematic act that imposes harm on non-consenting individuals[2,3,9]. Buddhist ethics similarly identifies suffering (dukkha) as intrinsic to conditioned existence, but situates this problem within a soteriological framework oriented toward liberation rather than prevention of birth[4,5]. This distinction marks the central ethical divergence between existential negation and spiritual liberation.

Ethical Implications for Reproductive Responsibility

One of the central implications of this study is the reframing of procreation as a morally significant act rather than a morally neutral default. Antinatalist philosophy emphasises the ethical weight of foreseeable suffering, while Buddhist ethics highlights the role of attachment, desire, and ignorance in perpetuating suffering

through saṃsāra[4,11]. Together, these perspectives support a more cautious and reflective approach to reproduction, particularly in contexts characterised by social instability, environmental degradation, and structural injustice.



Figure 2: Buddhist Samsara vs. Antinatalism Cycle

The concept of spiritual antinatalism proposed in this study does not advance universal non-procreation as a moral demand. Instead, it encourages voluntary ethical restraint grounded in compassion, non-maleficence (ahiṃsā), and responsibility. This position aligns with bioethical approaches that prioritise harm prevention without undermining individual autonomy[8,13]. By shifting ethical emphasis from reproductive entitlement to moral accountability, spiritual antinatalism offers a normative framework through which reproductive decisions may be ethically evaluated without coercion (see Figure 2).

Environmental Ethics and Collective Responsibility

Environmental considerations further reinforce the ethical convergence between Buddhist ethics and antinatalist reasoning. Antinatalist environmental ethics argue that population growth exacerbates ecological degradation and climate-related suffering, supporting reduced birth rates as a means of harm mitigation[14,15]. Buddhist ethics similarly emphasises moderation, non-harm, and interdependence, extending moral concern beyond immediate human interests to future generations and non-human life[16].

Empirical analyses linking population size to environmental impact provide additional ethical context for reproductive restraint[17,18]. Historical cases such as China's One-Child Policy illustrate the ethical complexity of state-enforced population control, demonstrating both the potential ecological benefits and the moral risks associated with coercive reproductive policies. Contemporary discourse therefore increasingly favours voluntary non-procreation as an ethically preferable alternative to state intervention[19,20].

Addressing Philosophical and Religious Objections

Several objections arise from both secular and religious perspectives. From a secular standpoint, critics may argue that incorporating Buddhist ethics risks introducing religious norms into bioethical reasoning. However, this study does not treat Buddhism as a doctrinal authority, but rather as a source of ethical insight that can be articulated in non-theistic terms, particularly regarding suffering, harm reduction, and restraint[10,12].

Conversely, within Buddhist traditions, antinatalist interpretations may appear incompatible with teachings that value human birth as an opportunity for liberation. Strict antinatalism may be seen as undermining the ethical significance of existence itself. The concept of spiritual antinatalism addresses this concern by rejecting metaphysical claims about the intrinsic superiority of non-existence and instead emphasising ethical intention, motivation, and compassion[11].

A further unresolved challenge concerns the moral status of non-existence and the role of consent. While antinatalism treats non-consensual birth as morally decisive[2], Buddhist ethics does not operate within a consent-based moral framework. This raises open philosophical questions regarding whether harm can be meaningfully attributed to potential persons and how far moral responsibility extends in the absence of a subject[10,16].

Limitations of the Study

This study is subject to several limitations. First, it relies exclusively on conceptual and textual analysis and does not incorporate empirical data on reproductive decision-making. Second, Buddhist ethics is examined primarily through canonical and philosophical sources, which may not fully reflect the diversity of lived Buddhist practices across cultural contexts. Third, spiritual antinatalism is introduced as a heuristic framework rather than a fully developed normative theory.

Open questions and Further Research

Future research could extend this comparative framework in several directions. Empirical studies may investigate whether ethical restraint in reproduction is present within Buddhist communities and how such decisions are justified in practice. Comparative philosophical analyses could also include other traditions that problematise birth and suffering, such as Schopenhauerian pessimism or Hindu ascetic ethics.

Further normative work is also needed to clarify the place of spiritual antinatalism within applied bioethics, particularly with respect to public policy, environmental ethics, and intergenerational justice. Developing ethical models that operationalise non-maleficence without coercion remains a key challenge for future scholarship.

V. Conclusion

This paper has examined whether contemporary antinatalist philosophy can be meaningfully interpreted through the lens of Buddhist ethical thought. While the two traditions diverge in their metaphysical commitments and ethical aims, they converge in recognising suffering as a morally decisive feature of existence. Antinatalism frames non-procreation as a preventative response to inevitable harm, whereas Buddhism offers liberation through ethical discipline and insight rather than the rejection of existence itself.

By proposing the concept of spiritual antinatalism, this study offers a middle position that integrates harm avoidance with ethical restraint without endorsing nihilism or denying the possibility of liberation. In doing so, it contributes to ongoing debates in bioethics and reproductive ethics by challenging the assumption that procreation is ethically unproblematic. The analysis invites further reflection on the moral responsibilities associated with bringing new life into a world marked by suffering, ecological vulnerability, and ethical complexity.

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